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RIGHTS OF THE USUFRUCTUARY;
LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE LAW
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
Articles 544-556 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 deal
comprehensively with the rights of the usufructuary, i.e., his
enjoyment of the property subject to usufruct and his legal
powers vis-a-vis the naked owner and third persons. These ar-
ticles, deriving from the reservoir of the civilian tradition, have,
for the most part, exact equivalents in foreign civil codes. The
following discussion is devoted to an analysis of the rights of the
usufructuary under the laws of Louisiana, France, Germany,
and Greece.
I. THE USUFRUCTUARY'S RIGHT OF ENJOYMENT
1. Use of the Thing
The usufructuary's right of enjoyment comprises, in all legal
systems under consideration, two elements: the right to use the
thing and the right to draw its fruits.' The usufructuary's right
to use the thing is as extensive as that of an owner. Article
597 of the French Civil Code provides expressly that the usu-
fructuary "enjoys... generally all the rights that the owner may
enjoy, and he enjoys them as the owner himself.' ' 2 Article 554
of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 corresponds in part to article
597 of the French Civil Code but does not assimilate the usu-
fructuary's enjoyment to that of an owner. 3 Nevertheless, it
ought to be accepted that, in principle, the usufructuary in Lou-
isiana as well as in other civil law jurisdictions is entitled to use
the thing as the owner himself.
The extent of the right of use is determined by the nature of
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 533, 535 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 578;
B.G.B. §§ 1030, 1068(2); GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1142.
2. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 579. Accordingly, the usufructuary has fishing and
hunting rights on the land subject -to usufruct. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITP,
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 768 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
3. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 554 (1870) : "The usufructuary enjoys the rights
of servitudes, ways or others due to the inheritance of which he has the usufruct;
and if this inheritance is inclosed within the other lands of him who has es-
tablished such usufruct, a way must be gratuitously furnished to the usufructuary
by the owner of the land or by his heirs." Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE. art. 547 (1825)
La. Civil Code p. 114, art. 20 (1808).
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the things subject to usufruct and by prevailing conceptions in
society. The usufructuary of non-consumable things does not
have the right to abuse these things or to dispose of them; on
the contrary he is under obligation to preserve their substance
and destination.4  But the usufructuary of consumables, having
merely an imperfect usufruct, is accorded by the law the power
of disposition as owner. 5
4. See LA. CIVIL CODE artV. 53M, 534(1), 535 (1870): FRENCH CIVIL CODE
art. 578; B.G.B. § 1037; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1142. In Germany, the usu-
fructuary may be given by the grantor the right to dispose of things subject to per-
fect usufruct. Further, the usufructuary is entitled by law to dispose of things in-
cluded in a perfect usufruct under the terms of section 1048(1) of the Civil Code.
See BAUR, LEHRBUCH DES SACHENRECHTS 261 (2d ed. 1963).
The grantor in Louisiana may expressly accord to the usufructuary of non-
consumable things the right to sell, in which case the usufruct may be converted
from perfect into imperfect at the option of the usufructuary. In Heirs of Mitchel
v. Knox, 34 La. Ann. 399, 401-402 (1882), testator left to his wife the usufruct
of his immovable property and conferred upon her power to sell the property subject
to usufruct. The court interpreted the will correctly, as follows: "Mrs. Mitchel
had the option to exercise her right of usufruct on her husband's immovables,
directly, or by provoking a sale of the same at public auction, to have her usu-
fruct established on the proceeds of the sale. If she elected to exercise her usu-
fruct on the property itself, she would have been subjected to the rules of perfect
usufruct, under which she could not acquire title to the property which she was
legally bound to restore to the owners at the termination of the usufruct. If, on
the other hand, she chose, as she did, to have the property sold, to enjoy the usu-
fruct of the proceeds of the sale, she was governed by the rules of the imperfect
usufruct, under which she became owner, of the fund, subject to the obligation
of accounting for the same to the heirs and legatees of the husband, at the ex-
piration of the usufruct." See also Michel v. Beale, 10 La. Ann. 352 (1855)
(testamentary usufruct with power of disposition ; perfect usufruct converted into
imperfect). But cf. Giroir v. Dumesnil, 184 So. 2d 1 (La. 1966). Testator in this
case left the usufruct of his estate to his widow with power to "enjoy and
dispose of as she pleases, and as a thing belonging to her." The widow sold
the property and her successors in title claimed that she had been bequeathed
ownership rather than usufruct; accordingly, she could validly convey ownership.
Heirs of the husband, on the other hand, claimed that the widow had been merely
given the usufruct of the property and any inconsistent language should be disre-
garded. The court held, as a matter of will construction, that the widow had merely
been given ownership rather than usufruct; accordingly, she could convey valid
title. It is submitted that the court should interpret the will as in the Heir8 of
Mitchel case, supra. The testator had clearly granted to the usufructuary an
option to convert the perfect usufruct into imperfect; accordingly, she had
authority to convey title.
5. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 534(2), 536, 549 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE
art. 587; B.G.B. § 1067; GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 1174, 1175. In Louisiana, the
grantor may relieve the usufructuary of things subject to imperfect usufruct of
the obligation to account for their value to the naked owner. In other words,
the naked owner may be given a right to whatever is left of a fund at the end
of the usufruct. See In rc Courtin, 144 La. 971, 81 So. 457 (1919). The testator
in this case directed that his property be sold and the proceeds be invested in an
interest bearing account. His sister was granted a usufruct thereon, with the
right to draw, in addition to interests, $40 per month from the principal for life.
Legal heirs attacked the will on the ground that it established a forbidden fidei-
commissum and a tenure unknown to civil law. The court held correctly that the
will was valid. The testator had presently vested in the naked owner the owner-
ship of whatever might remain of the principal at the death of the usufructuary.
Indeed, there is no reason why this type of bequest should not be given effect. The
usufructuary, by virtue of his imperfect usufruct, becomes owner of ,the fund and
is free to dispose of it as he pleases; the provision allowing him to touch the prin-
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The right of the usufructuary extends to all accessories of
the thing at the time of the creation of the usufruct.6 Further,
according to both the Louisiana and the French Civil Codes, the
right of the usufructuary extends to "the increase brought by
alluvion to the land of which he has the usufruct. ' '7 But the
usufructuary's right of enjoyment does not extend to islands
formed in the middle of the stream," nor to a tract of land carried
away from an adjoining field by a sudden eruption (avulsion).9
2. Right to Fruits
The right of the usufructuary to draw the fruits of the thing
is the principal characteristic of usufruct. This right may be
exercised by the usufructuary personally or through other per-
sons, like servants, agents, or lessees.1
a. Notion and Kinds of Fruits
The provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 concern-
ing fruits are almost identical with those of the French Civil
Code. Both Codes distinguish fruits into natural fruits, fruits
of industry, and civil fruits. Natural fruits are "the spontaneous
cipal has no meaning other than to relieve him of the obligation to account to the
naked owner at the end of the usufruct. Seen in another light, the disposition con-
fers on the usufructuary an imperfect usufruct plus true ownership of a portion
of the principal.
6. See Peters v. Fonville, 70 So. 2d 209 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954). The proposi-
tion in the text may be regarded as founded on an expansive interpretation of
articles 553 and 554, and on application by analogy of articles 1636 and 2490,
of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. See 3 PLANIOL ET RiPET, TRAITA PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 769 (2d ed. Picard 1952), relying in part on analogous
application of articles 1018 and 1615 of the French Civil Code, corresponding to
articles 1636 and 2490 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. See also B.G.B.
§ 1031: "By virtue of the usufruct of a tract of land the usufructuary acquires
the usufruct of its accessories under the provisions of Section 926 applicable to
the acquisition of ownership"; Id. §§ 93-96 (component parts) ; WOLFF-RAISER,
SACHENRECHT 466 (10th ed. 1957). For Greek law, see CIVIL CODE arts. 953-966;
BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 342 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
7. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 553(l) (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 596.
8. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 553(1) (1870). Doctrinal writers in France have
reached the same conclusion, even in the absence of a corresponding provision
in the French Civil Code. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITP PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANVAIS 769 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; 2 AunRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRAN-
CAIS 661 (7th ed. Esmein 1961). But cf. 10 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DE LA DISTINC-
TION DES BIENS 282 (1875).
9. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPFRT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 769
(2d ed. Picard 1952) ; 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DaOIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 661 (7th cd. Es-
mein 1961). But see 10 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITL' DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 281
(1875). It may be argued that avulsion is not an accessory of the land subject
to usufruct. Further, if the tract of land which has been carried away is sus-
ceptible of identification, its owner may reclaim it. See LA. CIVIL CODE art.
511 (1870). When this happens, the usufructuary is clearly without any rights
as to this tract of land which belongs to a third person.
10. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 555 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 595; B.G.B.
§ 1059; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1166.
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product of the earth" and "the product and increase of cattle."'"
Fruits of industry are those "obtained by cultivation" as a result
of "industry bestowed on a piece of. ground. 1 2 Civil fruits are
"rents of real property, the interest of money, and annuities"
as well as "all other kinds of revenue derived from property by
operation of the law or private agreement.' 3
Neither the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 nor the French Civil
Code defines the generic term "fruits." The definition accepted
by courts and writers in France is that fruits are things which
are produced periodically by a principal thing without diminu-
tion of its substance.1 4 This definition distinguishes fruits from
"products" (produits) which are derived from a principal thing
whose substance is thereby diminished. Once separated, products
are not reproduced. The significance of this distinction in
French law is that, in this way, the rights of the usufructuary
are confined, in principle, to revenues produced by a thing
periodically and without diminution of its substance while the
owner is accorded the right to obtain all products. 5  Thus,
stones extracted from a quarry not regularly exploited and trees
cut down without any plan of exploitation are products rather
than fruits. The owner of a thing, however, may by his inten-
tion and regular exploitation attribute the quality of fruits to
component parts of the ground. Accordingly, the products of
a regularly exploited quarry or forest are classified as fruits.I"
It is apparent, therefore, that the classification of certain things
as fruits in French law depends either on their intrinsic char-
acteristics or on the will of the owner. I T
In interpreting the corresponding provisions of the Louisiana
Civil Code in this area, Louisiana courts have frequently fol-
lowed French doctrine and jurisprudence. The distinction be-
tween "fruits" and "products," however, has not been accepted.
11. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 545(1) (1870) FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 583(1).
12. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 545(2) (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 583(2).
13. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 545(3) and (4) (1870); FRENCH CIVIL CODE art.
584. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 499 (1870).
14. See 2 CABBONNIEB, DROIT CIVIL 63 (1957) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 255 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; 2 AUBRY ET RAU,
DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 254 (7th ed. Esmein 1961).
15. The broad language of a number of articles in the French Civil Code con-
ferring upon certain persons the right to obtain "fruits" needed to be limited to
revenues produced periodically and without diminution of the substance of the
principal thing. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 20 (1966).
16. See 3 CARBONNIER, DRO1T CIVIL 64 (1957) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIt
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 256, 770 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; 2 AUBRY ET
RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 255 (7th ed. Esmein 1961) ; 2 COLIN, CAPITANT ET
JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIfrEE, TRAIT9 DE DROIT CIVIL 37 (1959).
17. For an excellent analysis, see Labb, Note, 8.1878.1.7.
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On the contrary, Louisiana courts have declared that the word
"products" in the Civil Code has the same meaning as the word
"fruits."'8  As a result, a different conceptual apparatus has
had to be employed for the apportionment of economic advan-
tages between the owner of a thing and other persons entitled
to "fruits" as usufructuaries, possessors in good or bad faith,
or as spouses living under the regime of community property.' 9
And, instead of a unitary notion of fruits for all purposes, Lou-
isiana courts have adopted different notions of fruits for dif-
ferent purposes. 2° With regard to the rights of the usufructuary,
Louisiana courts established the proposition that under article
533 of the Civil Code fruits are only things "born and reborn
of the soil." -  Accordingly, the usufructuary is not entitled to
products resulting from a depletion of the land such as timber
and mineral substances, except as provided in articles 551 and
552 of the Civil Code.22
In the complex scheme of the German Civil Code, "fruits"
are treated as a species of the generic concept "profits.' 23 Fruits
are subdivided into fruits of things and fruits of rights, direct
or indirect. Prior to the enactment of the Civil Code, fruits were
conceived of in Germany as periodically recurring economic ad-
vantages obtained from a thing according to its destination and
without diminution of its substance. The German Civil Code,
however, enlarged the notion of fruits by abandoning the re-
quirement of preservation of the substance in all cases, and in
the case of organic products, the requirement of production ac-
cording to destination. 24 This broad notion of fruits in the Ger-
man Civil Code made necessary the enactment of specific provi-
sions limiting the right of certain persons to the acquisition of
fruits produced according to the destination of the thing and
not resulting in diminution of its substance. 25
The usufructuary of a corporeal object is entitled to all its
profits, i.e., natural and civil fruits as well as all other advan-
18. See Harang v. Bowie Lumber Co., 145 La. 96, 81 So. 769 (1919) ; Elder
v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914).
19. See YIANNOPOULOS, CivIL LAW PROPERTY § 20, text at notes 138-165 (1966).
20. Id. § 20, text at notes 148-158 (relations among possessors and revendi-
eating owners) ; text at notes 159-162 (community property) ; text at note 162
(severance tax).
21. Elder v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 995. 66 So. 337, 337 (1914).
22. See text at notes 73, 97 infra: King v. Buffington, 240 La. 955, 126 So. 2d
326 (1961) ; Gueno v. Medlenka, 238 La. 1081, 117 So. 2d 817 (1960) ; Elder v.
Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914).
23. See YIANNOPOULOS, CiviL LAW PROPERTY § 21, text at notes 170-181
(1966).
24. See B.G.B. § 99.
25. Id. §§ 581, 993, 1039, 2133.
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tages of use.26 The usufructuary acquires the ownership of all
natural fruits upon separation. 27 But if these fruits are produced
contrary to the rules of orderly management or as a result of
the destructive forces of nature, the usufructuary must account
for the value of the fruits so produced to the naked owner upon
the termination of the usufruct. Further, if the usufructuary
is at fault, the naked owner has an action for damages during
the existence of the usufruct or an action for accounting upon
its termination. In all cases the usufructuary is required to
furnish security for the fulfillment of his obligations. 28 Fur-
ther, the usufructuary is entitled to draw the civil fruits of the
thing as of the creation of the usufruct. He may lease the thing
and collect the rent or if the thing is already leased by the owner
be may claim the rent from a lessee who has knowledge of the
creation of the usufruct. 29 Likewise, the usufructuary of a right
is entitled to all profits in accordance with the nature of the
right subject to usufruct.30 For example, the usufructuary of
an interest-bearing credit is entitled to collect interest as of the
day of the creation of the usufruct.3'
The Greek Civil Code, following the pattern of Roman-Byzan-
tine law, distinguishes fruits into natural and civil. 32 In addi-
tion, following the German Civil Code, the Greek Civil Code
establishes the categories of "fruits of things" and "fruits of
rights," and introduces the notion of "profits."33 According
to the Greek Code, fruits of things are organic products, ad-
vantages obtained according to the destination of a thing, and
any revenues the thing may produce by operation of law or by
virtue of a legal relation. According to the prevailing view, or-
ganic products are regarded as fruits only if the substance of
the principal thing is preserved.34 The destination of a thing
as fruit producing is determined by reference to its nature, pre-
vailing conceptions in society, and the intention of the parties
26. Id. § 1030; WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 465, 466 (10th ed. 1957).
27. See B.G.B. § 954.
28. Id. § 1039; cf. R.G. Oct. 16, 1912, 80 R.G.Z. 229, 232.
29. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACIENRECHT 465 (10th ed. 1957) ; 3, 2 STAUDINGER-
SPRENG, KOMMENTAR ZUm B.G.B. 1166 (11th ed. 1963) ; R.G. Nov. 2, 1912, 80
R.G.Z. 311, 316; R.G. May 27, 1929, 124 R.G.Z. 325, 329. See also text at notes
41, 59 infra.
30. See B.G.B. § 1068(2) ; WOLFF-RAISER, SACIIENRECHT 483 (10th ed. 1957).
31. See 3, 2 STAUDINGER-SP'RENG, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 1166 (11th ed.
1963) ; text at notes 50, 214 infra.
32. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 961; YL4NNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 21,
text at notes 182-185 (1966).
3.3. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 962.




to a transaction. Fruits of rights are royalties and interests
deriving from rights other than ownership. Under the Greek
Civil Code, the usufructuary is entitled to all profits of the thing
or right subject to the usufruct. Since, however, the notion of
fruits is limited by the requirement of production according to
the destination of the principal thing or right,35 the usufructuary
does not become owner of emoluments produced contrary to the
rules of orderly management or as a result of the destructive
forces of nature; these emoluments belong to the owner.3
b. Mode of Acquisition of Fruits
Neither the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 nor the French Civil
Code provides expressly for the mode of acquisition of natural
and civil fruits by the usufructuary.
Question thus arises as to whether the usufructuary acquires
the ownership of natural fruits produced by the thing subject
to usufruct by collection, i.e., acquisition of possession, or merely
upon separation from the principal thing. French doctrine and
jurisprudence, drawing arguments from articles 520 and 585 of
the Code Civil (corresponding to articles 465 and 546 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870), decide that the usufructuary ac-
quires the ownership of natural fruits upon their separation. 7
It is submitted that the same rule ought to apply in Louisiana.
The German and the Greek Civil Codes provide expressly that
the usufructuary, as any other person entitled to fruits by
virtue of a real right, acquires the ownership of natural fruits
upon separation.3"
Civil fruits, accruing by virtue of an obligation, involve dis-
35. GREEK CIVIL CODE, art. 961.
36. See GREEK CIWL CODE art. 1150: "Fruits collected by the usufructuary
contrary to rules of orderly management or as a result of extraordinary events
belong, as to the excess, to the naked owner." But cf. B.G.B. § 1039, text at note
28 supra, establishing a different rule.
37. See 2 AURRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 255, 655 (7th ed. Esmein
1961) ; 10 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITP, DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 230 (1875). But of.
3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITII PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 772 (2d ed.
Picard 1952) (collection rather than separation). Article 546 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870, discussed text at note 51 infra, provides that "natural fruits...
hanging by branches or roots at the time when the usufruct is open, belong to the
usufructuary." This does not mean that the usufructuary becomes owner, upon
the creation of the usufruct, of hanging natural fruits. These fruits, until separa-
tion, are component parts of the ground and immovables by nature owned by the
landower by right of accession. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 465 (1870). They "belong"
to the usufructuary merely in the sense that the usufructuary is entitled to ac-
quire ownership upon separation or collection during the existence of his usu-
fruct. See 2 MARCADtl, EXPLICATION THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CODE NA-
POLtoN 456 (1852)
38. See B.G.B. § 954; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1065.
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tinct considerations. According to traditional civilian ideas,
maintained in certain modern civil codes, 39 the usufructuary
acquires a "claim" to such fruits rather than "ownership" there-
of.40 Analytically, the creation of the usufruct operates as an
assignment of credits: the usufructuary is now entitled to col-
lect from the obligor but the obligor who has no knowledge of
the creation of the usufruct may validly be discharged by pay-
ment to the naked owner. In this case, as well as in case the
naked owner has collected civil fruits in advance for the period
of the usufruct, the usufructuary's claim is addressed against
the naked owner for accounting. These solutions are sanctioned
by the German and Greek Civil Codes. According to the rigor-
ously logical system of these codes, the usufructuary acquires a
claim for the collection of exigible civil fruits against the debtor
of the obligation as soon as the usufruct is created.41 But, in
the internal relations between usufructuary and naked owner,
the civil fruits collected by either of them for the period of the
usufruct are subject to apportionment in proportion to the dura-
tion of the usufruct. 42
In France, commentators relying on article 586 of the Code
Civil, corresponding to article 547 of the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870, declare cryptically that civil fruits are "acquired" by
the usufructuary day by day.43 No clear distinction is made
between the usufructuary's claim for the collection of civil fruits
from any obligor and the apportionment of civil fruits as be-
tween the usufructuary and the naked owner. One may thus
come to the conclusion that the usufructuary is entitled to claim
from the debtor of the obligation only the part of the civil fruits
to which he is entitled. It is submitted, however, that the provi-
sion under consideration may be interpreted as concerning
merely the internal relations of usufructuaries and naked owners
and the apportionment of fruits as between these persons. And,
in the light of the civilian tradition and contemporary analysis,
39. See notes 41, 42 infra.
40. See BALlS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 351 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
41. See note 29 supra; WOLFF-RAISER, SACIIENRECHT 465 (10th ed. 1957) ; 3,
2 STAUDINGER-SPRENG, KOMMENTAR zum B.G.B. 1166 (11th ed. 1963) ; R.G. May
27, 1929, 124 R.G.Z. 325, 329 (1929). If the lessee ignores the creation of the
usufruct, he is discharged by payment to the naked owner. See B.G.B. §§ 407,
412. For analysi3 of Greek law, see BALIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW
520, 522 (7th ed. 1955) (in Greek) ; id. CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 351 (3d ed. 1955)
(in Greek).
42. See text at notes 59-62 infra.
43. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 256, 655 (7th ed. Esmein
1961) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL" FRANVAIs 733
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
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it may be argued the usufructuary acquires upon the creation
of the usufruct, both in France and in Louisiana, a claim for
the collection of all exigible civil fruits against the obligor direct-
ly. Naturally, the naked owner may have a claim against the
usufructuary for apportionment; and in case the naked owner
has collected civil fruits in advance or from an obligor ignoring
the creation of the usufruct, the usufructuary may have a claim
against the naked owner for accounting or apportionment.
44
c. Commencement of the Right to Fruits
Article 566 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, and cor-
responding article 604 of the French Civil Code, create the im-
pression that the usufructuary's right to obtain fruits com-
mences, in all cases, "from the moment that the usufruct has
accrued.'45 In reality, this rule applies merely to legal usufructs
and to contractual usufructs in the absence of contrary agree-
ment by the parties.4
6
In cases of testamentary usufructs, the commencement of
the usufructuary's right to fruits should be determined in t-he
light of articles 1608 and 1626 of the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870 and corresponding articles 1005 and 1014 of the French
Civil Code. 47 Thus, the usufructuary by universal title has a
claim to fruits "from the day of the decease, if the demand for
the delivery has been made within a year from that period; if
not, enjoyment will only commence from the day of the judicial
demand, or from the day on which the delivery has been agreed
upon.'4 8 The usufructuary by particular title, on the other hand,
has a claim to fruits "only from the day the demand of delivery
was formed. . . or from the day on which that delivery was
voluntarily granted to him.
'49
Under the German and the Greek Civil Codes the usufruc-
tuary's right to fruits commences uniformly on the day of crea-
tion of the usufruct in the absence of contrary provision by the
testator or the parties to an agreement.5°
44. See text at notes 56-58 infra.
45. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 566 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 604.
46. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITL PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 772
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
47. Ibid. See also 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 654 (7th ed.
Esmein 1961).
48. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1608 (1870).
49. Id. art. 1626.




d. Apportionment of Fruits
According to article 546 of the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870, and corresponding article 585 of the French Civil Code,
natural fruits and fruits of industry "hanging by branches or
roots at the time when the usufruct is open, belong to the usu-
fructuary. Fruits in the same state, at the moment when the
usufruct is at an end, belong to the owner." 51 Under this provi-
sion, the usufructuary is merely entitled to natural fruits and
fruits of industry separated, even though not collected, 52 dur-
ing the existence of the usufruct. Fruits which have not been
separated or collected at the end of the usufruct, even due to ir-
resistible force,53 belong to the naked owner. But the usu-
fructuary is entitled to the value of fruits he was unable to col-
lect because of acts of the owner or disputes as to ownership. 4
The redactors of the two Codes thus rejected the principle of
apportionment of natural fruits and fruits of industry in order
to simplify accountings and minimize recourse to courts.55 They
accepted, however, the principle of apportionment with respect
to civil fruits.
Article 547 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, and cor-
responding article 586 of the French Civil Code, provide that
"civil fruits are supposed to be obtained day by day, and they
belong to the usufructuary, in proportion to the duration of the
usufruct, and are due to him, though they may not be collected
at the expiration of the usufruct."' ' The usufructuary has thus
a claim to civil fruits accruing during the calendar years of com-
mencement or termination of the usufruct in proportion to the
days of his enjoyment. Payment or collection during the ex-
istence of the usufruct is not required. For example, if an im-
movable subject to usufruct is already leased at the time of the
creation of the usufruct, the usufructuary has a claim for rents
corresponding to the days of his enjoyment whether they are
51. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 546 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 585; Caire v. Her
Creditors, 45 La. Ann. 461, 12 So. 624 (1893) ; In re Davis, 22 La. Ann. 497
(1870) ; Moore v. Moore, 20 La. Ann. 159 (1868).
52. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 256, 654 (7th ed. Esniein
1961) ; note 37 8upra.
53. See 2 AUBRY ET RAu, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 655 (7th ed. Esmein 1961)
10 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITI DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 310 (1875) ; 2 MARCAD),
EXPLICATION THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CODE NAPOL ON 456 (1852).
54. See 2 AuBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 655 (7th ed. Esmein 1961)
10 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 311 (1875).
55. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 773
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
56. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 547 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 586.
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paid in advance or after the termination of the usufruct. 7 The
civil fruits produced by a thing subject to usufruct are thus
divided into 365 or 366 equal parts: the usufructuary is at-
tributed a number of these parts corresponding to the days of
his enjoyment and the rest is given to the naked owner. It is
regrettable that this principle of apportionment has not been
adopted as to both natural and civil fruits.5 8
Under the German and Greek Civil Codes, the apportionment
of fruits between usufructuaries and naked owners concerns ex-
clusively their internal relations rather than the right of the
usufructuary to the acquisition of fruits. The two questions are
kept distinct: one set of rules determines the mode of acquisi-
tion of fruits,59 a matter of property law, and another set of
rules the question of apportionment, a matter of the law of
obligations. With respect to apportionment, the two Codes pro-
vide generally that one who has the right to collect the natural
fruits of a thing or of a right up to a certain time or from a
certain time is entitled, in the absence of other agreement, only
to fruits separated from the principal thing during the exis-
tence of his right.60 As to civil fruits, the German Civil Code
establishes a distinction between those which accrue periodical-
ly and those which do not. In the absence of other agreement,
one entitled to periodically accruing civil fruits may claim a part
proportionate to the duration of his right whereas one entitled
57. See Civ., July 20, 1897, S. 1899.1.1878; Gaspard v. Coco, 116 La. 1096,
41 So. 326 (1906). In this case, the usufruct was created on June 4, 1882, and
the usufructuary claimed $650 which she had collected as rental of lands for the
year 1882. The court stated: "Five months of the year have elapsed, the suc-
cession was entitled to five-twelfths as that portion of the rent that had accrued
although it was not collectible at that date. Her contention is, as before stated,
that she was entitled to the whole amount; the rental of the whole year, by reason
of the fact that the lease was for one year and the rental was not due and not
collectible at the beginning of the usufruct in June; it was due at the end of the
year; and the obligation cannot be divided. We cannot agree with that view.
The usufructuary was entitled to the rent from the day the usufruct begins. The
rent was due day by day." But cf. Stringfellow v. Murphy, 195 So. 844 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1940) (cash bonus paid for an oil and gas lease for the initial term of one
year is neither "rent" nor "civil fruit" accruing from day to day, but is all due at
one and the same time; hence, it is not subject to apportionment).
Ordinarily, the claim of the usufructuary arises on the day of the creation of
the usufruct. But if the civil fruits commence to accrue after the creation of
the usufruct, e.g., an immovable is leased three months after the creation of the
usufruct, the usufructuary is entitled to a proportionate share of the rents cor-
responding to his days of enjoyment from the date of the lease rather than from
the creation of the usufruct. See 10 DExOIONIBE, TRAITA DE LA DISTINCTION DES
BIENS 318 (1875).
58. For a critique, see 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANQAIS 773 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
59. See text at notes 38, 39-42 supra.
60. See B.G.B. § 101(1) ; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 963(1) ; cf. YIANNOPOULOS,
CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 21, note 185 (1966).
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to civil fruits which do not recur periodically may claim only
those matured during the existence of his right."1 The Greek
Civil Code has not adopted this distinction: all civil fruits are
apportioned in the light of the duration of the respective rights
of the parties.0 2
e. Apportionment of Expenses for the Production of Fruits
According to article 546 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870,
and corresponding article 585 of the French Civil Code, -the
owner: has no claim for reimbursement of expenses incurred for
the production of fruits which at the. commencement of the usu-
fruct are attributed wholly to the usufructuary.0 3  Conversely,
the usufructuary -has no claim for expenses incurred for the
production of fruits which at the end of the usufruct belong in
their entirety to the naked owner. These provisions have been
justified on the ground that they effect a balance among equal
chances.04  It has been pointed out, however, that just results
may be achieved only if the same persons were to repeat the
same operations an indefinite number of times. But every usu-
fruct is created and terminates only once; thus, the usufructuary
may benefit at the commencement of the usufruct without losing
anything at the end; and, conversely, the naked owner may
benefit at the end without having incurred any loss at the com-
mencement of the usufruct0 5
As in France and in Louisiana, usufructuaries and naked
owners in Germany and in Greece have, in general,. no claim
against each other for the production costs of non-separated
fruits which at the commencement of the usufruct are attributed
to the usufructuary and at the end to the naked owner. But
exception is made as to the usufruct of a rural immovable. In
this respect, the two Codes provide specifically that the usu-
fructuary is entitled to reimbursement of production costs for
fruits which at the end of the usufruct are attributed to the
naked owner, provided that the expenses do not exceed the value
of the fruits.0 0
61. See B.G.B. § 101(2).
62. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 963(2).
6.3. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 546 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 585.
64. Cf. 10 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITI DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 314 (1875).
65. See 3 PLANIOL ET IrIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT FRANQAIS 774 (2d
ed. Picard 1952).
66. See B.G.B. § 1055(2) making applicable by analogy §§ 591-593; GREEK
CIVIL CODE art. 1162; WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 472 (10th ed. 1957) ; BALIS,
CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 370 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
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3. Trees in usufruct
Trees in Louisiana and in France are considered, in prin-
ciple, as component parts of the ground," and capital assets
rather than fruits. Trees are born and reborn of the soil but, in
the light of their slow growth and relative value, French doc-
trine, jurisprudence, and legislation are in agreement that trees
are to be considered as fruits only in exceptional cases and in
accordance with the will of the owner. 68 Thus, in principle, the
usufructuary has the right to collect the fruits of trees but may
not treat the trees themselves as fruits of the ground. By way
of exception to the principle, however, the owner of a forest may
by regular exploitation and in accordance with a reforestation
plan that guarantees a regular income attribute to trees the
status of fruits. And a usufruct established over such a forest
confers on the usufructuary in France the right to continue the
exploitation of the owner.
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 does not deal in detail
with the rights of the usufructuary to cut trees. Article 551
merely provides that the usufructuary "may cut trees on land
of which he has the usufruct... but for his use only, and for
the amelioration and cultivation of the land, provided that he
act in that respect as a prudent administrator, and without abus-
ing this right."0 9 The Code makes no provision for exploitation
of timber and it might be argued that the usufructuary of a
67. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§ 18, 20, 40 (1966) ; cf. Harang
v. Bowie Lumber Co., 145 La. 96, 81 So. 769 (1919).
68. See text at notes 74, 79, 84 infra. In Roman law, the usufructuary did
not normally have the right to cut trees because trees were not considered to be
fruits of the ground. If, however, timber was a usual product of the estate and a
normal source of income for the owner, the trees were considered to be fruits;
the usufructuary had the right and duty to continue the operations of the owner
but had to conform to the rules of orderly management as a prudent head of
family. See BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BooK OF ROMAN LAw 268 (3d ed. Stein 196.3);
RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 380-83 (1927).
69. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 551 (1870). The 1808 La. Civil Code, p. 114, art. 18
provided that the usufructuary "may cut trees on land of which he has the usu-
fruct, dig stones, sand and other materials both for his use and for sale provided
that he act in these respects as a prudent father, and so as that the inheritance
[estate] be not thereby rendered entirely barren or useless." This provision was
changed in the 1825 revision to read like article 551 of the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870. See La. Civil Code art. 544 (1825). The redactors explained the change
as follows: "We have thought that the power given to the usufructuary to sell
the wood or earth at his pleasure might be ruinous to the owner, and we have
thought proper to limit his rights in this respect to what'mi-ht be necessary for
his own use and for that of the property." 1 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF THE
CIVIL CODE OF 1825 p. 52 (1937). For the purposes of this discussion, timber
may be defined as trees which, if cut, would produce lumber for building or man-
ufacturing purposes. This includes any trees which could be cut for economic
gain, such as pulp wood, pines, hardwoods or building lumber. This could be con-
sidered the definition of merchantable timber as used in Louisiana law.
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forest may never exploit it, not even if the owner himself had
exploited it in the past in accordance with regulated felling.
This question has not been presented to Louisiana courts.
It is submitted, however, that, without doing violence to the
precepts of the Civil Code, considerations of social and economic
utility as well as concern for the interests of both usufructuary
and the naked owner lead to the idea that the usufructuary ought
to be allowed, in certain cases, to exploit timber lands com-
mercially. In the first place, it ought to be noted that article
551 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 does not establish a rule
of public policy. Accordingly, the parties to a conventional usu-
fruct may well stipulate expressly that the usufructuary shall
have the right to conduct timber operations according to an
approved plan or even as he pleases. 70 And if this intention is
not expressed, it may be derived by the courts in the case of a
conventional usufruct established over timberlands regularly
exploited by the owner. Any other interpretation of the juridi-
cal act creating the usufruct which would exclude the right
of the usufructuary to continue the operations of the owner,
would do violence to the obvious intention of the parties or of
the grantor of the usufruct. Application of article 551 to con-
ventional usufructs should thus be limited to cases where the
juridical act creating the usufruct does not confer on the usu-
fructuary the right to cut timber and the usufruct is established
over timberlands not regularly exploited by the owner.
In the second place, in the more prevalent case of legal usu-
fruct, application of article 551 should be limited to timberlands
not regularly exploited by the owner at the time of the creation
of the usufruct. Concededly, article 551 might be taken literally
to exclude commercial exploitation of timberlands by the usu-
fructuary in all cases of legal usufruct. This literal interpreta-
tion would conform with the precept of the Civil Code that, in
principle, trees are not fruits of the ground. It is submitted,
however, that in the light of the civilian doctrine of destina-
tion7' underlying the provisions of the Civil Code, distinction
should be made between timberlands regularly exploited by the
70. See LA. CiVIL CODE art. 569(3) (1870) : "It is understood that all these
restrictions on the rights of the usufructuary, and others mentioned in this title
of the Code, only take place, when there is no provision to the contrary in the
act establishing the usufruct."
71. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 20, text at note 132 (1966).
The doctrine of destination has been clearly adopted in article 552 of the Lou-
isiana Civil Code of 1870.
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owner at the time of the creation of the usufruct and timber-
lands not so exploited. As to the latter, there is no doubt that
article 551 is directly applicable and that the usufructuary is not
entitled to commence timber operations. But as to regularly
exploited timberlands, the usufructuary ought to have the right
to continue the operations of the owner who, by his acts, has at-
tributed to treesthe quality of fruits. Further, society has an
interest in the continuous productivity of lands, the naked owner
has an interest in the maintenance of crafts and skills organized
around a going concern, and the usufructuary has an interest in
the security of a regular income. It would be of no avail to
argue that the continuation of timber operations by the usu-
fructuary will result in depletion of substance. Modern tech-
niques of regulated felling insure continuous reproduction of
timber and improvement of its quality. And, in any case, the
interests of the naked owner are protected by the prohibition of
waste and by the obligations of the usufructuary to act as pru-
dent administrator and to preserve the substance of the thing
subject to usufruct.7 2  The suggested solution is bolstered by
article 552 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 187073 which could ap-
ply by analogy. It is indeed difficult to explain why the ex-
haustible products of mines and quarries open at the creation of
the usufruct should be assimilated to fruits whereas the renewa-
ble products of timberlands should not be so assimilated.
The French Civil Code, in contrast with the Louisiana Civil
Code, contains detailed regulation of the rights of the usufruc-
tuary to cut trees. In that respect, the Code distinguishes un-
derwood (bois taillis), tall timber (haute futaie), trees in tree-
farms (arbres de pepinisres), and fruit-bearing trees (arbres
fruitiers).
Underwood is born and reborn of the soil a number of times
during the life of man. Accordingly, it is considered as a fruit
of the ground to which the usufructuary is entitled. He has the
right to exploit an underwood forest but as to the order and
quality of sections he is obliged to observe the prevailing or uni-
form custom of the owners.74 Thus, if the underwood was ex-
ploited at the time of the creation of the usufruct, the usu-
fructuary must respect the established method of exploitation.
For example, if the owner used to reserve a certain number of
72. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 533, E51, 558, 567, 621 (1870).
73. See text at note 107 infra.
74. See FRENCH CivIL CODE art. 590(1)
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trees per acre for future growth, the usufructuary must do the
same. If the forest was not regularly exploited in the past, the
usufructuary is bound, in principle, to follow the habits of the
owner. However, if the owner had engaged in haphazard felling,
the usufructuary cannot do the same because he is under obliga-
tion to act as a prudent administrator.7 f He must then conform
to the use of previous owners, and in the absence of any es-
tablished pattern, the usufructuary must conform to the best
methods followed in the area or to the rules established for the
exploitation of state forests.7 6  The right of the usufructuary
does not extend to tall timber found in an underwood forest. It
extends, however, to dead trees in the forest and to timber im-
properly cut before the arrival of its term. Doctrinal writers
maintain that trees felled or uprooted by accident belong to the
usufructuary 77 but the jurisprudence is to the contrary.78
Trees and plants in a tree farm are likewise considered as
fruits. The usufructuary of a tree farm may thus remove trees
and plants provided that he does not thereby deteriorate the
farm. Further, he is under obligation to conform to the usage
of the place with respect to the replacement of the trees and
plants removed.79
In contrast with underwood and trees in a tree farm, tall
timber is considered to be a component part of the ground and
a reserved capital asset. Thus, in principle, the usufructuary
does not have the right to touch tall timber. He does not even
have the right to take dead trees or trees felled by accident in
a tall timber forest, except to the extent that they may be needed
for repairs the usufructuary is bound to make. 0 But he may
take from a forest of tall timber all the annual products that the
forest produces, as acorns, beechnuts, birch-wood, or elm-wood,
according to the usage of the place or the custom of the owners. 8'
Further, he may take poles needed for the vines included in the
75. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TBAIT9 PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 775
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
76. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 657 (7th ed. Esmein 1961) ; 5
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITA THIkORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 390 (2d
ed. Chauveau 1899).
77. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 657 (7th ed. Esmein 1961)
5 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TBAII't T tORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 391 (2d
ed. Chauveau 1899).
78. See Req., Aug. 21, 1871, D. 1871.1213; Nancy, Feb. 26, 1870, D. 1870.2.169,
Note by Dubois.
79. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 590(2).
80. Id. art. 592.
81. Id. art. 593; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT]k PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN-
QAIS 778 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
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usufruct 82 and timber for repairs he is bound to make, provided
that in the last case the necessity of so doing is admitted by the
owner.
8 3
Exceptionally, tall timber exploited by regulated felling at
the time of the creation of the usufruct is considered as fruit
of the ground.84 The term "regulated felling" cannot be easily
defined. In general, periodical felling of trees of a certain age
in a designated part of a forest, or of certain quantity of trees
in the entire forest, constitutes regulated felling. The courts
in France attach much significance to the intention of the
owner to derive a periodical revenue. Thus, if the owner cuts
every year an undetermined number of trees in order to make
repairs, or to use them as firewood, the felling is not regulated.85
On the other hand, if the owner cuts in successive years a num-
ber of trees especially selected for sale to third persons, the
felling is regulated although the number of trees felled each
year or the lumber obtained may not be of the same quantity.8 6
Once it is established that a forest at the time of the creation of
the usufruct was exploited by regulated felling, the usufruc-
tuary is entitled to continue the operations of the owner. But he
must follow as to the periods, the order, and the extent of sec-
tions the methods established by the owner prior to the creation
of his right.87 The usufructuary of a regularly exploited forest
has the right to take trees felled or uprooted by accident only if
the owner used to include such items in his annual production
plan.88
Fruit-bearing trees, i.e., trees cultivated for the production of
edible fruits,8 9 are not themselves fruits of the soil. When they
are dead, however, uprooted, or broken by accident, the usu-
fructuary may take them subject to the obligation of replacing
them by others.9 0 In this way, the Code simplifies the rendering
of accounts between usufructuaries and owners and, at the same
82. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 593.
83. Id. art. 592.
84. Id. art. 591.
85. See Req., Dec. 16, 1874, D. 1876.1.431, S. 1875.1.265; Req., March 14, 1838,
S. 1838.1.741.
86. See Riom, July 19, 1862, D. 1862.2.123, S. 1863.2.29; 3 PLANIOL E' RIPERT,
TBAITI PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIs 777 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
87. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 591; Req., Jan. 8, 1845, ). 1845.1.113.
88. See Req., Aug. 21, 1871, D. 1871.1.213, S. 1871.1.144; Nancy, Feb. 26, 1870,
D. 1870.2.169, Note by Dubois; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANCAIS 778 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
89. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANcAIS 779
(2d ed. Picard 1932).
90. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 594.
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time, takes into account the interests of owners to have their
lands planted with new trees.
Trees are, under the German Civil Code always 9' and under
the Greek Civil Code depending on their destination922 fruits of
the ground. Accordingly the usufructuary of a forest is entitled
to exploit the timber growing therein. The law, however, tak-
ing into account the interests of both usufructuary and the naked
owner, provides that each of them may demand judicially and
at common expense the adoption of an approved plan of exploita-
tion.93  Once the plan of exploitation is established by the court,
the usufructuary is bound to follow it; violation of this obliga-
tion may give rise to a claim for damages. In the case of
material change of circumstances, the plan of exploitation may
be altered by the court.9 4
4. Minerals in Usufruct
Under the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 and the French
Civil Code, mineral substances extracted from the ground are
component parts and capital assets rather than fruits.95 Like
timber, however, the products of a regularly exploited mine or
quarry may exceptionally be regarded as fruits. Thus, in prin-
ciple, the usufructuary does not have the right to open mines
and quarries in order to extract mineral substances for exploi-
tation9 But if a mine or quarry was open at the time of the
creation of the usufruct, the usufructuary is entitled to con-
tinue the operations of the owner and to treat the minerals as
fruits of the ground.9 7
91. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 21, text at note 127 (1966).
Under the German Civil Code, the usufructuary thus becomes owner of any trees
lie chooses to cut down. However, being obliged to maintain the economic destina-
tion of the land, to observe the rules of orderly management, and to act as a
prudent administrator, he must account to the landowner for any trees cut in viola-
tion of his duties. See B.G.B. §§ 1037(1) ; 1039; 1041; R.G. Oct. 16, 1912, 80
R.G.Z. 229, 232.
92. See BALLS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 518 (7th ed. 1955) (in
Greek).
93. See B.G.B. § 1038(1) ; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1149; BALIS, CIVIL LAW
PROPERTY 353 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
94. See B.G.G. § 1038(1). Doctrinal writers in Greece have reached the same
conclusion even in the absence of a corresponding provision in the Greek Civil
Code. See BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 354 (3d cd. 1955) (in Greek).
95. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§ 18, 42 (1966). Cf. Jackson v.
Shaw, 151 La. 795, 92 So. 339 (1922) ; Elder v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337
(1914) ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Gray, 159 F. 2d 834 (5th Cir.
1947).
96. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 770,
780 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
97. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 552 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 598. These
articles effect a compromise between two conflicting principles: that the usu-
1967] 685
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW (Vol. XXVII
In France, the regime of mines is regulated by special laws. 8
According to the basic law of April 21, 1810, the exploitation
of mines may be undertaken by the usufructuary, the naked
owner, or even by a third person, by virtue of a concession
granted by the state. It is generally accepted in France that
the special statutes applicable to mines do not affect rights es-
tablished by the Civil Code. Thus, if the mine were open at the
time of the creation of the usufruct the royalties due to the sur-
face (redevance mini~re) belong to the usufructuary; if the mine
was opened subsequently, the royalties belong to the naked
owner.9 9 Mines, being distinct immovables, 0 0 may themselves
become the object of a usufruct. The creation of this usufruct is
governed by the rules applicable to the transfer of a conces-
sion.10l
In Louisiana, the branch of law governing minerals has been
predominantly the result of a creative jurisprudence dealing
with oil and gas. 0 2  The discovery and production of oil and
gas in the state compelled Louisiana courts to adapt the precepts
of the Civil Code to new developments and to supplement them
by the enunciation of rules applicable to the various "mineral
rights." The Louisiana legislature failed to adopt an all-in-
clusive mineral code and limited itself to piecemeal corrective
legislation in connection with particular issues.'0 3 In principle,
minerals extracted from the ground are not natural fruits be-
cause they are not "born and reborn of the soil.' 0 4 Nor are the
fructuary should enjoy the thing as owner and that he should preserve the substance
of the thing. In Roman law, the usufructuary had the right to work mines which
had been opened by the owner prior to the creation of the usufruct. D.7.1.13.5.
Further, he had the right to open new mines and quarries, provided that this should
not interfere with the cultivation of the land. If the mineral operations would
yield more profit than the pursuit of agriculture, interference with the cultivation
of the land formed no obstacle to the opening of new mines. Ibid. If, however, the
operations begun by the usufructuary polluted the air or necessitated a great array
of workmen, the usufructuary was considered to be abusing his right. D.7.1.13.6.
98. See Law of April 21, 1810; Law of Sept. 9, 1919.
99. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 781
(2d ed. Picard 1952) ; Lyon, Jan. 5, 1882, D. JUR. GtN. USUFRUIT, No. 145, ef.
Req. Feb. 23, 1881, D.1881. 1.315; Besangon, March 3, 1863, D. 1863.2.49;
Lyon, May 24, 1853, D. 1855.2.347.
100. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 69, text at note 353 (1966).
101. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TIHAITtI PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 781
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
102. See DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGIITS IN LOUISIANA, INTRODUCTION (2d ed.
1.949) ; id., Mineral Rights as They Affect the Community Property System, 1
LA. L. REV. 17, 26-44 (1938).
103. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 62, 99-102 (1966).
104. Elder v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 995, 66 So. 337, 338 (1914). See also Jack-
son v. Shaw, 151 La. 795, 92 So. 339 (1922) ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Gray, 159 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1947) ; Sachse, The Mineral Rights of the Usu-
fructuary,-1 LA. BAR J. 25 (1954) ; Comment, Mineral Leases on Land Subject
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various royalties, bonuses, and delay rentals, civil fruits of the
ground. 10 5 Thus, in principle, the usufructuary does not have
the right to exploit minerals found in the land subject to his
usufruct. He may merely "take from the earth, stones, sand
and other materials but for his use only, and for the amelioration
and cultivation of the land, provided he act in that respect as a
prudent administrator, and without abusing his right."106 By
way of exception, however, "the usufructuary has a right to the
enjoyment and proceeds of mines and quarries in the land subject
to the usufruct, if they were actually worked before the com-
mencement of the usufruct; but he has no rights to mines and
quarries not opened."' 07  In such a case, mineral substances ex-
tracted from the ground, and the proceeds therefrom, could be
exceptionally regarded as natural and civil fruits respectively.
The Louisiana Supreme Court was first called upon to de-
termine the respective rights of usufructuaries and naked owners
to oil and gas under the land subject to usufruct in Gueno v. Med-
lenka.108  In this case, the naked owners and the usufructuary
had separately executed mineral leases covering the land subject
to the usufruct and question arose as to who had the right to
grant such leases. The naked owners and their lessee sought a
declaratory judgment decreeing the usufructuary to be without
any right to the minerals under the land. The usufructuary
answered and each party then asked that his lease be recognized
as valid and the lease of the other party be cancelled. The court
to Usufruet, 34 TUL. L. REV. 784 (1960) ; Comment, Usufructuary's Right to the
Proceeds of Oil and Gas Wells in Louisiana, 2 LA. L. REV. 169 (1939).
105. See King v. Buffington, 240 La. 955, 126 So. 2d 326 (1961) ; Gueno V.
Medlenka, 238 La. 1081, 117 So. 2d 817 (1960) ; Stringfellow v. Murphy, 195 So.
844 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940) ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Gray, 159 F.2d
834 (5th Cir. 1947). But cf. Milling v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 220 La.
773, 57 So. 2d 679 (1952) ; Board of Commissioners of Caddo Levee District v.
Pure Oil Co., 167 La. 801, 120 So. 373 (1928) ; Gulf Refining Co. v. Hayne, 148
La. 340, 86 So. 891 (1921).
106. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 551(2) (1870). Under the Louisiana Civil Code of
1808, p. 114, art. 18, the usufructuary had the right to "dig stones, sand and other
materials both for his use and for sale." This article was modified in the 1825
revision and the right of the usufructuary was limited to minerals needed "for
his use only, and for the amelioration and cultivation of the land." See La. Civil
Code art. 544 (1825), same as LA. CIVIL CODE art. 551 (1870) ; note 69 supra.
At the same time, however, the redactors of the 1825 Code adopted the "open
mines" doctrine. See La. Civil Code art. 545 (1825), same as LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 552 (1870).
107. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 552 (1870). Article 552 refers in terms to "mines
and quarries." Its application to oil and gas operations has been contested, but
has consistently been affirmed by the courts. Gueno v. Medlenka, 238 La. 1081,
1090, 117 So. 2d. 817, 820 (1960) : ". . . that exploration for oil and gas is mining
within the meaning of our law is no longer an open question."
108. 238 La. 1081, 117 So. 2d 817 (1960) ; Note, 20 LA. L. REV. 773 (1960).
See also Wilson v. King, 165 So. 2d 70 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
1967]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
reasoned that minerals are component parts of the ground and
that the usufructuary does not have the right to "consume the
substance of the land," except under the terms of articles 551
and 552 of the Civil Code. "The products derived from mines
and quarries which are not opened before the commencement
of the usufruct," the court went on, "as they are expressly ex-
cepted by Article 552... must be excluded from the fruits and
products to which the usufructuary is entitled." 109 Since article
552 thus withholds from the usufructuary any right to mines
and quarries not opened, it follows, the court declared, that the
naked owner retains, as an incident to his ownership, the right
to open a new mine on the land subject to the usufruct and to
the products derived from mining operations. The right of the
naked owner to explore for minerals and reduce them to pos-
session is unaffected by the usufruct so long as the usufruc-
tuary's use of the surface is not unreasonably disturbed. The
naked owner may execute a mineral lease without the consent
of the usufructuary; and the rights granted under the lease are
not subordinate to the rights of the usufructuary.
The court in the Gueno case did not rule expressly on the
quality of minerals as fruits. The reasoning underlying the
decision, however, makes it clear that minerals are to be re-
garded as fruits only within the terms of articles 551 and 552 of
the Civil Code. In the subsequent case of King v. Buffington,10
the Louisiana Supreme Court declared that royalties, delay ren-
tals, and bonuses, deriving from a mineral lease granted after
the commencement of the usufruct, are neither natural nor civil
fruits, and therefore, that these economic advantages belong to
the naked owner. In this case the naked owner and the usu-
fructuary were both parties to the lease in question. The de-
fendant, owner of an undivided one-half interest in the land
and usufructuary of one-half, had received and retained the
bonus and delay rentals payable under the lease. The plaintiff,
naked owner of an undivided one-half interest in the land, filed
suit for a declaratory judgment decreeing her to be entitled to
a proportionate share of the bonus and delay rental payments
as well as to all future royalties attributable to her interest.
Counsel for the defendant usufructuary urged that the court
109. Id. at 1096, 177 So. 2d 822.
110. 240 La. 955, 126 So. 2d 326 (1961). According to the holding of the court,
the naked owner retains the right to search for minerals and may validly grant
a lease. Mineral operations, however, are not to be exercised in a manner de-
trimental to the usufructuary.
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was bound to apply articles 544, 545, and 547 of the Civil Code,
which grant to the usufructuary the right to gather civil fruits
produced as a result of the right to lease granted to a usufruc-
tuary by article 555. The court rejected this argument and held
that, since bonus payments are part of the consideration for
granting a mineral lease and since exclusive authority to ex-
ecute a mineral lease is vested in the naked owner, delay rental
payments made in compensation of the right of exploration neces-
sarily inure to the benefit of the naked owner. In the ,3ame
decision the Supreme Court indicated that a usufructuary should
be entitled to the proceeds of mines and quarries "actually
worked" before the commencement of the usufruct in accordance
with article 552 of the Civil Code."1
The rules established by articles 551 and 552 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870 may be altered by the instrument creating
the usufruct.1 2  It may be expected that in the case of a con-
ventional usufruct the owner will ordinarily take care to define
the rights of the usufructuary with respect to minerals, and,
in the absence of specific provision, the matter could be dealt
with as a problem of interpretation of the intention of the
parties. 1 3  But in the more frequent case of a legal usufruct,
Louisiana courts will have to define the rights of the usufruc-
tuary by reference to the open mines doctrine and application
of article 552 of the Civil Code. In that respect, the courts will
111. Id. at 962, 126 So. 2d at 328. In Gueno v. Medlenka, 238 La. 1081,
1091, 117 So. 2d 817, 820 (1960), the court indicated by way of dicta that in the
field of oil and gas operations a mine is actually worked "if the well is already
drilled and producing oil at the time when the usufruct was created." The court
was quoting from Gulf Refining Co. v. Garrett, 209 La. 674, 686, 25 So. 2d 329,
332 (1945), a case which, on rehearing, -was set aside and remanded. 209 La.
674, 25 So. 2d 329 (1946). The Garrett case has been revived, however, only "as
far as may be pertinent to the case at hand," namely, with regard to the applica-
tion of article 552 of the Civil Code to mineral operations.
It might be argued, however, that a mine is actually worked when: (1) at the
time the usufruct is created a mineral lease has been granted on the property
although drilling operations have not begun; (2) a well is being drilled but is not
completed at the time the usufruct is created; (3) a well is completed after the
creation of the usufruct in a reservoir from which wells completed prior to the
creation of the usufruct have heretofore produced; and (4) unitization is achieved
after the commencement of the usufruct which results in the inclusion of lands
heretofore non-productive in a producing unit. See Comment, Mineral Leases on
Land Subject to Usufruct, 34 Tus,. L. REV. 784, 795-97 (1960).
112. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 569(3) (1870) : "It is understood that all these
restrictions on the rights of the usufructuary, and others mentioned in this title
of the Code, only take place, when there is no provision to the contrary in the
act establishing the usufruct."
113. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1945-1962 (1870). Article 552 could thus apply
to conventional usufructs, as a rule of interpretation, in the absence of contrdi'y
manifestation of intention by the parties or by the grantor of the usufruct. It
could also apply directly when usufruct is established over mines, oil wells, or
mineral rights (leases, servitudes, royalties).
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have 'to determine specifically when a mine or quarry is "ac-
tually worked," since valuable mineral rights could be appor-
tioned between the naked owner and the usufructuary only on
the basis of this determination. 114
Insofar as the rights of the usufructuary are concerned, the
nature of minerals and of the proceeds of mineral rights may
thus be regarded as settled: minerals are to be regarded as
natural fruits and the proceeds of mineral rights as civil fruits
only in the exceptional cases of an express stipulation to that
effect in the juridical act creating the usufruct or of open mines
at the time of the creation of the usufruct. For a number of
other purposes, however, minerals and the proceeds of mineral
rights have been classified as fruits by Louisiana courts even in
the absence of an express stipulation or without regard to the
open mines doctrine. For example, in the fields of community
property and state income taxation, mineral royalties have been
classified as civil fruits.115 These apparently inconsistent judi-
114. See note 111 supra. It might be argued that, in cases of legal usufruct,
the usufructuary should have the enjoyment of all mineral rights included in the
estate subject to usufruct without regard to the provisions of article 552 of the
Civil Code. Legal usufructs are by universal title and cover all things, corporeal
or incorporeal. Thus, if a mineral lease were granted by the owner on the land
subject to usufruct, the usufructuary should be entitled to rentals and bonus pay-
ments as fruits of the lease rather than as fruits of the land.
Application of article 552 to legal usufructs may be detrimental to the interests
of naked owners. Indeed, at the end of the usufruct the land may well be depleted
of its most valuable assets. Louisiana writers, therefore, have suggested various
methods for restrictive interpretation of article 552. According to one view, the
usufructuary merely acquires an imperfect usufruct on the proceeds of mineral
rights. See DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 325 (2d ed. 1949). A
related proposal suggests that the proceeds be invested, that the interest therefrom
be paid to the usufructuary, and that the naked owner receive the principal upon
termination of the usufruct. l)reyfous, Symposium on the Proposed Louisiana
Mineral Code, 12 TUL. L. REv. 552, 606 (1938). Finally, proposal has been made
for a ratable distribution between the usufructuary and the naked owner. See Shot-
well, Symposium on. the Proposed Louisiana Mineral Code, 12 TUL. L. REV. 552,
593 (1938).
115. See Milling v. Collector of Revenue, 220 La. 773, 780, 57 So. 2d 679, 682
(1952) : "Although the products of mines and quarries, once taken would not be
reproduced, nevertheless they 'are products of the land, and products may be as-
similated to fruits, within the meaning of R.C.C. art. 2671'." Cf. King v. Buffing-
ton, 240 La. 955, 963, 126 So. 2d 326, 329 (1961) : "The case of Milling v. Col-
lector of Revenue, 220 La. 773, 57 So. 2d 679, relied on by the defendant, was con-
cerned with the declarations of Article 2402 of the Louisiana Civil Code concerning
property which forms the community; what was said there can have no bearing
on the question presented in the instant case."
For purposes of federal income tax, however, federal courts have refused to
treat mineral royalties from separate property as fruits falling into the com-
munity; consequently, these royalties are taxed as separate property. See Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue v. Gray, 159 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1947) (the court
conceding the proposition that mineral royalties may be regarded as fruits for
other purposes). See also United States v. Harang, 165 F.2d 106 (5th Cir.
1947). Similarly, for purposes of state severance tax, mineral royalties are not
regarded as civil fruits in louisiana. See Wright v. Imperial Oil & Gas Prod.
Co., 177 La. 482, 148 So. 685 (1933).
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cial determinations could, perhaps, be reconciled by a conceptual
analysis classifying minerals as civil fruits which belong to the
naked owner, except in the case of open mines.'10 A more desir-
able ground of reconciliation would be to distinguish between
fruits and products and to classify minerals as products for all
purposes. 1 17  Thus, a possessor in good faith should be entitled
to keep the fruits but not the products of a thing."" Similarly,
a usufructuary should be entitled to the fruits of a thing and to
products only within the limits of articles 551 and 552 of the
Civil Code. For purposes of community property and state in-
come taxation, economic advantages other than fruits, e.g., min-
eral royalties, delay rentals, and bonuses, could form part of the
community as "profits" within the literal meaning of article
2402 of the Civil Code ' 1 or within the meaning of the applicable
internal revenue legislation.
In Germany and in Greece, the exploitation of minerals is
governed by special legislation 120 and isolated provisions in the
Civil Codes. According to mineral codes and special statutes in
force in the two countries, a number of important minerals are
116. See Hardy, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1960-1961
Term, Mineral Rights, 22 LA. L. REV. 329, 333 (1962).
117. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 20, text at note 165 (1966).
The proceeds of mineral rights (bonuses, rentals and possibly royalties) should
be classified as civil fruits of these rights for all purposes. They shoulld belong,
however, to the holder of the mineral rights, be the usufructuary, the na-ked owner,
or a third person.
118. This suggestion, if adopted, will not upset the settled jurisprudence inter-
preting article 502 of the Civil Code. In that article the word "products" has
the same meaning as the word "fruits" in the preceding article 501. Clarification
may be necessary only in connection with the interpretation of article 2402 of the
Civil Code: "profits" in that article may mean both "fruits" and "products."
119. According to Article 2402 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, "the profits
of all the effects of which the husband has the administration and enjoyment"
fall into the community of acquets and gains. The word "profits" is an in-
correct translation from the French text of the corresponding Article 2371 of the
1825 Code and should read "fruits." Louisiana courts, however, have applied
Article 2402 literally to include "profits," i.e., both fruits and products. See
Milling v. Collector of Revenue, 220 La. 773, 57 So. 2d 679, 682 (1952), citing
Succession of Goll, 156 La. 910, 101 So. 263 (1924) ; Succession of Ratcliff, 212
La. 563, 33 So. 2d 114 (1947) ; Peters v. Klein, 161 La. 664, 109 So. 349 (1926).
120. See HEDEMANN, SACHENRECHT DES BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHEs 225-
31 (3d ed. 1960); WOLFF-RAISER, SACIIENRECHT 384-400 (10th ed. 1957) ; 5
SOERGEL-BAUR, BIRGERLICHES GESETZaUCI 1007 (9th ed. 1961). Articles 67
and 68 of the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code have retained in force
the mineral legislation of the various German states. Thus, in the absence of
comprehensive federal legislation, mineral rights are, for the most part, regulated
by state laws. With the exception of Saxony, mining and mineral law are still
regulated in the various states on the model of the P'russian Mineral Code of 1865.
In Greece, article 56 of tile Introductory Law to the Civil Code has retained in
force the pre-existing mineral legislation. See BALLS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 355
(3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
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either considered to be res nullius or are reserved to the state.121
The rights to search for and reduce to possession these minerals
are not exclusive prerogatives of land ownership. 122  And if a
usufruct is created on a tract of land which contains such min-
erals, the usufructuary has no greater rights than the landowner:
he may acquire the right of exploitation as any third person
in accordance with the applicable mineral laws.
Minerals which are neither reserved to the state nor declared
to be res nullius are considered to be component parts of the
ground. 123 The landowner may search for and reduce these min-
erals to possession as he pleases; further, he may lease his
rights or he may encumber his land by a limited personal serv-
itude for the exploitation of minerals. 12 4  If a usufruct is esta-
blished on a tract of land containing such minerals, the rights
of the usufructuary are determined, on principle, in the light of
the economic destination of the land as well as in the light of
his obligations to preserve its substance, not to alter essentially
its economic destination, and to act in accordance with the rules
of orderly management. 25  The usufructuary is entitled to take
component parts of the ground which qualify as fruits, i.e., those
produced in accordance with the destination of the immovable.1 23
121. For a list of minerals which are considered to be rea nulzius, see WOLFF-
RAISER, SACHENRECHT 387 n. 1 (10th ed. 1957).
122. Cf. section 905 of the German Civil Code, and corresponding article 1001
of the Greek Civil Code, according to which the landowner may not restrain an
interference with his ownership which "takes place at such height or depth that
he has no interest in its privation." Any person desiring to win minerals under
the land of another which qualify as res nullius must first acquire the right to
search for them from the owner of the surface. If the landowner refuses to grant
this right, the public authorities may intervene and fix the conditions of the
search. The most important condition in this respeot is the amount of compensa-
tion which will be due to the owner for damage to the surface of the land. The
finder of minerals, either in his own land or in the land of another by virtue of
the right to search, may file a claim with the authorities for a grant of the mineral
rights. The claimant must include a plat showing the exact position and dimen-
sions of the proposed mine. The date of filing the claim is conclusive as to the
priority of the claimant. The mining authority is bound to make the grant in ac-
cordance with the claim, if it does not refer to lands under which mining is
forbidden. The grants are subject to outstanding rights of third persons, but
these rights are barren unless exercised within a specified time. The grantee
obtains a right capable of alienation, encumbrance, and transmission on death,
to reduce to possession the mineral specified in the grant. This right is treated,
for all purposes, as an immovable real right. Obviously, the usufructuary of a
tract of land does not have greater rights than the landowner as to these minerals
which are considered to be res nulist8 or are reserved to the state.
123. See B.G.B. § 94(1) ; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 954.
124. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHRENRECHT 388 (10th ed. 1957).
125. See B.G.B. §§ 99(1), 1036(2), 1037; GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 961(1),
1142, 1148.
126. See B.G.B. § 99(1) ; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 961(1). Destination is de-
termined according to objective standards rather than the intention of the owner.
See 3 SOERGEL-M .HL, BORGELICHES GESETZBUCH 399 (9th ed. 1960).
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When the usufruct bears on an immovable destined to the ex-
ploitation of minerals, e.g., a mine or a quarry, minerals are
clearly fruits under both the German and Greek Civil Codes.
Almost identical provisions in the two Codes establish the rights
of the usufructuary and of the naked owner to have the plan
of exploitation determined at common expense by judicial
order. 127 When the usufruct bears on an immovable not destined
to the exploitation of minerals, the usufructuary may still have
the right to take certain component parts of the ground subject
to a number of limitations. The German Civil Code provides
specifically that the usufructuary of a tract of land "may erect
new structures for the purpose of obtaining stone, gravel, sand,
loam, clay, marl, peat, and other component parts of the ground
insofar as the economic destination of the land is not essentially
altered thereby.' ' 128  The Greek Civil Code does not contain a
corresponding provision but it is clear that the usufructuary may
take similar component parts of the ground, provided that he
does not thereby alter essentially the economic destination of
the land and that he act in accordance with the rules of orderly
management. 129
5. Treasure Found in Land Subject to Usufruct
Directly applicable provisions in all Civil Codes under con-
sideration declare that the usufructuary's right of enjoyment
does not extend to a treasure found in the land subject to usu-
fruct.13 0 The treasure is neither product nor component part of
the land. 13 1 There is no reason, therefore, to attribute the en-
127. See B.G.B. § 1038(2) ; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1149; note 93 supra.
128. B.G.B. § 1037(2). Thus material alterations are forbidden, even if they
accord with the economic destination of the land. The usufructuary is entitled to
such fruits as are produced in accordance with the destination of the land at the
time of the creation of the usufruct and following the rules of orderly manage-
ment. Fruits produced in violation of these rules are attributed to the usu-
fructuary by the German Civil Code subject to the obligation of restoring their
value at the end of the usufruct. See B.G.B. § 1039; 80 R.G.Z. 229; note 91
supra.
129. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1148; BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 353 (3d ed.
1955) (in Greek). in contrast with the German Civil Code, the Greek Civil Code
provides that fruits produced contrary to the destination of the thing or in violation
of the rules of orderly management belong to the naked owner. See GREEK CIVIL
CODE art. 1149; note 36 supra.
130. See LA. CrVL CODE art. 553(2) (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 598(2);
B.G.B. § 1040; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1151.
131. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITP PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIs 781
(2d ed. Picard 1952) ; 3 SOERGEL-M(eHL, BttRGERLICHES GESETZBUCii 403 (9th ed.
1960) ; BALiS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 350 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek) ; id., GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 518 (7th ed. 1955) (in Greek).
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joyment of a treasure to the usufructuary. But if the usufruc-
tuary discovers the treasure by accident, he is entitled to one-
half of the find in accordance with the general rules governing
treasure trove. 82
6. Herd of Animals in Usufruct
In contrast with the German and Greek Civil Codes, the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 and the French Code contain provi-
sions regulating specifically the usufruct of a herd of animals.
These provisions in the two Codes derive directly from Roman
sources.
133
According to well-established civilian doctrine, real rights
have as their object individually determined things.1 4 However,
by way of exception to the rule, the usufruct of a herd of animals
in Louisiana and in France bears on the universality 35 of the
herd rather than on individual heads. This exception, in turn,
results in modifications of the usufructuary's right of enjoy-
ment.
The usufructuary is entitled to the fruits produced by the
herd, i.e., milk, manure, wool, and its natural increase. But,
contrary to the rules applicable to the usufruct of individual
things, if a number of heads perish without the fault of the usu-
fructuary, he "is bound to make good the number of dead out
of new born cattle, as far as they go."' 136 According to French
132 See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3423 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 716; B.G.B.
§ 984; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1093.
133. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 593 (1870) ; La. Civil Code art. 587 (1825) ; La.
Civil Code p. 118, art. 41 (1808) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 616; Cf. BUCKLAND,
A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 223 (2d ed. 1932) ; 10 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITA DE LA
DISTINCTION DES BIENS 263 (1875).
"Head of cattle" in article 592 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 ought to
read "animal." The French text of the corresponding article 586 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1825 reads: "Si l'usufruit n'est dtabli que 8ur un animal. . ." Like-
wise, "herd of cattle" in article 593 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 ought to
read "herd of animals." The French text of the corresponding article 587 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 reads: "Si le troupeau, aur lequel un usufruit a 06
6tabli. .
134. See YIANNOFOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 18, text at notes 116, 117
(1066). In Germany and in Greece, therefore, the usufruct of a universality of
things is analyzed as consisting of as many usufructs as there are individual things
comprised in the universality. See 3 SOERGEL-WOHL, BtRGERLICHES GESETZBUCII
398 (9th ed. 1960) ; BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 342 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
135. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 782
(2d ed. Picard 1952) ; 2 AUBRY ET RAu, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 711 (7th ed.
Esmein 1961).
136. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 593(1) (1870) ; La. Civil Code art. 587 (1825) ; La.
Civil Code p. 118, art. 41 (1808) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 616. See also Wimbish
v. Gray, 10 Rob. 46 (La. 1845).
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doctrine and jurisprudence, the usufructuary must apply to that
end any increase he might have received since the commence-
ment of the usufruct, or its price. 37 Further, the usufructuary
may dispose of heads which are incapable of reproduction subject
to the obligation of replacing them by new born animals. 3 8 If
the entire herd is destroyed without the fault of the usufructuary,
he "is bound only to return to the owner the hides of such cattle,
or the value of such hides."' 3 9
Heads of livestock attached to an immovable subject to usu-
fruct for its service and improvement are considered as a herd.
Accordingly, the rights of the usufructuary of the immovable
with respect to the livestock are governed by the rules applicable
to a herd rather than individual heads. 140
7. Shares of Stock in Usufruct
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, following the pattern of the
French Civil Code, is mostly occupied with immovable property
which, at the time of its promulgation, was clearly the founda-
tion of wealth. Movables are dealt with scantily and new sources
of riches have not been regulated at all. Thus, it is not sur-
prising that neither the French nor the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870 contains provisions dealing with shares of stock in usu-
fruct. In the absence of directly applicable legislative texts,
courts in France and in Louisiana were compelled to adapt the
precepts of the Civil Codes to new situations and develop rules
governing the not so infrequent usufruct of shares of stock.
The usufruct of shares of stock gives rise to a number of
difficult problems concerning the apportionment of economic
advantages of stock ownership between usufructuaries and naked
owners. For example, questions arise as to voting rights, sub-
scriptions for new stock, distribution of capital reserves, and
rights to cash or stock dividends. In this respect, French doc-
trine and jurisprudence have developed the general principle that
137. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 782
(2d ed. Picard 1952); 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 711 (7th ed.
Esmein 1961). But see 5 BAUDRY-LACANTINER1E, TRAITA THItORIQUE ET PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL 466 (2d ed. Chauveau 1899) ; 10 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITA DE LA DIS-
TINCTION DES BIENS 264 (1875).
138. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITit PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 782
(2d ed. Picard 1952); 2 AUPRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 711 (7th ed.
Esmein 1961) ; 10 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITE DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 263 (1875).
139. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 593 (2) (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 616 (1), Law
of May 17, 1960 (estimation of value as of the day of restitution).
140. See 3 PLANIOL ET R1PERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 783
(2d ed. Picard 1952) ; Bourges, June 12, 1872, D. 1873.5.479, S. 1873.2.12.
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fruits of shares to which the usufructuary is entitled are merely
periodical revenues distributed to shareholders, representing
distributable profits of the corporation.'41 In principle, the
management of a corporation may at its discretion, and in ac-
cordance with the charter, designate certain profits as distribu-
table surplus and others as capital reserves. The usufructuary's
right of enjoyment is limited to cash dividends that the manage-
ment of the corporation attributes, in effect, the status of fruits.
Stock dividends, whether representing a dilution of the
original capital or capitalization of profits, belong to the naked
owner subject to the usufructuary's enjoyment.142  Apprecia-
tion of the value of stock by means of capitalization of profits
benefits the naked owner; the usufructuary has no claim to the
increased value or to the distribution of profits marked as ca-
pital reserves. 143  If capital reserves are later distributed to the
shareholders, the cash belongs to the naked owner subject to
the usufructuary's enjoyment. 44 But, exceptionally, when ca-
pital reserves are regularly distributed to shareholders to pro-
vide a minimum of periodical income, the sums distributed
acquire the nature of fruits and belong to the usufructuary.145
Subscription premiums, i.e., sums in excess of the par value
of shares paid by new shareholders, represent a capital surplus
to which the usufructuary has no claim as long as it remains in
the treasury of the corporation. 40 When this surplus is distri-
buted to the original shareholders, the usufructuary is entitled
to the enjoyment of the fund, the naked ownership of which
belongs to the owner of the shares. The rights to vote and to
subscription for new shares belong to the naked owner; these
rights are not fruits, nor increase of the stock, but powers in-
141. See 3 PLANIOL ET RtIPERT, TEAITI PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 783
(2d ed. Picard 1952) ; 2 AUBRY ET I.AU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 662 (7th ed. Es-
mein 1961) ; Leblond, Droita respectifs du nu-propridtaire et de l'uaufruitier dans
les bdnefices, les rdserves, lea remboursements et amortissements de capital, ainai
que dans les augmentations de capital en numdraire ou par incorporation de reser-
yes, GAZ. PALAIS 1956.2.Doctr.1; Lalou, Droits reapectifs du nu-propri~taire ct
de l'usufruitier d'actiona nominativC8, GAZETTE DALLOZ 65 (1924) ; Michel, Des
droits respectifa de l'usufruitier 4,t du nu-propridtaire d'actions, REc. Jun. D)ES
SOCItTAS 135 (1924) ; Solus, S. 1931.2.9.
142. See 2 AUBRY ET hAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 662 (7th ed. Esmein 1961)
3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITP PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 785 (2d ed.
Picard 1952) ; Req., March 14, 1877, D.1877.1.353, S.1878.1.5.
143. See Civ., Feb. 5, 1890, S.1893.1.471, D.1890.1.300; Montpellier, Oct. 17,
1926, Gaz. Pal. 1927.1.90.
144. See Req., March 14, 1877, D.1877.1.353, S.1878.1.5.
145. See Note, Labb, 8.1878.1.5; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TBAITIt PRATIQUE DE
DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 785 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
146. Req., Jan. 27, 1920, J. Soc. 214 (1920).
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herent in the naked ownership of shares. If the naked owner
fails to subscribe, the usufructuary may take his place only if
the by-laws of the corporation so provide. 147
Doctrinal controversies surround the questions of the rights
of the usufructuary to bonuses and cash paid by the corporation
for the redemption of stock. According to one view, both belong
to the naked owner because they cannot be regarded as fruits. 14
8
According to a diametrically opposite view, these are fruits which
belong to the usufructuary because both bonuses and redemption
price are paid out of withheld profits of the corporation. 49 The
usufructuary has suffered a privation as a result of the capital-
ization of profits and he is the one who ought to benefit from
the distribution of capital surplus. The Court of Cassation has
adopted an intermediate approach: the naked ownership of these
disbursements belongs to the owner of the shares and the en-
joyment of them to the usufructuary. '-" The principles developed
by the courts with respect to the usufruct of shares of stock
apply by analogy to partnership shares.
In Louisiana, in the absence of controlling legislative texts,
the question of which economic advantages of stock ownership
belong to the naked owner and which to the usufructuary must
be resolved in the light of doctrinal considerations and guide-
lines gained from a limited number of judicial decisions. As in
France, some benefits of stock ownership may be analogized to
fruits and others to capital. The rights to vote and to par-
ticipate in the administration of the corporation ought to be
regarded as incidental to stock ownership; they have nothing
in common with fruits and belong to the naked owner. Like-
wise, bonuses and payments representing distribution of capital
assets belong to the naked owner; but, by operation of the prin-
147. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIs 786
(2d ed. Picard 1952). According to the jurisprudence, the ownership of the new
shares for which the usufructuary has subscribed belongs to the naked owner.
Upon termination of the usufruct, the naked owner must reimburse the usu-
fruotuary for the price he paid. Paris, June 5, 1950, Gaz. Pal. 1950.2.96. But sce
2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 663 n. 51 (7th ed. Esmein 1961) (the
usufructuary becomes owner of the new shares but must reimburse the naked owner
at the end of the usufruct for the value of the subscription right).
148. See Lyon, May 29, 1884, D. Jur. G4n., Supp. Usufruit, No. 112; Chateau-
Thierry, Dec. 20, 1882, S. 1884.2.103.
149. See 5 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITt THItORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL 382 (2d ed. Chauveau 1899).
150. Req., March 14, 1877, D. 1877.1.353, S. 1878.1.5, Note by Labb6; Paris,
April 13, 1878, D. Jur. G~n., Contrat de marriage, No. 201; Lyon, May 29, 1884,
loc. cit. No. 122. See also 2 AUBRY ET RAU, l)ROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 663 (7th ed.
Esmein 1961) ; 3 PLANIOL ET IRIPERT, TRAITIb PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
787 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
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ciple of real subrogation, the usufructuary's right of enjoyment
attaches to the proceeds.' 5 ' On the other hand, cash dividends
are clearly fruits which belong to the usufructuary.152
No case has been found dealing directly with the rights of
the usufructuary to stock splitsI 53 and stock dividends.1 54 How-
ever, guidelines may be derived from cases considering the
nature of these operations for purposes of taxation and com-
munity property. In these two fields, when stock has been split
and a greater number of new shares issued in the place of the
old, it has been determined that the new shares are capital rather
than income or fruits. 155 Likewise, when the corporation, instead
of making a cash distribution from surplus capitalizes profits
and issues stock dividends, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
held that the new shares are capital assets rather than in-
come.156 The court reasoned that the interest of the shareholder
in the corporation remained the same after the distribution as
before: the same assets were represented in the original shares
plus their proportionate interest in the surplus account as in the
additional number of shares which the shareholder now pos-
sessed.'57 For purposes of income taxation, distinctions have
been drawn between a stock dividend which works no change
in the corporate structure, the same interest in the corporation
151. See Succession of Stewart, 100 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
152. Succession of Wengert, 180 La. 483, 156 So. 473 (1934) ; Leury v. Mayer,
122 La. 486, 47 So. 839 (1908) ; Succession of Heckert, 160 So. 2d 375 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1964) ; Succession of Stewart, 100 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
153. "Stock split" is used in the sense of corporate action dividing each share
into two or more, without capitalization of earned surplus. See GRAHAM & KATZ,
ACCOUNTING IN LAW PRACTICE 157 (1938) ; KATZ, INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNTING
167 (1954) ; LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 466 (1959).
154. In the Succession of Stewart, 100 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958),
the court, in accordance with the agreement of the parties, attributed stock dividends
to the naked owner subject to the enjoyment of the usufructuary. The new stock
certificate had been issued to the names of both, one as owner and the other as
usufructuary. "Stock dividend" is used in the sense of corporate action distributing
surplus in the form of additional shares, in proportion to the ownership of original
shares. The result is to move the surplus fund to capital. See GRAHAM & KATZ,
ACCOUNTING IN LAW PRACTICE 155 (1938) ; KATZ, INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNTING
167 (1954).
155. See Succession of Hemenway, 228 La. 572, 83 So. 2d 377 (1955). The
matrimonial community in Louisiana enjoys a right akin to usufruct over the
separate property of the spouses. See Comment, Problems of Classification of
Particular Property under Community Property Regimes, 25 LA. L. REV. 108,
135 (1964).
156. Daigre v. Daigre, 228 La. 682. 83 So. 2d 900 (1955). This is in line with
most tax cases which have held that a stock dividend is not taxable as income under
the federal internal revenue legislation. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189
(1920) ; cf. Scofield v.. Weiss. 131 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1942) (gift tax) ; Duncan v.
United States, 247 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1957) (estate tax).
157. Daigre v. Daigre, 228 La. 682, 83 So. 2d 900, 902 (1955) ; cf. Succession
of Quintero, 209 La. 279, 24 So. 2d 589 (1946).
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being represented after the distribution by more shares of the
same character, and a stock dividend which involves changes in
the corporate identity or a change in the nature of the shares
issued, whereby the interest of the shareholder in the corpora-
tion is basically affected. 58 In the last case, stock dividends
are treated as income.
It is submitted that, in the determination of the rights of the
usufructuary, Louisiana courts should hold dividend shares to
be fruits belonging to the usufructuary, at least in circumstances
in which federal courts would treat stock dividends as income,
as in the cases of shares of a different character in the same
corporation 59 or shares of another corporation.1 60 Further,
distinction could be drawn between stock dividends represent-
ing a capitalization of profits and stock dividends which, like
stock splits, merely dilute the existing capital. Stock dividends
distributed in lieu of cash should benefit the usufructuary. 10
From an accounting viewpoint, though the corporate structure
is not affected by the normal stock dividend, the net result is
the same as if the stockholders had been paid a cash dividend
and all recipients had immediately reinvested the cash in addi-
tional shares of the same corporation.1 2 Had this transaction ac-
tually occurred, the new shares would belong to the usufructuary.
Totally different consequences following from two different
methods destined to accomplish the same result cannot be justi-
fied. It might be argued, of course, that if the ownership of
the stock dividend were to be attributed to the usufructuary,
voting rights as well as other incidental advantages of stock
ownership belonging to the naked owner would be affected ad-
versely. 0 3 The answer to this objection is that the usufructuary
158. See SCHAPIRO & WIENSHIEK, LAW AND ACCOUNTING 173 n.19 (1949).
See also Duncan v. United States, 247 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1957); Scofield v.
Weiss, 131 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
159. See Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936).
160. See Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U.S. 347 (1918).
161. Cf. Comment, Problems in Classification of Particular Property Under
Community Property Regimes, 25 LA. L. REV. 108, 134, 137 (1964).
162. See PATON, ACcOUNTANT'S HANDBOOK 1016 (3d ad. 1950).
163. This objection was considered in Daigre v. Daigre, 228 La. 682, 691 n.1, 83
So. 2d 900, 903 n.1 (1955) : "At this point it might also be well to consider the
difference :between a stock dividend and a cash dividend which the shareholder uses
to buy stock in the same corporation. The difference between these two transac-
tions is easy -to grasp. In the stock dividend transaction the shareholder's 1,ropor-
tionate interest in the corporation assets remains unchanged. On the other hand,
if a shareholder receives a cash dividend with which he buys additional shares of
the same type of stock in the same corporation, the shareholder's proportionate in-
terest in the corporation assets is increased." Of course, this assumes that all




could be attributed the cash equivalent of the new shares. A
much more serious objection to the suggested solution is that it
might give rise to litigations and corporations might be sub-
jected to continuous harassment by judicial investigations tend-
ing to ascertain the extent of their capitalized profits."
The stock dividend method may effectively postpone the time
when the corporation will be able to pay cash dividends through
reduction of its surplus account. 10 5 And if the naked owner
owns a controlling interest in a closely held corporation, this
effect would allow him freedom to determine the measure of the
usufructuary's enjoyment. It ought to be expected, however,
that any abusive exercise of the rights of the naked owner will
be closely scrutinized by the courts and that in appropriate cases
the corporate veil will be pierced. 160
It is well settled in Louisiana that the usufruct of shares of
stock is a perfect usufruct 6 7 and that the usufructuary is under
obligation to preserve them. When, without right, the usu-
fructuary disposes of the shares of stock, question arises as to
the rights of the naked owner. It may be argued that in such
a case the usufruct terminates and that the naked owner is
entitled to claim the proceeds in the hands of the usufructuary. 16
When, as it frequently happens, the sale of the shares is dis-
covered by the naked owner at the end of the usufruct, the courts
charge the usufructuary with the value of the shares at the
time of the sale or of the creation of the usufruct. 1 9 It is sub-
mitted that the naked owner, entitled to restitution of the stock
at the end of the usufruct, should be able to claim its value at
that time.170 But if the stock depreciated since the sale, the
164. Cf. LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 459, 461 (1959).
165. Cf. PATON, ESSENTIALS OF ACCOUNTING 726-28 (rev. ed. 1949). It ought
to be noted, however, that earnings or profits permitted to accumulate beyond
the "reasonably anticipated needs of the business" receive a very heavy accumulated
earnings surtax. See LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 461 (1959).
166. Of. Wainer v. Wainer, 210 La. 324, 26 So. 2d 829 (1946).
167. See Leury v. Mayer, 122 La. 486, 47 So. 839 (1908); Succession of
Heckert, 160 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964). But cf. Kelley v. Kelley, 185 La.
185, 168 So. 769 (1936).
168. It ought to be clear that if the usufructuary alienates things subject to
perfect usufruct he violates his obligation -to preserve the substance of the thing.
Accordingly, his usufruct may terminate by application of article 621 of the Civil
Code. Upon termination, the usufructuary will be "answerable for such losses
as proceed from his fraud, default, or neglect" (article 567).
169. See Succession of Wengert, 180 La. 483, 156 So. 473 (1934) ; Succession
of Heckert, 160 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
170. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 567(2) (1870). Further, it is clear that the
usufructuary who without authority alienates shares of stock commits an of-
fense and is liable under article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
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usufructuary should not be allowed to benefit from his own
wrong and the naked owner should be given the value of the
stock at the time of sale by application of the principle of un-
just enrichment."' When the shares of stock are converted
into money without any act of the usufructuary, as a result of
redemption by the corporation or liquidation of its capital, the
right of the usufructuary attaches to the proceeds by operation
of the principle of real subrogation. 17 2  In these circumstances,
the usufruct becomes imperfect and the usufructuary is entitled
to reinvest or use the proceeds as he pleases. 173
Stock of building and loan associations involves distinct prob-
lems as it bears characteristics of both ordinary stock and of an
indebtedness. 17 4  In most American jurisdictions this stock has
been consistently treated as indebtedness' 75 but Louisiana courts
have implicitly treated it as ordinary stock for some purposes
and as an indebtedness for other purposes. 7 0 Depending on the
171. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1965 (1870). Cf. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW
PROPERTY § 143, text at note 305 (1966).
172. See Succession of Dielman, 119 La. 101, 43 So. 972 (1907). Any capital
gain reflected in the liquidation dividends benefits both the naked owner and the
usufructuary. The naked owner acquires ownership of the entire dividend, subject
to the enjoyment of the usufructuary. Succession of Stewart, 100 So. 2d 228
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1958). The federal capital gains tax on the stocks is to be
paid by the naked owner. Ibid.
173. See Succession of Dielman, 119 La. 101, 43 So. 972 (1907). Naturally,
the parties may by agreement determine the mode of reinvestment. See Suc-
cession of Stewart, 100 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958). The Louisiana Su-
preme Court has declared that when shares of stock are converted into money
by the usufructuary rather than by the corporation the usufruct does not become
imperfect. See Wainer v. Wainer, 210 La. 324, 26 So. 2d 829 (1946). It is dif-
ficult to understand what the court meant by this statement. Perhaps, the court
wished to indicate that, in these circumstances, the usufructuary is not free to use
the cash as he pleases and that he is bound to account to the naked owners for
all profits rather than for the value of the shares at the creation of the usufruct
plus legal interest. Id. at 344-47, 26 So. 2d at 836-37.
174. First, the owners of building and loan stock control the operation of the
association through voting power (LA. R.S. 6:747 (1950)), and second, any
return on investment paid to the owner of the stock is in the form of a dividend
which can only be paid from the profits of the association (LA. R.S. 6:744
(1960)). These are attributes of ordinary corporate stock. On the other hand,
the owner of building and loan stock is entitled to repayment from the associa-
tion of any amount which he has invested (LA. U.S. 6:791 (1950)). This right
of return of investment from the association parallels the debtor-creditor rela-
tions arising from a bank deposit. But cf. LA. U.S. 6:741(3) (b) (1950), allowing
the issue of permanent reserve shares which are non-redeemable until dissolution
of the association. These types of shares should be treated as ordinary corporation
stock.
175. See cases cited in Note, 18 LA. L. REV. 335, 336 n.14 (1958).
176. See Lilley v. First Federal Say. & Loan Assn., 194 So. 901 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1940) ; State ex rel. Moulin v. Ideal Say. & Homestead Assn., 178 So. 521
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938) (Uniform Stock Transfer Act, held, applicable to the
transfer of building and loan shares). The Louisiana Uniform Stock Transfer
Act (LA. R.S. 12:521(1950) ) regulates the transfer of corporate stock whereas
the transfer of negotiable instruments which are evidences of debt is regulated by
the Negotiable Instruments Law (LA. R.S. 7:1 (1950)). Accordingly, these
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one or the other classification, building and loan association stock
could be held to be subject to perfect or imperfect usufruct. In
the absence of compelling reasons for the classification of this
stock as consumable, and taking into account primarily the in-
terests of the naked owner, the usufruct of building and loan
association stock ought to be considered as perfect.177
In Germany and in Greece, the usufruct of shares of stock
issued to the bearer and of shares of stock to the order endorsed
in blank is governed .by the rules of the Civil Codes applicable
to the usufruct of negotiable instruments. 17  These rules, how-
ever, do not resolve the question of apportionment of economic
advantages between naked owners and usufructuaries. Doctrine
and jurisprudence in the two countries, groping for solutions,
establish a distinction between economic advantages which as
fruits belong to the usufructuary and powers incidental to stock
ownership which belong to the naked owner. The rights to vote
and, in general, to participate in the administration of the cor-
poration belong to the naked owner according to the prevailing
view in Germany.179  The Greek Civil Code, however, provides
that in the absence of contrary agreement the usufructuary is
entitled to participate in the meetings of the shareholders. 80
Cash dividends belong to the usufructuary but options for the
acquisition of new shares to the naked owner.18' The proceeds
of the liquidation of stock by the corporation belong to the naked
owner subject to the enjoyment of the usufructuary. 182 And,
decisions give rise to the implication that building and loan association stock is to
be treated as ordinary corporation stock. But 8ee Dimitry v. Shreveport Mut. Bldg.
Assn., 167 La. 875, 120 So. 581 (1929) ; Succession of D'Anna, 6 La. App. 142
(Orl. Cir. 1927) (an association shareholder is a creditor of the association and
upon the death of the shareholder the administrator of his estate is entitled to
withdraw the value of the shares from the association). These decisions give
rise to the implication that, if the shares were burdened with usufruct, the usu-
fruct should be qualified as imperfect.
177. Cf. Succession of Wengert, 180 La. 483, 156 So. 473 (1934) (homestead
stock dealt with as if it were subject to perfect usufruct). But see Note, 18 LA. L.
REv. 335, 337 (1958).
178. See B.G.B. §§ 1081-1084; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1176; text at notes
797-807 infra; and, in general, WEIDER, DER NIESSBRAUCH AN AKTIEN (1925)
S.ebert, Note, 63 JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 111.6 (1934).
179. See 3, 2 STAUDINGER-SPRENG, KOMMENTAR zum B.G.B. 1186 (11th ed.
1963) ; 3 SOERGEL-MtHL, BCaRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 428 (9th ed. 1960) ; WOLFF-
RAISER, SACHENRECHT 483 (10th ed. 1957) ; and in general, PETERS, AUSOBUNO
DES STIMMRECHTS BEI NUTZNIESSUNGSBELASTETEN AKTIEN (1952).
180. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1177.
181. See 3, 2 STAUDINGER-SPRENG, KOIMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 1189 (11th ed.
1963) ; WOLFF-RAISER, SACHIENRECIIT 483 (10th ed. 1957) ; Heidecker, Das
Bezugsrecht bei niessbrauchbelasteten Aktien, 9 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENS-
CHRIFT 892.
182. See 3, 2 STAUDINGER-SPRENG, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 1190 (11th ed.
1963) ; 3 SOERGEL-.MAtHL, BORGERLICHES GESETZDUCH 428 (9th ed. 1961).
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with respect to stock dividends, distinction is made between the
value of the new shares representing capitalization of profits
which belong to the usufructuary and the value of the share
representing a fractional interest in the corporation itself which
belongs to the naked owner.18 3
8. Business Enterprise in Usufruct
Questions arising from the creation of a usufruct over a busi-
ness enterprise are not specifically dealt with in the Civil Codes
under consideration. A business enterprise may be defined as
the sum total of rights, interests, corporeal objects, and rela-
tions destined for a determined purpose and organized as an
economic unit by a person called enterpreneur. 8 4  An enter-
prise thus includes corporeal elements, as merchandise, and in-
corporeal elements, as leases, good will, trademarks, and copy-
rights, which form a universality or a special patrimonial mass.
According to French doctrine and jurisprudence, the right
of the usufructuary bears on the universality rather than on in-
dividual objects.'8 5 The usufruct of an enterprise is, in the
absence of contrary agreement, a perfect usufruct; accordingly,
the usufructuary does not become owner of the various elements,
nor does he have the right to sell the enterprise. And, in case
of bankruptcy, the creditors of the usufructuary may merely
seize the usufruct; the naked ownership is beyond their reach. 8 0
The usufructuary has the right and the obligation to continue
the business. If he refuses to do so, the naked owner may de-
mand the sale of the enterprise. As any other usufructuary,
the usufructuary of an enterprise may lease it or he may assign
his rights to a third person.
Continuation of the business presupposes the usufructuary's
right to sell merchandise and, in general, individual elements of
the enterprise. This right of the usufructuary cannot be easily
explained on theoretical grounds. Certain authors suggest that
the usufructuary possesses a quasi usufruct which confers upon
183. Ibid.; cf. Bayer, Oberstes Landesgericht, Jan. 18, 1918, 36 O.L.G. 282.
184. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 83 (1966).
185. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 708 (7th ed. Esmein 1961)
3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIf PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 788 (2d ed.
Picard 1952); 2 COLIN, CAPITANT, ET JULLIOT DE LA AIORANDItRE, TRAITt DE
DROIT CIVIL 151 (1959); DELALANDE, L'USUFRUIT D'UN FONDS DE COMMERCE
(Thesis, Bordeaux 1922); Civ., Feb. 26, 1894, S. 1895.1.102, Note by Wahl;
Aix, March 12, 1878, S. 1878.2.265.




him the ownership of the individual elements and enables him,
as owner, to sell individual objects. This analysis has been
rejected in France because it leads to the conclusion that the
usufructuary is bound to restore, upon termination of the usu-
fruct, the estimated value of the merchandise rather than the
stock in kind. Yet, restoration of the stock in kind may be in-
dispensable for the preservation of the enterprise; and the obli-
gation .of the usufructuary to preserve the thing subject to usu-
fruct implies clearly his duty to replace the merchandise sold.
Thus, according to the prevailing view, the usufructuary of an
enterprise in France has the power of alienation of individual
objects in his capacity as administrator. Sale is the normal ex-
ercise of his right of enjoyment and constitutes an act of ad-
ministration required by the obligation to continue operations. s7
The usufructuary is entitled to the profits of the enterprise
which are considered as civil fruits. But he is bound to make
allowance for the depreciation of the various elements and he
may be required to place certain profits on reserve because,
according to article 578 of the French Civil Code, the usu-
fructuary must conform to the methods of enjoyment established
by the owner. 88
In Louisiana, the usufruct of a business enterprise has been
classified by the courts as an imperfect usufruct. 8 9 Accordingly,
the usufructuary has been held to be entitled to dispose of the
stock of merchandise as owner. His obligation is to account
to the naked owners upon termination of the usufruct for the
estimated value of the merchandise at the commencement of the
usufruct.'0° It is submitted that in the absence of legislative
texts much benefit could be derived from the consideration of
French doctrine and jurisprudence. Louisiana courts could re-
187. See 3 PLANIOL ET RI PERT, TRATTIP PRATIQUE DE DIOIT CIVIL FRANCAIS
189 (2d ed. Picard 1952); 5 BALrDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITIt THtORIQUE ET
RATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 377 (2d ed. Chauveau 3899); 2 CoLiN, CAPITANT, ET
JULLIOT DE LA MOBANDItBE, TRAITt DE DROIT CIVIL 151 (1959).
188. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 578; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 790 (2d ed. Picard 1932).
189. See Succession of Trouilly, 52 La. Ann. 276, 26 So. 851 (1899) ; Succes-
sion of Blanchard, 48 La. Ann. 578, 19 So. 683 (1896). Cf. Success~on of Journe,
21 La. Ann. 391 (1896) (surviving spouse and usufructuary disposed of rights
to a butcher's stall in the market place; the court did not question the authority
of the usufructuary to terminate the business).
190. See Succession of Trouilly, 52 La. Ann. 276, 26 So. 81 (1899) ; Succes-
sion of Blanchard, 48 La. Ann. 578, 19 So. 683 (1890). If the usufructuary sells
the enterprise, the price representing the good will of the business or other in-
corporeal assets should belong to the naked owner, subject to the enjoyment of the
usufructuary. Cf. Succession of Journe, 21 La. Ann. 391 (1869).
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consider their solutions in the interest of justice, and, taking
into account the interests of both the usufructuary and of t.he
naked owner could conclude that the usufruct of an enterprise
is a perfect Usufruct which, by its nature, confers on the usu-
fructuary power of administration'" and alienation of the
various elements. The usufructuary should be entitled to the
profits of the enterprise subject to the obligations of preserving
its substance, renewing the stock of merchandise or other equip-
ment, and of making proper allowances for depreciation and
capital reserves. 192
According to the prevailing views in Germany and in Greece,
the usufruct of an enterprise bears on the various individual ele-
ments rather than on the business as a whole.193 Depending on
the nature of these elements as corporeal or incorporeal, the usu-
fruct is governed by the rules of the Civil Codes applicable to
usufruct of things or usufruct of rights.194  Since, however, a
number of these rules are incompatible with the requirements
of orderly management of an enterprise, doctrine and juris-
prudence affirm deviations as to certain specifics.
For the determination of the rights of the usufructuary and
of the naked owner, distinction is drawn between fixed capital
which continues to be owned by the naked owner and circulating
capital which is now owned by the usufructuary. The usufruct
of an enterprise is thus partly perfect and partly imperfect.
Fixed capital, being non-consumable, is subject to perfect usu-
fruct, whereas circulating capital, being consumable, is subject
to imperfect usufruct. The usufructuary is under obligation
to preserve the fixed capital, which constitutes the essence of
the enterprise, and to continue operations. His administration
must conform to the rules of orderly management, lie cannot
191. See note 187 supra; Folse v. Maryland Cas. Co., 193 So. 385 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1940). See also Bell v. Saunders, 139 La. 1037, 72 So. 727, 730 (1910) :
"The law constitutes him [i.e., the usufructuary], in effect, and with respect to
the rights of ownership, the agent or representative of the owner, imposes on him
the obligation of an administrator. .
192. See note 188 supra.
193. See 3 SOERGEL-MIGHL, BtRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 441 (9th ed. 1961)
WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECI[T 490 (10th ed. 1957) ; BRECHEn, DAS UNTERNEHMEN
ALS RECIITSGEGENSTAND 130 (1953); GODIN, NUTZUNGSRECIIT AN UNTERNEII-
MEN UND UNTERNEHMENSI ETEILIUNGEN (1949) ; Gieseke, DER RECHTSBEGRIFF
DES UNTERNEUMENS, DEUTSCHE LANDSREFERATE Z7UM III. INTERNATIONALEN
KONORESS FVR RECHTSVERGLEICIIUNO IN LONDON 60 (1950). Cf. BALIS, CIVIL
LAW PROPERTY 342 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).




substantially transform or alter the nature of the enterprise.195
It is disputed whether the usufructuary is under obligation to
pay business debts of the grantor incurred prior to the creation
of the usufruct. But if the usufructuary continues operations
.under the same firm name, he is bound to the payment of debts
under Section 25 of the German Commercial Code. The same
applies to the naked owner who, after termination of the usu-
fruct, continues the business of the usufructuary under the same
firm name. The collection and investment of credits due to the
business escapes application of the general rules because the
restrictions established therein are incompatible with the de-
mands of orderly business administration. 1 6
In Germany, the usufructuary of an enterprise is bound to
contribute to the payment of private debts and public burdens in
accordance with the rules governing usufruct of individual
things.1 7 The rules of the German Civil Code governing usu-
fruct of patrimonies apply to the usufruct of an enterprise only
if the enterprise constitutes the entire patrimony of the gran-
tor.19 8 On the contrary, under the Greek Civil Code, the liabil-
ity of the usufructuary ought to be measured in the light of the
rules governing usufruct of an entire patrimony.1 9
The usufructuary is entitled to the net profits of the enter-
prise, which are its civil fruits. He must balance operating
losses with gains and he must undertake expenditures for the
maintenance or renewal of fixed capital even in excess of his
profits. 20 The risk of depreciation and the gain of appreciation
of the business are attributed to the naked owner.
10. Rights in Usufruct
a. In general
Under the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 and under the French
Civil Code, "things" may be either corporeal or incorporeal. The
general provisions on usufruct in the two Codes are thus sup-
posed to apply without discrimination to corporeal objects and
195. See GODIN, NUTZUNGSRECHT AN UNTERNEHMEN UND UNTERNEHMENSBE-
TEILIGUNGEN 21 (1949).
196. Sec 3 SOERGEL-tIIL, BIRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 442 (9th ed. 1961).
197. See B.G.B. § 1047.
198. See 3 SOERMEL-AtIlhL, BfR(GERLICHES GESETZBUCii 441 (9th ed. 1960).
199. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1156; cf. id. art. 479.
200. See GODIN, NUTZUNOSREC11T AN UNTERNEHMEN UND UNTERNEHNIENS-
BETEILIGUNOEN 37 (1949) ; 3 SOERGEL-M~tIL, BtRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 442
(9th ed. 1960).
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rights burdened with a usufruct. 2 1 Yet, a great number of
these provisions contemplate usufruct of corporeal objects, and,
particularly, of immovables. 2 2 Their application. to. usufruct
of incorporeals, as it will be shown, is not always warranted
nor entirely adequate to regulate the incidents of these usu-
fructs which involve problems of their own. In the event of a
Code revision, therefore, it would be preferable, from the view-
points of both legislative technique and substantive regulation,
to enact in Louisiana special provisions applicable to the usu-
fruct of rights.
Under the German and Greek Civil Codes, "things" are only
corporeal objects, and, strictly speaking, real rights of enjoy-
ment may burden only such objects. 0 3 But, since the usufruct
of rights is a useful legal institution which has its place in every
civilian system, theory had to be stretched to accommodate the
demands of social utility. The redactors of the two- Codes
thus felt compelled to enact special provisions authorizing ex-
pressly, and regulating the effects of, the usufruct of rights.20 4
Usufruct may be established on both personal and real rights,
movable or immovable. Under the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870 and under the French Civil Code, usufruct may thus burden
any right, with the possible exception of "strictly personal"
rights. 20 5 It may even burden another usufruct.20  In Germany
and in Greece, usufruct may be established only on transferable
rights . 2 0  Usufruct, being in principle a non-transferable right
in these two countries, cannot be established on another usu-
fruct.20 8
According to section 1069 of the German Civil Code, and
corresponding article 1178 of the Greek Civil Code, the crea-
201. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 541 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 581.
202. See, e.g., LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 546, 548, 551-554, 563, 565, 568-579, 581, 582,
590, 591, 594-598, 601-605, 613-615, 622 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 585,
590-594, 596, 597, 599, 605-609, 614, 624.
203. See YIANNOPOULOS, CivIr. LAW PROPERTY § 13, text at note 75 (1966).
204. See B.G.B. §§ 1068-1084; GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 1178-1182; cf. DULCK-
EIT, DIE VERDINGLICHUNG OBLIGATORISCIIER RECIITE 54 (1951).
205. For the notion of strictly personal rights, see YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW
PROPERTY § 78, text at note 117 (1966). Since strictly personal rights are in-
calable of assignment or exercise by third persons, they ought to be insusceptible
of encumbrance.
206. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT9 PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 755
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
207. See B.G.B. § 1069(2) ; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1178(3). Further, it is
self-evident that only rights capable of enjoyment may be burdened with usufruct.
See WESTERMANN, SACIIENRECtT 681 (4th ed. 1960) ; 3, 2 STAUDINGER-SPRENG,
KOMMENTAR zumI B.G.B. 1165 (11th ed. 1963).
208. See B.G.B. §§ 1059, 1059b; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1166.
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tion of usufruct on rights is subject to the rules governing trans-
fer of rights.209 Thus, depending on the nature of the right in-
tended to be burdened with usufruct, formal and substantive
requirements for the creation of usufruct are the same as those
applicable to assignment of credits or alienation of real rights.
For the rest, the German Civil Code contains detailed provi-
sions which in many instances do not have an equivalent in the
Greek Civil Code. The German Civil Code, for example, pro-
vides expressly that if the right burdened with usufruct in-
volves a performance, the relations between the usufructuary
and the debtor of the obligation are subject to the rules govern-
ing the relations between assignee of a credit and debtor. 210
Further, in case the exercise of the usufruct is transferred to an
administrator, 211 the transfer is effective against the debtor
as of the time he acquired knowledge or received notice thereof.
The same rule applies in case of termination of the administra-
tion. 212 A right subject to usufruct may be terminated by juri-
dical act only with the consent of the usufructuary; the consent
must be declared to the person in whose favor it is given and
is irrevocable. The same rule applies to transformations of the
right which might affect adversely the interests of the usu-
fructuary. 213
The content of the usufruct of a right is determined as to
specifics in Germany and in Greece in the light of the nature
and characteristics of the right burdened. In general, the usu-
fructuary is entitled to receive profits, i.e., advantages of use
and fruits. For example, the usufructuary of a predial lease
is entitled to the use of, as well as to the fruits produced by, the
leased immovable; the usufructuary of an interest producing
credit, to the interests; and the usufructuary of an annuity or
life rent, to accruing payments. 214 The usufructuary of the
burdened right acquires the ownership of fruits of things, which
209. See B.G.B. § 1069(1) ; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1178. Thus, in Germany,
the usufruct of a claim or of a patent may be created merely by agreement be-
tween the parties. Cf. B.G.B. §§ 39S, 413. The usufruct of a mortgage requires,
in addition to agreement, entry into the land register and delivery of the mortgage
certificate to the usufructuary. Id. § 1154. For the creation of usufruct on
negotiable instruments, see tex-t at note 241 infra.
210. See B.G.B. § 1070(l.).
211. According to section 1052 of the German Civil Code, the exercise of usu-
fruct may, on demand of the naked owner, be entrusted to an administrator in
case the usufructuary fails to furnish security under the terms of a judicial decision
ordering him to do so.
212. Id. § 1070(2).
213. Id. § 1071.
214. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 483 (10th ed. 1957).
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are at the same time fruits of rights, 215 on separation. If the
fruits of the right are merely claims, e.g., interests, the usu-
fructuary is entitled to them as of the creation of the usufruct. 16
For the rest, the rules governing usufruct of things in the
German and Greek Civil Codes apply by analogy to the usufruct
of rights unless this is excluded by directly applicable legal
provisions or by the nature of the right subject to usufruct.2"17
Thus, in principle, rights and obligations of the usufructuary
and of the naked owner, and termination of the usufruct of
rights are matters to be determined in the light of the rules
governing usufruct of corporeal objects.
The legal nature of the usufruct of rights has given rise to
doctrinal controversies in Germany. According to the prevail-
ing view today, the usufruct of a right is of the same nature
as the burdened right.218  Thus, the usufruct of a dismember-
ment of ownership is a real right and the usufruct of a personal
right is itself an obligation. 219
b. Usufruct of Credits
According to French doctrine and jurisprudence, non-ma-
tured credits are the object of a perfect usufruct. 220 The usu-
fructuary, therefore, does not become owner of the titles of
obligations, as promissory notes, certificates of deposit, or nego-
tiable instruments evidencing an indebtedness. But, by virtue
of his right of enjoyment, the usufructuary has power of ad-
ministration and authority to collect the capital assets evidenced
by these various titles.221 If the object of delivery is money
or other consumables, the usufruct is transformed into an im-
215. See text at note 27 supra.
216. See text at note 41 supra. Interests ar.a regarded as direct fruits of rights
under B.G.B. § 99(2). See 1 SOERGEL-SIEEIRT, BOIROERLICHES GESETZBUCH 353
(9th ed. 1959); Reichel, Der Begriff der Fracht int roemischen Recht und in
deutschen B.G.B., 42 IIIERINGS, JAHRROGCHER 205, 299 (1901).
217. See B.G.B. § 1068(2), GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1182. B.G.B. § 1039 is
inapplicable to usufruct of rights. Thus, the usufructuary of a right does not
acquire ownership of fruits produced contrary to the rules of orderly manage-
ment. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACIIENRECIIT 484 (10th ed. 1957).
218. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 482 (10th ed. 1957).
219. Cf. 2 AUBRY ET ]RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 633 n. 1 (7th ed. Esmein
1961) explaining that "technically" the usufruct of incorporeals is not a real right,
in the same way that the ownership of incorporeals is not, strictly sj.eaking, a real
right.
220. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT]t PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 794
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
221. Ibid. See also 6 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 521
(1876) ; Comment, Usufruct of a Promissory Note-Perfect or Imperfecti, 4 TUL.
L. REV. 104, 108 (1930).
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perfect one upon payment; if the object of delivery is a non-
consumable thing, the usufruct continues being perfect. Since
the creation of usufruct on a credit functions as an assign-
ment,222 the usufructuary is entitled to receive payment either
by amicable demand or following judicial action. He may dis-
charge the debtor without the consent of the naked owner (cred-
itor), who cannot intervene even if the usufructuary is in a state
of insolvency. 223 And the debtor cannot raise the exception that
the usufructuary has not furnished security to the naked owner.
The usufructuary is entitled to dispose of money and other
consumables he has received in payment as he pleases, subject
to his obligation to account to the naked owner upon termina-
tion of the usufruct. This prerogative of the usufructuary in-
volves many dangers for the naked owner, and, for this reason,
it has been criticized in France.224  It might have been more
reasonable to require the usufructuary to invest the capital
assets he has collected in cooperation with the naked owner, but
in the absence of a directly applicable legislative text the courts
cannot impose such requirements. However, they may order
the usufructuary to furnish security that he will restore the
capital at the end of the usufruct, even if the juridical act creat-
ing the usufruct relieved him of the obligation to furnish secu-
rity.225 Indeed, it may be argued that the intention of the grantor
of the usufruct was to dispense with security merely as to the
perfect usufruct of the non-matured credit; when the usufruct
is converted into an imperfect one, the situation is not covered
by the juridical act creating the usufruct and the requirement
of security is to be determined under the applicable text of the
Civil Code. 220
In Louisiana, no distinction is made between matured and
non-matured credits. The jurisprudence is settled that the usu-
fruct of credits is an imperfect usufruct and, therefore, the
usufructuary of titles evidencing indebtedness becomes owner of
222. See text at notes 40-41 supra.
223. See Req., May 21, 1930, S.1930.1.286; Req., Nov. 8, 1881, D.1883.1.174,
S.1885.1.11; Civ., March 3, 186S, D.1868.1.160; Req., Jan. 21, 1845, D.1845.1.104,
S.1845.1.129.
224. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANAIS 795
(2d ed. Picard 1952) ; and, in general, Chancerelle, De l'usufruit des valeurs
mobiliers (Thesis, Paris 1912).
223. See Req., Oct. 28, 1889, S.1890.1.53; Req., March 26, 1889, S.1889.1.206;
Aix, June 12, 1879, S.1880.2.77; Aix, Jan. 31, 1879, 8.1879.2.332.
226. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TBAIT]t PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 795
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
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these titles. 227 As owner, the usufructuary may pledge the
title,228 collect the capital, 229 and reinvest it as he pleases. 230 .
The decided Louisiana cases deal mostly with promissory notes
and bonds, but the rules announced therein are susceptible of
generalization and application to all usufructs of credits.
Detailed provisions in the German and Greek Civil Codes
regulate the incidents and effects of obligatory claims (credits).
The German Civil Code establishes a distinction between claims
which produce interests and claims which do not. The usufiuc-
tuary of a non-interest producing claim is entitled to take
delivery of the object of performance, and, if the maturity of
the obligation depends on notice by the creditor, to give notice.231
He may not dispose of the claim otherwise; for example, he may
not cede or remit it. The creation of the usufruct functions as
an assignment of the credit; accordingly, the debtor is discharged
by payment to the usufructuary rather than to the naked owner
(creditor). But if the debtor ignores the creation of the usu-
fruct, payment to the creditor is valid.2 32 The usufructuary is
under obligation to act as a prudent administrator for the or-
derly collection of payment. 233 Upon payment, if the object of
delivery is a consumable thing, the usufructuary becomes owner
subject to his obligation to account to the grantor at the end of
the usufruct; if the object of delivery is a non-consumable thing,
the usufructuary acquires a right of enjoyment thereon and
ownership vests in the grantor. 34
If the claim produces interests, the usufructuary is entitled
to collect these interests which are fruits of the claim and of his
right of enjoyment. The principal, however, is payable jointly
to the usufructuary and the naked owner. The debtor who has
227. See Vivian State Bank v. Thomason-Lewis Lumber Co., 162 La. 660, 111
So. 51 (1927) ; Migucz v. Delcambre, 125 La. 176, 51 So. 108 (1910) ; Succession
of Block, 137 La. 302, 68 So. 618 (1915) ; cf. Taylor v. Taylor, 189 La. 1084,
181 So. 543 (1938) (negotiable instruments to the bearer; imperfect usufruct)
Johnson v. Bolt, 146 So. 375 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933).
228. See Vivian State Bank v. Thomason-Lewis Lumber Co., 162 La. 660, 111
So. 51 (1927) ; Miguez v. Delcambre, 125 La. 176, 51 So. 108 (1910).
229. See Succession of Block, 137 La. 302, 68 So. 618 (1915) ; Kahn v.
Becne], 108 La. 296, 32 So. 444 (1902).
230. See Succession of Block, 137 La. 302, 68 So. 618 (1915) ; cf. Burdin v.
Burdin, 171 La. 7, 129 So. 651 (1930) ; Lagle v. Marchand's Estate, 129 So. 2d
849 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) ; Gryder v. Gryder, 37 La. Ann. 638 (1885) ; Danna
v. Danna, 161 So. 348 (La. Ap~p. 1st Cir. 1935) ; Johnson v. Bolt, 146 So. 375
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1933) ; Comment, The Usufructuiary'8 Obligation of Restitution
in Imperfect Usufruct, 6 TUL. L. REV. 105 (1931).
231. See B.G.B. § 1074.
232. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENBECMT 486 (10th ed. 1957) cf. B.G.B. § 1070.
233. See B.G.B. § 1074.
234. Id. § 1075.
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knowledge of the creation of the usufruct is thus discharged
only by payment to both the usufructuary and the naked owner;
but if he ignores the usufruct, he is validly discharged by pay-
ment to the naked owner alone. Either the usufructuary or the
naked owner may demand payment on account of both of them;
but if the maturity of the claim depends on prior notice, this
notice must be given jointly.235 If the object of delivery is a
consumable thing, the naked owner and the usufructuary acquire
co-ownership; if the object is a non-consumable, the naked owner
acquires ownership and the usufructuary enjoyment. Usu-
fructuary and naked owner are bound toward each other to co-
operate for the orderly collection of payment.23 6 They are like-
wise obligated to cooperate for the safe investment of the col-
lected capital in interest bearing accounts. The mode of in-
vestment is determined by the usufructuary. The usufructuary
does not have a right of enjoyment on the reinvested capital by
operation of law: he merely has a personal right against the
naked owner for the creation of a usufruct thereon. 237 These
rules apply to all kinds of obligations, even to those secured by
a pledge or mortgage: the usufruct on the secured credit ex-
tends to the accessorial rights of real security.
The Greek Civil Code establishes a distinction between mon-
etary and non-monetary claims. The usufructuary of a non-
monetary claim is entitled to collect payment; after collection
of the object of delivery his usufruct of a claim is transformed
into a usufruct of a thing.23 8 If the claim is monetary, the usu-
fructuary is entitled to the collection of any interests due with-
out the participation of the naked owner; but the capital may
be collected only by the usufructuary and the naked owner acting
in cooperation. In lieu of collection of the capital, or after col-
lection, either the usufructuary or the naked owner may demand
the safe investment of the capital in an interest bearing account.
The mode of investment is determined by the usufructuary. 239
c. Usufruet of Negotiable Instruments
In France and in Louisiana, the usufruct of negotiable instru-
ments is governed by the general rules on usufruct.240 In Ger-
235. Id. § 1077.
236. Id. § 1078.
237. Id. § 1079; WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 487 (10th ed. 1957). But cf.
as to non-interest bearing credits B.G.B. § 1075, text at note 234 aupra.
238. See GREEK CivrL CODE art. 1179.
239. Id. art. 1180.
240. See text at note 201 8upra.
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many and in Greece, however, the Civil Codes contain a number
of special provisions which need to be considered at this point.
Usufruct on all kinds of negotiable instruments may be
created in Germany following the formalities and substantive
regulations which govern the transfer of the particular right
evidenced by, or incorporated into, the title. The creation of
usufruct on the right results, at the same time, in creation of
usufruct on the title.241 Negotiable instruments to the order, as
checks, bills of lading, or shares of stock issued to the order,
may also be burdened with usufruct by endorsement, delivery of
the instrument to the assignee, and agreement as to the creation
of usufruct. The endorsement need not state the purpose of the
transaction, i.e., the intention of the parties to create a usu-
fruct.242 Further, negotiable instruments to the bearer, or to
the order endorsed in blank, may be burdened with usufruct in
accordance with the rules governing the creation of usufruct on
corporeal movables. This transaction requires only agreement
of the parties and delivery of the title to the usufructuary. The
delivery need not be actual: recognized substitutes for actual
delivery or creation of joint possession suffice.243
The rights and duties of the usufructuary and of the naked
owner of negotiable instruments issued to the order of a named
person are governed by the rules of the German Civil Code ap-
plicable to the usufruct of credits. 244 But with respect to nego-
tiable instruments issued to the bearer, or to the order endorsed
in blank, the German Civil Code provides by way of exception
that possession of the title and of the renewal coupons belongs
jointly, to the usufructuary and the naked owner. Possession
of interest coupons, annuity coupons, or dividend coupons, on the
other hand, belongs to the usufructuary alone. 245 Either the usu-
fructuary or the naked owner may demand that the title, to-
gether with its renewal coupons, be deposited with a depositary
institution subject to the condition that it be withdrawn jointly.
The usufructuary may designate certain named banks as depos-
itaries. 240 The matured principal must be collected jointly by
the usufructuary and naked owner. Joint action is also required
for all requisite measures of orderly management as well as for
241. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 488 (10th ed. 1957) ; cf. B.G.B. § 952.
242. Ibid.; cf. B.G.B. § 1068(2).
243. See B.G.B. § 1081(2).
244. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 488 (10th ed. 1957).
245. See B.G.B. § 1081.
246. Id. § 1082.
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the procuration of new coupons, annuity, or dividend coupons.
Upon payment of the principal, the parties are under duty to
cooperate for its reinvestment in accordance with the rules gov-
erning usufruct of claims. 247 If the instrument subject to usu-
fruct is itself a consumable thing, the rights and duties of the
usufructuary and of the naked owner are determined in the light
of the rules governing usufruct of consumables.248
In contrast with the complex system of the German Civil
Code, the Greek Civil Code provides simply that the usufruct
of negotiable instruments is subject to the rules governing usu-
fruct of (corporeal) things.249 Thus, creation, incidents, and
termination of this usufruct are matters determined by analo-
gous application of the rules governing usufruct of things rather
than usufruct of rights. In accordance with the general rules,
the usufructuary is obligated to furnish security unless the con-
trary has been stipulated.250 By way of exception, however, the
Greek Civil Code provides that the usufructuary is relieved of
the obligation to furnish security if the instruments are deposited
with a safe bank or other depositary institution subject to the
rights of the usufructuary or if the usufructuary is a donor who
has reserved usufruct. In all cases, the usufructuary is entitled
to the possession of dividend coupons without security.251
II. LEGAL POWERS OF THE USUFRUCTUARY
In addition to his right of enjoyment, the usufructuary is ac-
corded by law a certain measure of authority to administer the
property subject to usufruct and to bring all actions, personal
and real, for the protection of his interests. Accordingly, the
usufructuary may have authority to lease the property subject to
usufruct, sell standing crops which are expected to mature after
the end of the usufruct, collect payment of maturing obliga-
tions, and participate in general assemblies of corporations if
shares of stock are burdened with usufruct; further, he may
enforce his rights against the naked owner or against third
persons by recourse to justice in his own name. The following
discussion is devoted to an examination of the scope of the usu-
fructuary's power of administration and of the incidents and
effects of actions initiated by or against the usufructuary.
247. Id. § 1083.
248. Id. § 1084.
249. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1176.
250. Id. art. 1176(1).
251. Id. art. 1176(2).
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1. Acts of Administration
According to well-established French civilian doctrine, juridi-
cal acts are distinguished, in the light of their nature, into con-
servatory acts, acts of administration, and acts of disposition.2 52
Classification of juridical acts within one of the three categories
is not always easy. In this respect, the criteria developed by
French doctrine and jurisprudence are in the nature of general
propositions which, by necessity, lack precision.2 53  In general,
conservatory acts are those which tend to preserve a thing
within a given patrimony, to prevent it from being destroyed,
damaged, or lost for the owner. Acts of disposition tend to
divest the owner of his interest, to deprive him, in part or in
whole, of a real or personal right. Thus, acts translative of
ownership or of other real rights, as sales, exchanges, and dona-
tions, the burdening of ownership with a real right, the abandon-
ment of a real right or the renunciation of a personal right, and
the compromise of a claim are examples of acts of disposition.
Acts of administration are acts of management of a thing or of
a patrimony which exceed the limits of mere conservatory
252. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAIT THt'ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIrL, III Supplement by Bonnecase 630-86 (1926) ; 1 CARBONNIEB, DROIT CIVIL
625-28 (1955); 1 MARTY ET RAYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL 261 (1956); 1 PLANIOL,
RIPEaT, ET BOULANOER, TaAIT DE DaOIT CIVIL 929 (1956) ; and, in general,
TRASBOT, L'ACTE D'ADMINISTRATION EN DROIT PRIVt FANC.AIS (Thesis, Bordeaux
1921) ; cf. 2 AuBny ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 239, 663 (7th ed. Esmein
1961).
The distinction of juridical acts into conservatory acts, acts of administration,
and acts of disposition is also known in Germany and in Greece. For example,
under Greek law, the tutor or the curator of a person may perform conservatory
acts and certain acts of administration without prior authorization by the family
council. See BALIs, FAMILY LAW 410 (1956) (in Greek). This classification of
juridical acts, however, does not determine by itself the authority of a person to
act, be he tutor, curator, or owner with limited juridical capacity. Instead,
directly applicable provisions in the Civil Codes prescribe specifically the capacity
or authority of certain persons to perform juridical acts affecting their own
patrimony or the patrimony of another person under their control without reference
to the nature of these juridical acts. Thus, a person having the administration of
another's patrimony may well be authorized to perform certain acts of disposi-
tion. See 1 ENNECCEBUS-NIPPERDEY, ALLOEMEINER TEIL DES BIORGERLICHEN
RECHTS 885 (10th ed. 1960). Under German and Greek law, therefore, acts of
disposition need not be contrasted to either acts of administration or to conservatory
acts. Disposition is dealt with in the framework of the theory of loss of rights
and is contrasted to acts involving merely a promise for the disposition of a right.
The question of authority to dispose is dealt with as one of the requirements for
the validity and effect of dispositive juridical acts. See ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY
882, 885, 814 8upra; BALIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 97-105, 111, 172-
74 (7th ed. 1956) (in Greek).
253. See 1 PLANIOL, RIPERT, ET BOULANGER, TRAITt DE DROIT CIVIL 929 (1956).
The lack of precise criteria has led Aubry and Rau to the conclusion that the
distinction between acts of disposition and acts of administration ought to be
abandoned. See 1 AuaaY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANUAIS 696 n. 1 (5th ed. 1897).
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measures. 254  Acts of administration thus constitute a residual
category, frequently defined by the process of exclusion. In
the absence of rigorous criteria, classification in concrete cases
may rest on directly applicable legal provisions, or, more elusive-
ly, on policy considerations and teleological interpretation of
existing texts.
From a functional viewpoint, the distinction is supposed to
furnish guidelines for the determination of the authority of
certain persons to act with respect to things under their owner-
ship or control. 255  But in this regard, classification actually
depends on the purpose rather than the nature of individual
acts. Thus, especially in connection with the administration of
an entire patrimony, certain acts which are necessary or useful
for the orderly management of the property are classified as
acts of administration although they may tend to divest the owner
of a real or of a personal right.250
Insofar as the usufructuary is concerned, the classification of
certain acts within one of the three categories carries significant
legal consequences. The usufructuary of non-consumable things
is under obligation to perform conservatory acts,2 57 may have
authority to perform acts of administration, 25 and lacks au-
thority to make acts of disposition.219  In this context, "author-
ity" means the power of the usufructuary to represent the owner
254. See 1 CARBONNIEB, DROIT CIVIL 627 (1955); 1 MARTY ET RAYNAUD,
DROIT CIVIL 261 (1956).
255. Thus, for example, a competent major may, in the absence of legal or
contractual prohibition, perform as to his property all kinds of juridical acts.
See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRAN.AIS 239 (7th ed. Esmein 1961). In-
terdicted persons and non-emancipated minors may perform conservatory acts but
they may not perform acts of disposition or acts of administration. Emancipated
minors, prodigals, and feeble-minded persons under curatorship may perform
conservatory acts and acts of administration but not acts of disposition. Further,
the authority of tutors or curators to act alone or with the concurrence of the
family council or of the court, or their lack of authority to act, may be determined
in the light of the classification of the various acts as conservatory, acts of ad-
ministration, or acts of disposition. See 1 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 625-28
(1955) ; 1 PLANIOL, RIPERT ET BOULANGER, TRAITI DE DROIT CIVIL 929, 948
(1956).
256. Cf. Trib. Perigueux, April 29, 1947, 2 Gaz. Pal. 53 (1947) ; 1 PLANIOL,
RIPERT ET BOULANGER, TRAIT~t DE DROIT CIVIL 929 (1956). Cf. 7 DEMOLOMBE,
TRAITt DE LA MINORITA 313, 366 (1880).
257. See, e.g., LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 533, 558, 567, 570, 571, 578 (1870)
FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 578, 595, 601, 605, 614; B.G.B. §§ 1036(2), 1037, 1041,
1042; GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 1142, 1148, 1152, 1153.
258. See text at notes 856, 864, 867 infra.
259. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 533, 535, 567, 590, 591 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL




and to perform juridical acts with binding effects toward the
naked owner and third persons.260
a. Leases
According to article 555 of the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870,201 and corresponding article 595 of the French Civil Code,
the usufructuary is entitled to lease his right to another. 26 2 This
is an attribute of the usufructuary's enjoyment, accorded to
him in all legal systems under consideration.2 13  Questions arise,
however, as to the authority of the usufructuary to lease movables
or immovables subject to usufruct for a term exceeding the period
of his enjoyment by a contract binding the lessee and the naked
owner.
Since according to traditional ideas leases give rise to merely
personal obligations, they should not be binding on persons other
than the contracting parties.26 A lease by the usufructuary
should not bind the naked owner and an existing lease at the
time of the creation of the usufruct should not bind the usu-
fructuary. Abstract principles, however, had to give way to
practical considerations of economic utility. Accordingly, in all
systems under consideration, leases of immovable property may,
to a variable extent, be binding on persons other than the con-
tracting parties.
Leases of immovables contracted by the owner prior to the
creation of the usufruct remain in effect everywhere--subject
260. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
790 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; 2 AUBRY ET IlAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 663 (7th ed.
Esmein 1961).
261. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 555 (1870) : "The usufructuary may enjoy by
himself or lease to another, or even sell or give away his right; but all contracts
or agreements which he makes in this respect, whatever duration he may have
intended to give them, cease of right at the expiration of -the usufruct." The sec-
ond sentence was added in the 1825 revision. According to the redactors, the
source of this provision is Book 7, tit. 1, law 67 of the Digest of Justinian. See
1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1825 p. 52 (1937).
It ought to be noted, however, that the passage in the Digest reads as follows:
"Anyone to whom the usufruct has been bequeathed can sell the same to a stranger,
even without the consent of the heir."
262. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 595: "The usufructuary may enjoy by him-
self, or lease to another, or even sell or transfer his right by gratuitous title.
If he leases it, he must comply, as to the reriods for the renewal of leases and
as to their duration, with the rules established for the husband administrator
of property of his wife in the title Of the Contract of Marriage and of the
Respective Rights of the Spouses." It ought to be noted that the second sentence
of this article is materially different from the second sentence of article 555 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.
263. See B.G.B. § 1059; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1166.
264. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIIPERT, TRAITIk PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 790(2d ed. Picard 1952) ; YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 95 (1966).
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to certain conditions in some instances. Since, in principle,
change of ownership does not affect existing leases adversely,265
the creation of usufruct should a fortiori be without effect on
the validity of existing leases. The usufructuary, however, is
entitled to rentals as of the creation of the usufruct.2  In France,
a lease contracted by the naked owner prior to the creation of
the usufruct is effective against the usufructuary if it acquired
certain date before the commencement of the usufruct. 267 Fur-
ther, leases made for a period in excess of twelve years bind the
usufructuary only if recorded.206 If the absence of recordation,
the duration of the lease is reduced to twelve years.
269
In Louisiana, leases granted by the owner prior to the crea-
tion of the usufruct are binding on the usufructuary regardless
of their duration, even in the absence of certain date. In this
respect, article 2733 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870270 dif-
fers substantially from the corresponding article 1743 of the
French Civil Code which requires certain date.27' However,
predial leases, in order to be effective against third persons,
need to be recorded. Article 2266 of the Louisiana Civil Code,
which has no equivalent in the French Civil Code, provides that
"all sales, contracts and judgments affecting immovable pro-
perty, which shall not be so recorded, shall be utterly null and
void, except between the parties thereto. ' 272 Further, the Lou-
isiana legislature enacted in 1950 a statute which provides that
"no... surface lease or other instrument of [sic] writing relat-
ing to or affecting immovable property shall be binding on or
affect third persons or third parties unless and until filed for
registry in the office of the parish recorder of the parish where
265. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2733 (1870); FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1743;
B.G.B. §§ 571, 577; GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 614, 615.
266. See text at notes 56-62 supra.
267. Cf. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1743: "If the lessor sells the thing leased,
the purchaser cannot turn out the tenant who has a lease by notarial act or of
certain date, unless the contrary has been stipulated in the contract." The article
speaks of "purchaser" but it ought to apply a fortiori to the usufructuary. See 3
PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 791 (2d ed.
Picard 1952).
268. See Decree of Jan. 4, 1955, art. 28(1) b; 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL
FRANQAIS 666 (7th ed. Esmein 1961).
269. See Decree of Jan. 4, 1955. art. 30 (3) ; cf. 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 791 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
270. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2733 (1870) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2704 (1825)
LA. CIVIL CODE p. 380, art. 44 (180S). The version adopted in Louisiana is that
of the Projet du Gouvernment, Book III, Title XIII, art. 56.
271. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1743, note 267 supra.
272. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2266 (1870). This provision derived from La.
Acts 1855, No. 274, § 2. According to Louisiana jurisprudence constante, predial
leases are "contracts . . . affecting immovables" within the meaning of article
2266. Accordingly, in order to be effective against third persons, predial leases
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the land or immovable is situated; and neither secret claims or
equities nor other matters outside the public records shall be
binding on or affect such third parties. '2 3  Third persons or
third parties are defined to be "any third person ... acquiring
a real or personal right therein as purchaser, mortgagee, grantee
or vendee of servitude .... -274
A literal interpretation of the quoted provisions might lead
to the conclusion that leases contracted by the owner prior to
the commencement of the usufruct are never binding on the usu-
fructuary in the absence of recordation. It is submitted, how-
ever, that distinction ought to be made between usufructuaries
by universal title and usufructuaries by particular title.275 A
usufructuary by particular title is certainly a "third person"
and "grantee or vendee of a [personal] servitude," within the
scope of the statute. In the absence of recordation, such a usu-
fructuary is not bound by leases contracted by the owner. On
the other hand, a usufructuary by universal title, as the surviving
spouse in community, is not a third person but a successor who
continues the personality of the deceased and assumes his rights
and obligations. Such a usufructuary is bound by the leases of
the owner, even in the absence of recordation.
In Germany, leases for a period in excess of one year must
be made in writing to be valid 276 and leases in excess of thirty
years may always be cancelled after completion of thirty years
in accordance with statutory rules of notice. 277 Subject to these
limitations, and without any requirement as to certain date or
recordation of the lease, the usufructuary is bound to respect
leases granted by the owner if the lessee had taken delivery
of the leased premises at the time of the creation of the usu-
fruct.27 8 If the lease were granted prior to the creation of the
usufruct but the lessee had not taken delivery at the time of the
must be recorded. See Flower v. Pearce & Son, 45 La. Ann. 853 (1893) ; Lewis
v. Klotz, 39 La. Ann. 259 (1887) ; Anderson v. Comeau, 33 La. Ann. 1119 (1881) ;
Tate v. Fakouri, 118 So. 2d 464 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) ; State ex rel. Winn v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 25 So. 2d 543 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946) ; Hamilton Co. v.
Hughes, 141 So. 398 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932); cf. Redmann, The Louisiana Law
of Recordation: Some Principles and Some Problems, 39 TUL. L. REV. 491 (1965).
273. La. Acts 1950 (2 E.S.) No. 7, now LA. R.S. 9:2721 (1950). The statute
was intended to overrule legislatively the decision of the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Arnold v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 50, 48 So. 2d 369 (1950).
274. LA. R.S. 9:2722 (1950).
275. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3556(28) (1870).
276. See B.G.B. § 566.
277. Id. § 567.




creation of the usufruct, the usufructuary is bound to respect
the lease only if he assumed towards the lessor the fulfillment
of the obligations arising from the lease.27 9
In Greece, leases which acquired certain date prior to the
creation of usufruct over the leased premises are binding on the
usufructuary280 up to a period of nine years without recorda-
tion, and for a period in excess of nine years if they are dressed
in the form of notarial act and are recorded. 2 1 Leases which
have not acquired certain date prior to the creation of the usu-
fruct are subject to cancellation by one month's notice if they
are made for one year or less, and by two months' notice if they
are made for a period in excess of one year.2
82
Different solutions have been adopted as to the validity of
leases contracted by the usufructuary. Article 555 of the Lou-
isiana Civil Code of 1870 establishes the general principle that
all contracts or agreements made by the usufructuary "whatever
duration he may have intended to give them, cease of right at the
expiration of the usufruct. ' 2s. In accordance with this prin-
ciple, article 2730 of the same Code declares that "a lease made
by one having a right of usufruct, ends when the right of usu-
fruct ceases.''284  It may be said, therefore, that in Louisiana
leases are not acts of administration insofar as the usufructuary
is concerned. The usufructuary has no authority to act in a re-
presentative capacity by virtue of his real right of enjoyment.
His contracts, however, may be binding on the naked owner in
accordance with the general rules of express mandate,28 5 negotio-
279. See B.G.B. § 578.
280. See GRaur CIVIL CODE art. 614.
281. Id. art. 618: 2 ZEros, LAW OF OBLGATIONs 247 (2d ed. 1965).
282. See GaExK CIvIL CODE art. 615.
283. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 555 (1870), note 261 aupra; Dickson v. Dickson,
33 La. Ann. 1370 (1881). The second sentence of article 555 has no equivalent
in the Civil Codes of France, Germany, or Greece. This does not mean that the
usufructuary may elsewhere burden the property with real rights or affect it with
contractual agreements running in excess of the period of usufruct. On the con-
trary, it follows from general theory that contracts made by the usufructuary
and real rights validly granted by him expire with the usufruct. But, by virtue
of exceptional provisions in these Civil Codes, leases granted by the usufructuary
may, within certain limits, be binding on the naked owner for a period in excess
of the usufruct. See text at notes 301-320 infra.
284. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2730 (1870) ; La. Civil Code art. 2701 (1825);
La. Civil Code p. 380, art. 41 (1808). This article derives from the Projet du
Gouvernment, Book III, Title XIII, art. 53. There is no equivalent in the
Napoleonic Code.
285. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2985-3034 (1870) ; of. Yiannopoulos, Brokerage,
Mandate, and Agency in Louisiana: Civilian Tradition and Modern Practice, 19
LA. L. REv. 777, 778 (1959) ; IA. CIVIL CODE art. 1889 (1870) : "No one can,




rum gestio,28s stipulation pour autrui,2s7 and ratification by the
owner.
288
If the usufructuary grants a predial lease merely for the
period of the usufruct or makes it clear to the lessee that he acts
as usufructuary, the lessee is not entitled to any indemnity upon
termination of the lease as a result of the termination of the
usufruct. 2s9 But "he who lets out the property of another,
warrants the enjoyment of it against the claim of the owner. '290
Thus, if the usufructuary misrepresents himself as owner or
fails to disclose to the lessor the fact that he is usufructuary
rather than owner, the lessee is entitled to an indemnity from
the usufructuary or his heirs in case of premature termination
of the lease. 291  The warranty of the lease by the usufructuary
need not be express; it arises by operation of law in all cases of
misrepresentation or non-disclosure of the identity of the lessor.
Naturally, indemnity will be due a fortiori in case the usu-
fructuary expressly warrants the lease for a stated period of
time. In this case, the obligation is purely contractual and has
nothing to do with misrepresentation or non-disclosure of iden-
tity.
Misrepresentation or non-disclosure of the lessor's identity,
and express warranty, give rise to heritable obligations for the
286. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2299 (1870) : "Equity obliges the owner, whose
business has been well managed, to comply with the engagements contracted by the
manager, in his name .... "
287. Id. art. 1890: "A person may also, in his own name, make some ad-
vantage for a third person the condition or consideration of a commutative con-
tract, or onerous donation; and if such third person consents to avail himself of
the advantage stipulated in his favor, the contract can not be revoked." See also
id. arts. 1889, 1902.
288. See id. art. 1840: "Contracts, however, made in the name of another,
under void powers, will be valid, if ratified by the principal before the other con-
tracting party has signified his dissent to the agreement." Cf. id. art. 2272; Au-
coin v. Greenwood, 199 La. 764, 7 So. 2d 50 (1942) (usufructuary's lease rdtified
by the owner). Question arises as to whether the lessee is bound by a lease con-
tracted by the usufructuary for a period in excess of the usufruct. Since the
naked owner is not bound, argument could be made that in the absence of mutuality
of obligations the lessee should likewise be free of any contractual obligations.
Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1792, 1913 (1870). However, after ratification of the
lease by the owner, the lessee is bound to the agreement. Id. art. 1840.
289. See id. art. 2730(2) : "The lessee has no right to an indemnification from
the heirs of the lessor, if the lessor has made known to him the title under which
he possessed."
290. Id. art. 2682.
291. Id. art. 2730(2) (arg. a confrario) ; Sparks v. Dan Cohen Co., 187 La.
830, 175 So. 590, 593 (1937) : "The second paragraph of article 2730 is intended
to protect one who leases property from an usufructuary under the belief on the
part of the lessee that the lessor is the owner of the property. The reason for
this is given in article 2682 of the Civil Code, thus: 'He who lets out the property
of another, warrants the enjoyment of it against the claim of the owner'."
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payment of the indemnity.292 Since usufructs are normally for
life, indemnity is ordinarily claimed from the heirs of the usu-
fructuary as a result of the termination of the usufruct and of
the lease by the death of the usufructuary. The heirs of the
usufructuary, if they happen to be naked owners of the leased
property, are not under obligation to continue the lease; the
lease "ceases of right" upon the death of the usufructuary. 293
But the naked owners may be bound to pay an indemnity in cases
of misrepresentation, non-disclosure of identify, or express war-
ranty, as all other heirs of the usufructuary, or, at their choice,
to respect the terms of the lease. Where, exceptionally, the
usufruct is for a term or terminates during the lifetime of the
usufructuary because of the usufructuary's abuse of the pro-
perty, any indemnity is due by the usufructuary himself.294
Mineral leases in Louisiana involve distinct problems. Ac-
cording to the "open mines" doctrine, the usufructuary has no
right to grant mineral leases on lands which, at the time of the
creation of the usufruct, were not being exploited by mineral
operations. 295 This is the prerogative of the naked owner who
also enjoys the proceeds of minerals operations deriving from
mines, quarries, or oil wells not opened at the time of the crea-
292. Language in Sparks v. Dan Cohen Co., 187 La. 830, 175 So. 590, 592
(1937), creates the impression that "the obligation of a lessor, to warrant and
defend the lessee's right of possession of the leased premises, survives as an
obligation of the succession of the lessor, in the event of his death before the
expiration of the term of the lease, only in cases where the lessor claimed ownership
of the leased premises. . ." (Emphasis added.) Elsewhere in the opinion, however,
the court seemed to indicate that the intended meaning of article 2730(2) is to
protect the lessee not only in cases where the lessor claimed ownership of the leased
premises but also in case the lessor merely failed to disclose his identify. See
note 291 supra. It would seem that, according to a proper interpretation of
articles 2730(2) and 2682 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 in combination with
articles 1999 and 2008 of the same Code, the heirs of the usufructuary incur the
obligation to pay an indemnity in all cases of misrepresentation, non-disclosure
of identity, or express warranty. On heritable obligations, see LA. CIVIL CODE
arts. 1997-2009 (1870); Currier, Heritability of Conventional Obligations, 31
TUL. L. REV. 324 (1957).
293. Sparks v. Dan Cohen Co., 187 La. 830, 175 So. 590, 593 (1937) : "A lease
made by the usufructuary, therefore, 'ceases of right at the expiration of the
usufruct', whether the lessor informed the lessee, or failed to inform him before
or at -the time of making the lease, that he, the lessor, was only usufructuary,
and not the owner, of the property." It is the right of the lessee to be in-
demnified by the heirs of the lessor, if the lessor is only the usufructuary and
if he dies before the expiration of the term of the lease, that depends upon whether
the lessor failed to make known to the lessee that he, the lessor, was not the owner
but only the usufructuary of the proyerty. That is the precise language and
meaning of Article 2730 of the Civil Code. "An usufructuary cannot, by failing
to disclose to a lessee that he, the lessor, is not the owner but only the usu-
fructuary of the property, deprive the owner of the right under the law which says
that such a lease 'ceases of right at the expiration of the usufruct'."
294. See Dickson v. Dickson, 33 La. Ann. 1370 (1881).
295. See LA, CIVIL CODE art. 552 (1870).
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tion of the usufruct. 296  If the usufructuary, without right,
grants a mineral lease, the naked owner is free to cancel it at
will; but the usufructuary or his heirs will incur the obligation
to pay an indemnity for breach of the lessor's warranty. 297
Conceivably, the usufructuary may grant mineral leases as
to mines or oil wells opened and under exploitation by the owner
at the time of the creation of the usufruct. This, however, is
hardly a practical situation in oil development. Due to the high
cost of oil production it is rare that a simple landowner is ever
himself the producer. If wells are in operation at the time of
the creation of the usufruct, the chances are that the mineral
rights are already under lease or under some other form of
exploitation. 29 Questions, therefore, are more likely to arise
in practice as to the disposition of the proceeds of mining oper-
ations and as to the rights of the usufructuary to extend or alter
the terms of existing leases. 299
In France, article 595(2) of the Civil Code, which has no
equivalent in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, provides that if
296. See King v. Buffington, 240 La. 955, 126 So. 2d 236 (1961), text at notes
102-114 8upra.
297. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2682 (1870), text at note 290 supra. In this
respect, the usufructuary occupies the position of a person who, without right,
leases the property of another. In effect, his position is similar to that of a usu-
fructuary who grants a predial lease for a term in excess of the period of the
usufruct by misrepresenting himself or failing to disclose his identity. The heirs
of the usufructuary, if they accepted the succession unconditionally, incur the
obligation to idemnify the lessee for the breach of the warranty.
If the heirs of the usufructuary are also naked owners of the property, they
are bound by the warranty of their ancestor as heirs rather than as owners.
Whatever rights the usufructuary grants on the property expire of right with
the usufruct insofar as owners of the land are concerned; but heirs who have
accepted the succession of the usufruotuary unconditionally, assume the heritable
obligations of the deceased. In theory, therefore, the obligation of the heirs,
even if they are naked owners of the property, should be merely the payment
of an indemnity for the breach of the warranty or at their choice, continuation
of the lease, as in the case of predial leases. In practice, however, the amount
of the indemnity for the breach of a mineral lease may not be easily ascertainable,
and, in any case, the cancellation of the lease may involve reimbursement of large
sums of money which the heirs may not have at their disposal. Under the
pressure of circumstances, the heirs may be forced to respect the lease.
298. See Daggett, Mineral Rights as They Affect the Community Property
System, 1 LA. L. REv. 17, 34 (1938). It ought to be clear that in the rare
case of a mineral lease that the usufructuary is allowed to grant, the term of the
lease may not exceed the period of the usufruct. In this respect, the respective
positions of the usufructuary, the lessee, and of the naked owners are precisely
the same as in the case of predial leases. Specifically, misrepresentation, non-
disclosure of identity, and express warranty by -the usufructuary ought to have
the same effects as in predial leases.
299. In Cochran v. Gulf Refining Co., 139 La. 1010, 72 So. 718 (1916), the
surviving widow of the lessor, and usufructuary of land, granted extension of the
term of an existing mineral lease. She died before the last extension expired.
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the usufructuary grants "leases, he must conform, as to the
periods for the renewal of the leases and as to their duration,
with the rules established for the husband administrator of the
property of his wife in the title Of the Contract of Marriage and
the Respective Rights of the Spouses." 00 Accordingly, whereas
the usufructuary is always bound personally toward the lessee
for the execution of the lease, the naked owner may be bound
to respect the lease for limited periods and under stated terms
and conditions applicable to the administration of matrimonial
property. The validity of leases executed by the usufructuary
is, specifically, determined according to the following rules:
At the end of the usufruct, the lease is divided into periods
of nine years and the lessee is accorded the right to continue the
lease until the end of the nine-year-period running at the time
of the termination of the usufruct. If the lease has been granted
for a longer period of time, it is reduced to fit the rule.80 1 The fact
that the naked owner is the heir of the usufructuary is immaterial
al in this respect: the obligations assumed by the usufructuary as
usufructuary terminate with the usufruct and do not pass to
his heirs.80 2  If the usufructuary, however, misrepresented him-
self as owner or expressly warranted the lease, his heirs inherit
obligations arising from the misrepresentation or from the war-
ranty. 0 By way of exception, any lease granted by the usu-
Her heirs and naked owners of the property accepted the succession unconditionally
and by their actions showed their assent to the acts of the usufructuary. In an
action to set aside the last extension and to cancel the lease, the court held that
the heirs assumed the obligation of the deceased "with respect to the land, and
were thereby bound to recognize the contract of lease" (139 La. at 1018, 72 So.
at 720). Since the case was decided prior to Gulf Refining Co. v. Glassel, 186
La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936). the decision was predicated on the assumption that
the oil and gas lease in question involved the sale of a real right. See Sparks v.
Dan Cohen Co., 187 La. 830, 175 So. 590 (1937). Under the applicable rules of
sales, heirs of the seller who accept the succession unconditionally assume the
obligation of warranty of title which includes the duty "to cause the buyer to
be placed in possession of the thing sold, that is, to deliver it, and to warrant
the buyer's peaceable possession." Smith, Recovery of Damages for Non-Delivery
and Eviction in Louisiana-A Comparison, 17 LA. L. REV. 253 (1957). If the
case were decided today, the court would have to apply the rules governing leases
rather than sales. Accordinaly, the obligation of the heirs would be, on prin-
ciple, the payment of an indemnity, or, at their choice, the continuation of the
lease.
300. FRENCH CIVIL CODE, art. 595 (2), note 262 supra.
301. See Toulouse, Nov. 29, 1915, D. 1917.2.87; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, T¢RAIT]k
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 792 (2d ed. Picard 1952). Cf. FRENCH CIVIL
CODE art. 1429.
302. See Req., April 18, 1921, D.1922.1.210, S.1922.1.15; Req., April 13, 1897,
D.1898.1.76, S.1900.1.173. But see 2 COLIN, CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DE LA MORAN-
DIkRE, TRAITIt DE DROIT CIVIL 161 (1959).
303. See Req., April 18, 1921, D.1922.1.210, 8.1922.1.15; Trib. Civ. Fon-
tainebleau, Nov. 25, 1932, Gaz. Trib. March 24, 1933, 2 AURRY ET RAU, DROIT
CIVIL FRANCAIS 665 n.58 (7th ed. Esmein 1961).
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fructuary in fraud of the rights of the naked owner is subject to
annulment regardless of its intended duration.3 14
The law, in order to prevent vacancies, allows the usufruc-
tuary to renew the lease of a building in the last two years of
the running nine-year-period and the lease of a rural immovable
in the last three years of the running nine-year-period.305 In
case the usufructuary exercises this faculty, the lease may bind
the owner of a building for eleven years and the owner of a
rural immovable for twelve years. Leases executed by the usu-
fructuary prior to the last two or three years of the running
nine-year-period are null, unless performance of the contract
commenced before the termination of the usufruct.306
Annulment or reduction of the term of a lease may be de-
manded only by the naked owner. The lessee has not been ac-
corded a corresponding faculty ;307 thus, if the naked owner
chooses to maintain the lease, the lessee is bound to the terms
of the contract. Rentals, even if paid in advance, are appor-
tioned between the naked owner and the usufructuary in propor-
tion to the duration of the usufruct.30 8 Bonuses received by the
usufructuary upon conclusion of the lease are likewise subject
to apportionment.30 9
French writers maintain that article 595 of the French Civil
Code refers to immovables exclusively. Accordingly, any lease
of movables granted by the usufructuary should, on principle,
be effective only as between the parties to the contract. It has
been pointed out, however, that this rigorous interpretation may
run counter to the intention of the parties and may do violence
to the demands of economic utility. By way of exception, there-
fore, it seems to be generally admitted that the usufructuary has
authority to lease movables which by their nature are destined
to be leased, as for example, a fleet of automobiles for hire.310
304. See Ch. r~un. May 21, 1952, D.1952.537; Pau, Feb. 19, 1959, D.1959.409;
Req., Oct. 28, 1896, D.1897.1.45; Poitiers, March 22, 1881, D.1881.2.150, S.1882.2.-
105; Orleans, Dec. 31, 1868, S.1869.2.51; Poitiers, April 29, 1863, 8.1863.2.169.
305. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1430.
306. See Trib. Pithiviers, May 28, 1925, D.H. 1925.511; Trib. Civ. Seine,
LE DROIT, Feb. 11, 1892; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIt PHATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANQAIS 793 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
307. See Req., Jan. 29, 1883, D.183.1.314, S.1885.1.482; Douai, March 18,
1852, D.1853.2.20, S.1852.2.337; 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 665 (7th
ed. Esmein 1961).
308. See Civ., July 20, 1897, D.1899.1.17, S.1899.1.78.
309. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FBANQAIS 664 n.56 (7th ed. Esmein
1961).
310. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TnAIT]k PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FHANQAI8 794
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
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In Germany and in Greece the usufructuary has been ac-
corded by law, in effect, authority to lease immovables for a
period exceeding the term of the usufruct.3 11 In both countries,
upon termination of the usufruct, the naked owner is substituted
for the usufructuary as lessor. However, different rules apply
in each country with respect to the precise effect of usufruc-
tuary's leases vis-a-vis the naked owner. In Germany, the naked
owner has been given the right to terminate the lease of the
usufructuary before the expiration of the stipulated term by
complying with the statutory rules of notice. 312 In case the usu-
fructuary waives his usufruct or is deprived of his right of en-
joyment for any cause, the naked owner may give notice for the
termination of the lease only at the time that the usufruct would
have expired without the waiver or cancellation. 313 Upon termi-
nation of the usufruct, the lessee is entitled to summon the owner
to make a declaration within a fixed reasonable period whether
or not he will exercise his right of giving notice; after the lapse
of this period, the owner may terminate the lease for cause
only.314 Disposition, by the usufructuary, of rentals due to ac-
crue after the termination of the usufruct may be opposed to
the naked owner only for the calendar month current at the
time of termination of the usufruct.31 5 Juridical acts made be-
tween the lessee and the usufructuary for the payment of the
rent are effective against the naked owner only for the calendar
month in which the lessee acquired knowledge of the termina-
tion of the usufruct, and, if he acquired knowledge after the
fifteenth day of the month, for the following month. Such
juridical acts are entirely ineffective if made after the termina-
tion of the usufruct and the lessee had knowledge of the fact.316
311. See B.G.B. § 1056; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1164. Section 1056 of the
German Civil Code makes applicable to leases contracted by the usufructuary, with
certain modifications, and article 1164 of the Greek Civil Code without modification,
the rules governing transfer of ownership or encumbrance of immovables under
lease. Under both Codes, the lessee is protected, subject to certain conditions,
against eviction by the new owner or acquirer of a real right on the immovable.
See, in general, Ackerman, Haftung des Niessbrauchers aus von ihm abgeschlo8-
senen Mietsvertrdigen bei vorzeitiger Kiliadigung durch den Ersteher oder den
Eigentilmer, BLXTTER FIVR RECHTSPFLEGE IM BEZIRK DES KAMMERGERICHTS 12
(1919) ; Gschnitzer, Miete von Nichtberechtigten, 123 ABCHIV FOR DIE CIVILIS-
TISCHE PRAXIS 43 (1925).
312. See B.G.B. § 1056(2), referring by implication to §§ 565 and 595 of
the same Code; 3 STAUDINGER-SPRENG, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 1142 (11th ed.
1963).
313. Ibid. See also K.G., Oct. 10, 1907, 18 O.L.G. 150 (1909) ; 3 SOERGEL-
MOHL, BRGERLICHES GESETZBUCM 415 (9th ed. 1960).
314. See B.G.B. § 1056(3).
315. See id. § 1056(1), referring to § 573, first sentence, of the same Code.
316. See B.G.B. § 1056(1), referring to § 574 of the same Code.
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According to the much simpler regulation of the Greek Civil
Code, the validity and effect of leases made by the usufructuary
are matters determined, without exception, by analogous ap-
plication of the provisions governing transfer of leased im-
movables.31 1 Thus, if the lease is embodied in an instrument
which has acquired certain date, the naked owner, upon termina-
tion of the usufruct, assumes the obligations and enjoys the
rights attributed to any lessor under the Code.3 18 If the lease has
not acquired certain date, or if the lease provides that the naked
owner will have the right to terminate the lease, the naked owner
is free to give notice in accordance with the statutory rules.319
Payments of advance rentals to the usufructuary or his assigns
may be opposed to the naked owner only for a period of three
months from the time the naked owner has notified the lessee
of the termination of the usufruct.320
In both countries, the substitution of the naked owner in the
position of the usufructuary as lessor does not relieve the usu-
fructuary of his own civil responsibility toward the lessee for
premature termination of the lease. Thus, if upon termination
of the usufruct the naked owner has the right, and chooses, to
give the statutory notice before the expiration of the term of the
lease, the usufructuary or his heirs will suffer the consequences
of the violation of the contract.321
b. Collection of Capital
In all legal systems under consideration, the usufructuary has
some measure of authority to collect capital payments due to the
naked owner. In Germany and in Greece, directly applicable
provisions in the Civil Codes322 confer on the usufructuary of
a claim authority to collect payment with or without the con-
currence of the naked owner. In the absence of corresponding
provisions in the Louisiana and French Civil Codes, doctrine and
jurisprudence have reached comparable solutions by reference to
the usufructuary's power of administration. 323
317. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1164.
318. Ibid., referring by clear implication to article 614 of the same Code. Leases
made for a period in excess of nine years must be recorded. See text at note 281
supra; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 618.
319. GREEK CIVI CODE art. 1166, referring by clear implication to article 615
of the same Code.
320. Ibid., referring by clear implication to article 617 of the same Code.
321. See B.G.B. §§ 535, 536, 538, 541; GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 574, 575, 583,
584.
322. See text at notes 231-251 supra.
323. See 'text at notes 220-230 8upra.
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Further, the usufructuary may have authority to collect pay-
ments due for the expropriation, damage, or total destruction
of the property subject to usufruct. In this respect, solutions
vary with each legal system and detailed discussion of the ap-
plicable rules of law is here desirable.
(1) Expropriation. In Louisiana, argument could be made
that the expropriation of the property subject to usufruct results
in termination of the usufructuary's right of enjoyment 3 4 and
that the usufructuary is entitled to demand from the expropria-
ting authorities compensation for the deprivation of his in-
terest.3 25 However, at least in cases involving the legal usu-
324. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 613(1) (1870) : "The usufruct expires before the
death of the usufructuary, by the loss, extinction or destruction of the thiag subject
to usufruct." Paragraph 3 of the same Article seems to exclude application of the
principle of real subrogation, stating expressly that "the usufruct is to be restained
to what is specified in the title". See also id. art. 615: "The thing subject to the
usufruct is considered as lost, when it undergoes from accident, such a change in
its form that it can no longer be applied to the use for which it was originally
destined."
325. This is the rule of law applicable to the expropriation of property burdened
with a predial servitude or with a predial lease. See Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.
v. Louisiana Department of Highways, 104 So. 2d 204 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958)
(expropriation of property burdened with a pipeline right of way; held, a right
of way is property and interference with its free use by the owner thereof gives
rise to a right for compensation). See also Department of Highways v. Caldwell
Brothers Real Estate, Inc., 155 So. 2d 231 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963) ; Louisiana
Power and Light Co. v. Department of Highways, 142 So. 2d 807 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1962). In case the expropriated property is leased, the lessee, though holder
of a personal right, is entitled to recover compensation from the expropriating
authorities for the privation of his "lease advantage." See State Through the
Department of Highways v. Levy, 242 La. 259, 136 So. 2d 35 (1961) ; State v.
Ferris, 227 La. 13, 78 So. 2d 495 (1955) ; In re Morgan R. R. & S. S. Co., 32
La. Ann. 371 (1880). In State through Department of Highways v. Cockerham,
182 So. 2d 786, 789 (La. App. 1st Cir. 196), the court declared: "The purchase
or expropriation of the rights of the owner does not therefore necessarily embrace
or operate upon the right of the lease. That right in order to be affected must
be itself the object of purchase or expropriation .... The purchaser gets only the
thing encumbered by the lease. That is all he can get, for that is all the owner
has." It would seem, therefore, that in case of expropriation of the property subject
to usufruct, the usufructuary ought to recover the value of his interest from the
expropriating authorities. Decided cases dealing with the rights of the lessee
do not only furnish a rule by analogy but also give rise to an argument a fortiori.
Further, it would seem that, in an action for expropriation of property subject
to usufruct, the usufructuary as well as the naked owner is an indispensable party.
See Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Derouen, 239 La. 467, 118 So. 2d 889,
891 (1960) : "It is elementary that every partywho may be affected by a decree
must be made a party to a suit, because no one should be condemned without
a hearing. This principle is sanctioned by numerous decisions of this court." In
this case, involving expropriation of a pipeline right of way. action was brought
against the owner of an undivided one-half share in the property and usufructuary
of the other half; the court held that the naked owners were indispensable parties.
Obviously, the same rule ought to apply in the converse situation of an action
brought against the naked owner alone.
It ought to be noted, however, that existing legislative texts in Louisiana are
susceptible of the interpretation that the expropriating authorities acquire perfect
ownership "free and clear of all encumbrances" upon deposit of the indemnity in
the registry of the court and that persons claiming interests on the land must look
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fruct of the surviving spouse, Louisiana courts seem to be pre-
pared to grant to the usufructuary the right to collect and enjoy
the sums due as an indemnity for the taking of the property
subject to usufruct. In State Through the Department of High-
ways v. Costello, 26 land burdened with a usufruct in favor of the
survivor in community had been expropriated and the indem-
nity deposited in the registry of the court. The children, issue
of the marriage and naked owners of the land, opposed the with-
drawal of funds from the registry of the court by the usufruc-
tuary, relying on article 613 of the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870.327 The court, citing a number of cases for the proposition
that the survivor's usufruct did not terminate "merely because
the property to which the usufruct attached was changed in
form,' 328 held that the usufructuary was entitled to withdraw the
funds. "The proceeds of the expropriated property," the court
declared, "belong to the naked owner, subject however to the
rights of the usufructuary.'" 3 29  The decision may be explained
as involving application of the principle of real subrogation:
the indemnity of expropriation that the usufructuary has col-
lected is substituted for the property.3 30
It remains to be seen whether Louisiana courts will apply the
same principle of real subrogation to conventional usufructs.
It ought to be noted that the court in the Costello case took
care to ground its decision on article 916 of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870 and pointed out that "the purpose of this article
is to preserve the community upon the death of one spouse and
to grant to the survivor the means of maintaining himself and
for reimbursement in a concursus proceeding or from "the person who received
the price." See LA. R.S. 19:11 (1950) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2641 (1870) ; and,
in general, Comment, Expropriation-Compensable Items in Louisiana, 24 LA. L.
REV. 849, 868-76 (1964).
326. 158 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
327. See note 324 supra.
328. State Through Department of Highways v. Costello, 158 So. 2d 850, 852
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1963). Indeed, Louisiana decisions support the proposition that
property subject to the usufruct of the surviving spouse is governed by the prin-
ciple of real subrogation. See Magee v. Catlin, 51 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1951) (motor vehicles subject to survivor's usufruct sold by the survivor; held,
usufruct attached to the proceeds of the sale) ; Succession of Russel, 208 La. 213,
23 So. 2d 50 (1945) (sale of assets of the succession for the payment of debts;
held, usufruct of the survivor attaches to cash residue after payment of debts);
Succession of Dielman, 119 La. 101, 43 So. 972 (1907) (sale of stock by liquidator
of succession; held, survivor's usufruct attached to the proceeds of liquidation).
See also Note, 39 TUL. L. REv. 160 (1964).
329. State Through Department of Highways v. Costello, 158 So. 2d 850, 852
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
330. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAw PROPERTY § 82 n. 196 (1966).
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his family."'331 Obviously, this rationale does not apply to con-
ventional usufructs; and, in the absence of legislative authoriza-
tion, further extension of the principle of real subrogation is
unwarranted. Moreover, courts ought to be aware that real
subrogation without some form of security for the naked owner
may indeed be detrimental to the interests of the naked owner.
Prior to the expropriation, the naked owner is afforded a
measure of protection by the rules governing usufruct of cor-
poreal immovables as well as by the form of the property; after
expropriation, the usufructuary acquires a quasi-usufruct of
money and restitution of the sum at the end of the usufruct is
largely dependent on the financial situation and good faith
of the usufructuary. 33 2
In France, the statute regulating expropriation of property
for public utility provides expressly that, in case the property
is burdened with usufruct, the administrative authorities owe a
single indemnity which is substituted for the property expro-
priated. 333 Accordingly the usufructuary is entitled to collect
and enjoy for the period of the usufruct the entire indemnity
of expropriation. Since, however, expropriation results in con-
version of a perfect usufruct into an imperfect one, usufruc-
tuaries other than parents having the enjoyment of the property
of their minor children are required by the same law to furnish
security. This requirement, being a rule of public law, does
not establish a civil obligation of the administrative authorities
toward the naked owner; if the usufructuary obtains payment
without having given security, the administrative authorities
are not civilly liable to the naked owner.334
In Germany, expropriation of the thing subject to usufruct
extinguishes the usufructuary's right of enjoyment. However,
constitutional guarantees and rules of public law contained in
federal and state legislation secure to the usufructuary and to
the naked owner an indemnity representing the value of their
respective interests.335
331. State Through the Department of Highways v. Costello, 158 So. 2d 850,
852 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
332. See Comment, The Usufruct of the Surviving Spouse, 25 LA. L. REV.
873, 885 (1965).
333. See Decree of August 8, 1935, art. 35.
334. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS
796, 842 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
335. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACIIENRECIJT 224, 479 (10th ed. 1957) ; 3 STAUDIN-
OER-SPRENc, KOMMENTAR zum B.G.B. 1111 (11th ed. 1963). Cf. INTRODUCTORY
Law of the Civil Code art. 109.
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In contrast with the casuistic approach followed in Louisiana,
France, and Germany, article 1171 of the Greek Code provides
generally that the usufruct of a corporeal thing includes claims
for any payment, compensation, or indemnity, due by virtue of
insurance contracts or as damages for the deterioration, destruc-
tion, or expropriation of the thing subject to usufruct.336 In case
the thing subject to usufruct is expropriated, damaged, or des-
troyed, the usufruct attaches to attendant claims and is governed
by the articles of the Civil Code which deal with claims in usu-
fruct.337  Both the usufructuary and the naked owner have the
right to demand that any sum collected be disbursed for the
restoration or replacement of the thing, if restoration or repla-
cement is warranted under the rules of orderly management. 338
In case this demand is granted, the usufruct becomes again gov-
erned by the rules applicable to corporeals. 339
(2) Damage to, or total destruction of, the property subject
to usufruct. In case the thing subject to usufruct is damaged
or totally destroyed through the wrongful act of a third person,
both the usufructuary and the naked owner may suffer pecuniary
losses. Questions arise, therefore, as to the rights of the usu-
fructuary to bring action and collect payment for injuries to
his interest, the interest of the naked owner, or both.
In Louisiana, the usufructuary is clearly entitled to proceed
in his own name and recover damages attributable to the in-
fringment of his right of enjoyment due to the wrongful de-
terioration or partial destruction of the thing subject to usu-
fruct.34 0 If, however, the damage is attributable both to the
right of enjoyment and the naked ownership, or to the naked
ownership exclusively, it would seem that the naked owner must
be made a party to the proceeding. 341 Sums recovered for dam-
336. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1171.
337. See text at notes 238-239 supra; See BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 382
(3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
338. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1172.
339. See BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 382 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
340. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2315 (1870); Miller v. Colonial Pipeline Co.,
173 So. 2d 840 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) ; New Orleans v. Wire, 20 La. Ann. 500
(1868).
341. In Miller v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 173 So. 2d 840, 842 (La. App, 3d
Cir. 1965), the court of appeal apparently adopted the view that in case of "al-
teration or depletion of the substance of the land, such that the naked owners will
be permanently deprived of any part thereof or right thereto," the naked owners
must be made a party to the suit. Yet, in another part of the opinion, the court
of appeal quoted with approval the following language from the opinion of the
lower court: "The Exception ot Improper Parties Plaintiff . ..is overruled for
the reason that the usufructuary is charged with the responsibility of maintaining
the land in its original condition. Should the usufructuary fail to take action
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age to the property will have to be disbursed for its restoration,
subject to the rules of the Civil Code governing repairs.3 42
No Louisiana cases have been found dealing with the total
destruction of the property subject to usufruct due to the wrong-
ful act of a third person. In this case, a literal interpretation of
article 613 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, 43 should lead to
the conclusion that the usufruct terminates and that both -the
usufructuary and the naked owner may sue the wrongdoer for
injuries to their respective interests. 34 4  Further, it might be
argued that the usufructuary is under duty to notify the naked
owner of the destruction of the property345 and to bring suit
in his own name, making the naked owner a party to the litiga-
tion.3 40 In cases involving usufruct of the surviving spouse,
however, Louisiana courts may be expected to apply the prin-
ciple of real subrogation, allowing the usufructuary not only to
sue in his own name but also to recover and enjoy the payment
for the period of the usufruct.3 47
In France, doctrine and jurisprudence are in agreement that,
in case of wrongful damage or destruction of the property sub-
ject to usufruct, the usufructuary is entitled to collect by virtue
of his power of administration, and enjoy by application of the
principle of real subrogation, any indemnity due.348  In this
respect, article 617 of the French Civil Code, corresponding to
article 613 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, has been in-
terpreted as applicable, exclusively, to accidental destruction of
the property.
In Germany, the usufructuary may bring action against any
wrongdoer for any damage suffered in the exercise of his right
to recover for and rep~air the damages, then the naked owners would have a cause
of action against the usufructuary for damages (LSA-R.C.C. 570, 573) or could
sue for the termination of the usufructuary (sic), LSA-R.C.C. 621." The require-
ment that the naked owner be made a party to the suit tends to safeguard the n-
terests of the naked owner: the usufructuary will not be allowed to recover, and
spend at his pleasure, sums representing damage to the property or to the right
of naked ownership. But if, for any reason, the naked owner does not wish to
prosecute the claim, the usufructuary ought to be allowed to proceed alone and
recover damages representing injuries to his right of enjoyment.
342. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 567, 570-577 (1870). Thus, if neither the usu-
fructuary nor the naked owner is under obligation to make repairs, each will be
entitled to keep the sums recovered.
343. See note 324 supra.
344. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2315 (1870).
345. Id. art. 591.
346. See text at note 341 snpra.
347. See text at notes 326-331 supra.
348. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FEANVAIS
842 (24 ed. Picard 1952).
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of enjoyment, and if the property is completely destroyed and
his usufruct extinguished, for the full value of the usufruct.
34 9
Naturally, the naked owner may bring an independent action for
any injury to his naked ownership. In Greece, as indicated
above, the usufructuary's interest attaches to the claims born
of the deterioration or destruction of the thing. 50
(3) Insurance payments. In case the property damaged
or totally destroyed is covered by insurance, questions arise as
to the rights of the usufructuary and of the naked owner to the
proceeds of insurance. If the usufructuary and the naked owner
had insured their respective interests separately, i.e., the usu-
fructuary his right of enjoyment and the owner his naked owner-
ship, each should be entitled to recover and keep payments due as
compensation for their individual losses. 351 But if insurance
has been taken by the usufructuary or by the naked owner for
the value of the entire property, several solutions are possible.
For example, the proceeds of insurance may be apportioned be-
tween the usufructuary and the naked owner; the naked owner
may be granted the entire sum, subject to the enjoyment of the
usufructuary; or payment may be made to the named insured
up to the amount of his actual loss.
In Louisiana, in the absence of directly applicable legislative
texts or judicial decisions on point, solutions may be suggested
in the light of general principles, considerations of equity or
policy, and analogous application of existing texts.352  These
solutions may vary with the person of the insured, the coverage
of the insurance, and the type of the loss.
Under Louisiana law, both the naked owner and the usu-
fructuary have insurable interests; therefore, each may insure
not only his own right of enjoyment or naked ownership, as the
case may be, but also the entire property subject to usufruct.353
349. See B.G.B. § 1065; 3 SOERGEL-IMIHL, BtRGERLICHES GESETZBUCSi 422-23
(9th ed. 1960). The usufructuary, however, cannot bring an action in his own
name for damages to the naked ownership. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT
479 (10th ed. 1957).
350. See text at notes 336-339 supra.
351. See text at notes 355, 365 infra. In France, insurance companies request
that usufructuary and naked owner be insured separately. See 3 PLANIOL ET
RIPERT, TRAITIt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 796 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
352. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 21 (1870).
353. Cf. LA. R.S. 22:614 (1950), as amended and re-enacted by La. Acts 1958,
No. 125; Knighten v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 238 La. 767, 116
So. 2d 516 (1960) ; Welch v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 145 So. 2d 376
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Rube v. Pacific Ins. Co.. 131 So. 2d 240 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1961). The statute does not preclude the existence of multiple insurable
1967]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Indeed, the usufructuary may be under obligation to insure the
property up to its full value ;354 and the naked owner, though
not under obligation, ought to be granted the same right. If the
usufructuary had insured his right of enjoyment only, and the
naked owner his naked ownership, each should be entitled
to recover an indemnity from his insurer as compensation of
his individual loss. It is another question, of course, whether
the person recovering the indemnity may or may not be under
obligation to expend sums for repairs. 35 5
When the entire property is insured jointly by the usu-
fructuary and by the naked owner, it is clear that the insurance
has been taken in their common interest and that each named
insured has a claim to the proceeds in proportion to his loss.
If insurance is taken on the entire property by the usufructuary
or by the naked owner acting alone but expressly in the names
or interests of both, it ought to be equally clear that the other
party may recover payments from the insurer under the theories
of stipulation pour autrui or negotiorum gestio.356 But if in-
surance is taken by the usufructuary or by the naked owner
on the entire property without any mention of the name or in-
terests of the other party, argument could be made that, under
Louisiana insurance law, recovery may be had only by the named
insured.3 57  It is submitted, however, that this solution, confer-
ring on insurance companies an unfair advantage, should not
be adopted; instead, it ought to be admitted that in all cases
where the entire property is insured by the usufructuary or by
interests. Milan v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 227 F. Supp. 251 (E. D. La.
1964).
354. According to article 567 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, the usu-
fructuary is under duty to administer the property as a "prudent owner." This
provision should be interpreted to include the duty to insure the property. Cf.
LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 4262 (1960), providing that the tutor "shall
act at all times as a prudent administrator." Comment (c) under the same article
points out that "the duty to insure is covered by the prudent administrator con-
cept." See also Besangon, April 1, 1963, D.1863.2.93 which analogized the usu-
fructuary's situation as prudent administrator to that of a tutor and held him
responsible to the naked owner for not having paid premiums where a loss had
occurred. But see Comment, The Usufructuary's Obligation to Preserve the Pro-
perty, 22 LA. L. REV. 808, 817 (1962), suggesting that the naked owner should
bear the cost of premiums for accidental losses which he is responsible to make
good, and the usufructuary for losses occasioned by his own fault or neglect which
he is under obligation to repair.
355. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 570-577 (1870).
356. See notes 286, 287 supra ; text at note 367 infra. Resort to these theories
would be unnecessary if the naked owner and the usufructuary were named co-
beneficiaries or if the policy taken by one were partly assigned to the other with
the consent of the insurer.
357. See LA. R.S. 22:615, as amended and reenacted by La. Acts 1958, No.
125: "When the name of a person intended to be insured is specified in the policy,
such insurance can be applied only to his own proper interest."
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the naked owner, even if the name or interests of the other party
are not mentioned, the person not named in the insurance policy
could have a claim to the proceeds, in proportion to his loss,
under the theory of a tacit stipulation in his favor or under the
rules of negotiorum gestio.35 8
If Louisiana courts were to adopt the view that insurance
taken on the entire property by either party benefits, in all
cases, both the usufructuary and the naked owner, the following
results would be obtained. In case of partial destruction or dam-
age to the property, each should be entitled to recover for his
actual loss. 359 Thus, the usufructuary should recover for the
diminution of his enjoyment, damage to his own property on
the premises, and damage to the property subject to usufruct
which he is under obligation to repair, i.e., the cost of ordinary
repairs as well as the cost of extraordinary repairs occasioned
by his own fault or neglect. 'H0  The naked owner should like-
wise recover for his actual loss, i.e., the cost of extraordinary
repairs he is under obligation to make.3 61 In case of total
destruction of property, if, it were accepted that the usufruct
terminates, 30 2 the actual loss of the usufructuary is the value
of his enjoyment as well as any damage to his own property.
Conversely, the actual loss of the naked owner is the value of
his naked ownership or the value of the entire property minus
the value of the usufructuary's enjoyment. If the principle of
358. See text at note 368 infra.
359. Under Louisiana insurance law, in principle, the insured may recover only
for his actual loss. Lighting Fixture Supply Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 176
La. 499, 146 So. 35 (1933); Macarty v. Commercial Ins. Co., 17 La. 365, 369
(1841) : "If the assured retains but a partial interest in the property, it will only
protect such insurable interest as he had at the time of the loss"; Chambers v.
North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 175 So. 95 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937). How-
ever, under valued insurance policies, an insured could recover in the past the
face value of the policy even if his insurable interest were less than the face value.
See The Forge, Inc., v. Peerless Co.. 131 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ;
Share v. Northwestern Underwriters of Citizens Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp. 461
(W.D. La. 1962). Today, under LA. R.S. 22:695, as amended by La. Acts 1964,
No. 464, "the lability of the insurer, in the event of total or partial loss, shall not
exceed the insurable interest of the' insured in the property and nothing shall be
construed as precluding the insurer from questioning or contesting the insurable
interest of the insured."
360. In the first place, the usufructuary is under obligation to repair damage
occasioned by his own fraud, fault or neglect. LA. CIVIL COnE art. 567 (1870).
Further, the usufructuary is bound to make ordinary repairs (id. arts. 570, 571(1),
and 577) as well as extraordinary repairs whiuh "have become necessary in con-
sequence of the usufructuary's neglect to make the repairs for keeping the pro-
perty in good order" (id. art. 571(2) ).
361. The naked owner is under obligation to make, or at least reimburse the
usufructuary for, certain extraordinary repairs. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 571(2),
576 (1870).
362. See text at notes 327, 343 supra.
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real subrogation were to be applied, as in cases of legal usu-
fruct,35 the usufructuary should be attributed the entire pro-
ceeds until the end of the usufruct. This is the simplest solu-
tion, and, perhaps, it should be adopted in all cases of total
destruction of the property, especially if it were accepted that
the usufructuary is under obligation to insure the property and
pay the premiums.3 4
If Louisiana courts were to adhere strictly to the rule that
insurance payments must be recovered by the named insured
only,36 the following results would ensue. In case the entire
property is insured by the usufructuary, and the loss is dam-
age to, or partial destruction of, the property, the usufructuary
should be entitled to recover his actual loss as itemized above.3 10
If the insured party is the naked owner, it would seem that his
loss should be measured merely by the cost of extraordinary re-
pairs he is bound to make, since any other loss would have to
be made good by the usufructuary. Indeed, if the naked owner
were to recover for the entire damage to the property, the in-
surer would have a right to be subrogated in the rights of the
naked owner against the usufructuary, which would result in a
circuity of actions. In case of total destruction of the property,
the recovery of the insured usufructuary should be limited to the
value of his enjoyment, plus any damages he may owe to the
naked owner. Conversely, the insured naked owner should
recover only the value of his naked ownership. Strict adherence
to the rule would also limit the operation of the principle of real
subrogation in cases of legal usufruct: the legal usufructuary
could not properly claim the funds representing the value of the
naked ownership. These solutions confer an unfair advantage
on insurance companies. The insured party has paid premiums
calculated on the value of the entire property but his recovery
may be limited to a small fraction of the insured value. For
this reason, and in the interest of justice for all concerned, it
has been suggested that insurance policies covering the entire
property should be so interpreted as to protect both the usu-
fructuary and the naked owner, no matter who is the named
insured.
363. See text at notes 330, 347 supra; Succession of Glancey, 114 La. 1051, 38
So. 826 (1905) (indemnity of insurance for the destruction of property by fire paid
to the usufructuary rather than the naked owners).
364. See text at note 354 supra.
365. Cf. note 357 aupra.
366. See text at note 360 supra.
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In France, insurance taken jointly by the usufructuary and
by the naked owner for the entire property benefits the parties
up to the amount of their respective interests. If insurance
is taken on the entire property by the naked owner or by the
usufructuary separately but expressly in the interests of both,
the other party may recover payments from the insurer under
the theory of stipulation pour autru.3 7  But if the contract of
insurance made by the usufructuary or by the naked owner does
not mention the interests of the other party, payments according
to the prevailing view may be claimed only by the named insured
up to the value of his interest. This solution has been rightly
criticized in France on the ground that where insurance is taken
by either party on the entire property there is a tacit stipula-
tion in favor of the other party.30 8
Under the German Civil Code, the usufructuary is bound to
insure the property subject to usufruct against fire and casualty,
"if orderly management so requires."3 69  The insurance policy
is taken by the usufructuary in his own name but on behalf
of the naked owner who is the beneficiary. If the property is
already insured, the usufructuary must pay for the period of
the usufruct, premiums which he would have been under obliga-
tion to pay had the property been uninsured. These provisions
do not preclude the usufructuary or the naked owner from insur-
ing their interests separately and to recover under their own
separate policies payments for losses sustained.3 70 If insurance
has been taken by the usufructuary or by the naked owner on
the entire property, the usufruct extends to all claims against
the insurer for damage or destruction of the property.3 71 These
payments need be collected jointly by the usufructuary and the
naked owner, as is the case with all claims bearing interest.372
367. See 3 PLANIOL Er RIPERT, TRAITPr PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FANVAIS 833
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
368. Id. at 834. Under the theory of a tacit 8tipulation pour autrui, in com-
bination with the principle of real subrogation, it is maintained in France that a
usufructuary who has insured the entire property is entitled to recover in case
of total destruction the full value of the property rather than the value of his enjoy-
ment. At the end of the usufruct, the usufructuary is bound to restore this value
to the naked owner; in turn, the naked owner is bound to reimburse the usu-
fructuary for the premiums he has paid. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL
FRANOAIS 675 (7th ed. Esmein 1961).
369. See B.G.B. § 1045; J. Gierke, Der Versicherungsvertrag beim Niessbrauch
in B.U.B., 40 IMEBINGS JAHIBOCHER 341-450 (1899). See also GREEK CIVIL
CODE art. 1154.
370. See 2 STAUDINGER-SPILENG, KOMMENTAR zux B.G.B. 1125 (11th ed. 1963).
371. Id. at 1126; B.G.B. § 1046(1).
372. See B.G.B. § 1046(1) ; text at notes 235-236 aupra.
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Either of them, however, may demand that payments collected
be applied to the restoration or replacement of the property, if
the demand accords with orderly management. 3 3  In case no
such demand is made or granted, the usufructuary is entitled to
enjoy the indemnity in accordance with the rules governing usu-
fruct of claims. Identical solutions are provided for in the Greek
Civil Code on the basis of a much broader regulation.3 74
c. Sales of Crops, Fruits, and Timber
In France, the usufructuary may, by a contract valid toward
the naked owner, sell standing crops, fruits, and timber, even
if the usufruct is to terminate before the harvesting of the crops
and fruits or the cutting of the timber.36 This solution rests on
a broad interpretation of article 595 of the French Civil Code and
on considerations of economic utility.3 76  The sale of hanging
crops and fruits, and of standing timber, is thus classified as an
act of administration furthering the interests of both the usu-
fructuary and the naked owner. Indeed, a better price may be
realized by timely sale and single harvesting. The price of the
sale is apportioned according to the rules established in article
585 of the French Civil Code: the usufructuary is entitled to the
portion of the price representing the value of crops, fruits, and
timber harvested or cut prior to the termination of the usu-
fruct and the naked owner to the portion representing the value
of crops, fruits, and timber hanging by branches or roots at the
end of the usufruct.3 77
These solutions, though perhaps desirable, cannot be followed
in Louisiana, Germany, or Greece. In these jurisdictions, in
the absence of express legislative provisions to the contrary,
contractual rights granted by the usufructuary are without ef-
fect vis-a-vis the naked owner after the end of the usufruct.37
Sales of crops, fruits, or timber, therefore, which at the end of
the usufruct belong to the naked owner 379 will be subject, as to
373. See B.G.B. § 1046(2) ; 3 SOERGEL-MtHL, BTRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 406
(9th ed. 1960).
374. See text at notes 336-339 8upra.
375. See Civ., July 21, 1818, S.1818 Chr.; Req., Aug. 9, 1881, D.1882.1.365,
S.1882.1.369, Note by LabbA; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANgAIS 796 (2d ed. Picard 1952); 5 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITA
THItORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 340 (2d ed. Chauveau 1899).
376. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT~t PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 797.
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
377. See text at note 51 supra; Req., Aug. 9, 1881, D.1882.1.365, S.1882.1.369;
2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 667 (7th ed. Esmein 1961) ; 2 COLIN,
CAPITANT, ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIIRE, TRAITIt DE DROIT CIVIL 162 (1959).
378. See text at notes 283, 284, 311 supra.
379. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 546(2) (1870); B.G.B. § 954; GREEK CIVIL
CODE art. 1065; text at note 59 supra.
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all their incidents and effects, to the rules governing the sale
of a thing belonging to another. Under these rules, the usu-
fructuary will always be personally liable toward the purchaser
for any violation of the contract. The naked owner, however,
being a third person, will be free of any responsibility toward
the purchaser unless, of course, the responsibility of the naked
owner could be made to rest, independently of the contract of
sale, on ratification, representation, stipulation pour autrui, or
negotiorum gestio380
d. Participation in General Assemblies of Corporations; Voting
of Shares
According to well-settled French doctrine and jurisprudence,
one who administers the property of another, e.g., as tutor or as
husband, is entitled to participate in general assemblies of cor-
porations and vote shares of stock under his control. Exercise
of voting rights is thus considered, on principle, as an act of
administration. Consistent application of this principle ought
to lead to the conclusion that the usufructuary of shares of stock
may, by virtue of his power of administration, participate in gen-
eral assemblies of corporations and vote shares of stock subject to
his enjoyment. 38 Yet, in the absence of judicial decisions on
point, there is much disagreement among doctrinal writers in
France as to who should be entitled to vote shares of stock
burdened with usufruct. Under one view, voting rights belong,
in accordance with the principle, to the usufructuary; accord-
ing to the second view, these rights belong to the naked owner;
and according to a third view, voting rights may belong either
to the usufructuary or to the naked owner. Adherents of the
last view distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary gen-
eral assemblies and argue that the usufructuary is entitled to
vote in ordinary assemblies whereas the naked owner is entitled
to vote in extraordinary ones. These doctrinal controversies
are, of course, obviated where the shares of stock subject to
usufruct are issued to the bearer, or where the right to vote
is granted to the usufructuary by the title creating the usufruct
or by the by-laws of the corporation.
380. Cf. text at notes 285-288 supra.
381. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS
797 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; 2 AUBRY ET RAu, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 669 (7th ed.
Esmein 1961); and, in general, COCART, DE L'LUSUFRUIT DES ACTIONS ET DES




In Louisiana, the voting of shares of stock may be regarded as
a prerogative of ownership, which, however, cannot be ex-
ercised abusively.38 2 In Germany, the question has given rise
to doctrinal controversies but the prevailing view today is that
shares of stock are to be voted by the naked owner.383 And, ac-
cording to the Greek Civil Code, the right to participate in gen-
eral assemblies of corporations belongs to the usufructuary in
the absence of a provision to the contrary.38 4
e. Change of the Form of Securities
In France, prior to the law of February 27, 1880,385 an ad-
ministrator of the property of another had authority to convert
titles issued to the name of the owner into titles to the bearer.
This was considered to be an act of administration. However,
article 10 of the law of February 10, 1880, provides that the con-
version of titles issued to the name of a minor or interdict into
titles to the bearer is an act of alienation. Applying this provi-
sion by analogy to the usufructuary, French courts have held,
with the approval of doctrinal writers, that the usufructuary
lacks authority to convert titles issued to the name of the naked
owner into titles to the bearer or into other forms of securities.88
Further, French courts have held that the usufructuary may
not split blocks of shares into individual titles, or group indi-
vidual titles into a single block, because he is under obligation
to restore the titles to the owner in their original form. 8s7 And,
according to at least one decision that has been rightly criticized,
the usufructuary lacks authority to renew expired dividend cou-
pons of titles to the bearer.388 This solution does violence to the
right and duty of the usufructuary to manage the property sub-
ject to usufruct as a prudent head of family.
Conversion by the usufructuary of titles issued to the name
of the naked owner into other forms of securities ought to be
regarded as a prohibited act of alienation in Louisiana, Germany,
and Greece.889
382. Cf. text at notes 151, 166 supra.
383. See 3 STAUDINGER-SPRENG, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 1174 (11th ed.
1963) ; 3 SOERGEL-MtHL, BtRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 428 (9th ed. 1960).
384. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1177; BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 387 (3d.
1955) (in Greek).
385. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 799
(3d ed. Picard 1952).
386. See Lyon, Jan. 20, 1882, S. 1884.2.205.
387. See 2 AuBBy ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 668 (7th ed. Esmein 1961).
388. See Trib. civ. Saint Omer, April 15, 1892, D. 1893.2.433; 3 PLANIOL ET
RIPERT, TRAITI PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANIVAIS 799 (2d ed. Picard 1952).




2. Alienation and Other Acts of Disposition
In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that the usufructuary
does not have power of alienation or disposition of the property
subject to perfect usufruct. He may not sell, mortgage, or
generally burden the property with a real right ;390 nor may he
validly renounce a servitude or other real right existing in favor
of the property.39' And, if the usufructuary loses "by non-
usage on his part, a servitude belonging to the property subject
to his usufruct," 392 or allows a third person to acquire a serv-
itude by acquisitive prescription, 393 the usufructuary is civilly
responsible toward the naked owner. The usufructuary, how-
ever, is free to undertake any personal obligation with respect to
the property subject to his right of enjoyment; thus, he may
undertake the obligation not to exercise a predial servitude in
favor of the dominant estate or to suffer the exercise of a right-
of-way over the land subject to the usufruct. These obligations,
in principle, do not bind the naked owner, except for the period
390. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 737 (1870): "The usufructuary can not es-
tablish on the estate of which he has the usufruct, any charges in the nature of
servitudes because they of necessity cease with the usufruct." A fortiori, the usu-
fructuary has no authority to alienate the property subject to usufruct. See Miller
v. Blackwell, 142 La. 571, 77 So. 285 (1918) (usufruct of the surviving spouse).
However, it has been held in Louisiana that the surviving spouse, having an
undivided one-half interest in the community as owner and usufruct over the other
half, may donate immovables belonging to the former community. In case the
donation violates the interests of the naked owners, it may be annulled or reduced
at the end of the usufruct. Gryder v. Gryder, 37 La. Ann. 638 (1885). This
holding has been rightly criticized by CROSS, SUCCESSIONS 274 (1891). Further,
it has been held that if the surviving spouse in community sells movables subject
to his perfect usufruct, he is entitled to keep the proceeds until the end of the
usufruct. See Magee v. Catlin, 51 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951). It would
seem that the sale or donation of things subject to usufruct, even by the surviving
spouse, is null and void. See Miller v. Blackwell, supra. The naked owners
ought to have the right, during the existence of the usufruct, to reclaim the things
alienated by the usufructuary without authority. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2452
(1870); YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 145 (1966). And the usu-
fructuary ought to be civilly responsible toward the naked owner for the violation
of his duties. Cf. Yiannopoulos, Usufruct; General Principles in Louisiana and
Comparative Law, 29 LA. L. REv. 369 (1967). Of course, it is a different matter
when the usufructuary sells property as administrator of -the succession to satisfy
debts. In these circumstances, the sale is valid and the usufruct attaches to any
cash residue. See Succession of Russel, 208 La. 213, 23 So. 2d 50 (1945), note
328 supra.
For France, Germany, and Greece, see 3 PLANIOL, TRAITP PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANVAIS 800 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 467
(10th ed. 1957) ; BALIs, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 351 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
391. See Civ., August 25, 1863, D. 1863.1.361, S. 1963.1.466. See also LA.
CIVIL CODE art. 590 (1870), which has no equivalent in the French Civil Code.
392. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 950 (1870).
393. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 951 (1870); FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 614. Cf. 3
SOERGEL-MeGHL, BGORGEaLICHES GESETZiUCH 413 (9th ed. 1960); BALLS, CIVIL
LAW PROPERTY 357 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
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of the usufruct. 8 94  But if the naked owner is a universal suc-
cessor of the usufructuary who has accepted the succession un-
conditionally and without benefit of inventory, heritable obliga-
tions of the usufructuary with respect to the property will be
assumed by the naked owner. 395
Naturally, the usufructuary is entirely free to dispose of any-
thing he owns. Thus, as owner, he may sell separated natural
fruits, consumable things subject to imperfect usufruct, or any
movables delivered to him following an estimation-sale.
The usufructuary has power of disposition over consumable
things, as wines, foodstuffs, money, or a stock of merchandise
which is destined to be used or to be alienated, by virtue of
directly applicable provisions in the various Civil Codes.386 But
with respect to non-consumable things, the usufructuary's power
of disposition, if any, will have to rest on the intention of the
grantor or of the parties to the title creating the usufruct.397
Further, in Louisiana, France, and Greece the usufructuary may
be accorded power of disposition indirectly by the creation of an
imperfect usufruct over non-consumable movables39s This end
is accomplished in France by a transaction known as estimation-
sale, i.e., a sale of movables with estimation of their value.
394. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 555 (1870); 3 PLANIOL ET RIPEET, T&AITA
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANUAIS 800 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; BALIS, CIVIL LAw
PROPERTY 351 (2d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
395. See Civ., Aug. 25, 1863, D.1863.1.361, S.1863.1.466. Cf. text at notes
292, 303, 321 supra.
396. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 549 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 589; B.G.B.
§ 1067; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1174. Further, the usufructuary in Germany may
have legal power of disposition under the provisions of §§ 1048, 1074, and 1087(2)
of the Civil Code.
297. In Louisiana, occasionally, wills confer on a beneficiary the usufruct of
the estate of the deceased with power of disposition. In these circumstances, ques-
tion arises as to the nature of the interest bequeathed. Louisiana courts, almost
uniformly, proceed on the assumption that the will grants necessarily either full
ownership or merely usufruct. For example, in Giroir v. Dumesnil, 184 So. 2d 1
(1966), testator left to his widow "the enjoyment and usufruct during her life
span of all the property. . for her to do with, enjoy and dispose of as she pleases,
and as a thing belonging -to her." The court, on the basis of extrinsic evidence,
concluded that the testator bequeathed to his wife the perfect ownership of his
property. It is submitted, however, that this type of bequest does not necessarily
involve a choice between full ownership and usufruct. The bequest may indeed
be a grant of usufruct with power of disposition. In accordance with the will,
the usufructuary is entitled to dispose of the property; but, at the end of the
usufruct, the usufructuary or his heirs will have to restore to the naked owner
the price of the sale.
398. In Germany, parties are not free to create an imperfect usufruct over
non-consumables. See 3 SOERGEL-MttnL, BCRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 395, 424 (9th
ed. 1960) ; STAUDINGER-SPRENG, KOMmENTAE zUM B.G.B. 1164 (11th ed. 1963).
However, the grantor of the usufruct may by independent juridical act confer on
the usufructuary power of disposition. See WOLFF-RAISER, S'ACHENRECHT 468
(10th ed. 1957).
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Estimation is not by itself equivalent to sale. Ordinarily,
movables subject to perfect usufruct are delivered to the usu-
fructuary following the making of an inventory and an estima-
tion of their value.3 99 The purpose of this estimation is to de-
termine in advance the indemnity to which the naked owner will
be entitled in case of destruction or undue deterioration of the
movables subject to perfect usufruct. Parties, however, may,
in the exercise of their contractual freedom declare by un-
ambiguous language that the purpose of the estimation is to ef-
fect a sale. In this case the usufructuary becomes owner of the
movables, whatever be their nature, and is vested with full
powers of disposition; at the same time, he becomes debtor of
the price of the sale which he must restore to the naked owner
at the end of the usufruct.40
0
a. Transfer, Mortgage, and Seizure of Usufruct
The alienation of the usufruct is clearly an act of disposition
of the right of enjoyment rather than of the property subject
to usufruct. The usufructuary, being entitled to enjoyment,
ought to have, on principle, the right to dispose of it as he
pleases. 40 1 However, disposition of the enjoyment and substitu- -
tion of another person for the original usufructuary may affect
adversely the interests of the naked owner. Thus, in an effort
at balancing conflicting interests, provisions in the various Civil
Codes under consideration either exclude the transfer of usu-
fruct or attach to the transfer certain guarantees in favor of
the naked owner.
Transfer. According to article 555 of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870, and the corresponding article 595 of the French
Civil Code, the usufructuary may "lease to another, or even sell
or give away his right. ' 40 2 These provisions establish the prin-
ciple that the right of usufruct is fully transferable: the usu-
fructuary, in the absence of a prohibition in the title creating the
usufruct, may transfer "his right" to another person. The trans-
feree becomes himself usufructuary, i.e., the holder of a real
right of enjoyment, vis-a-vis the transferor, the naked owner,
399. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 557 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 600; B.G.B.
§ 1035; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1146.
400. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TEAITIt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 800
(2d ed. Picard 1952) ; 5 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITt THrtORIQUE et PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL 410 (2d ed. Chauveau 1899).
401. See, in general, von Blume, Die Ubertragung de8 Niessbrauch&, 34 IHERINGS
JAaRBfCCHER 281-324 (1895) ; cf. text at notes 395-396 supra.
402. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 555 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 595.
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and third persons. However, the original usufructuary remains
bound toward the naked owner for any violations of duty by the
transferee of the usufruct ;403 and the usufruct terminates upon
the death of the original usufructuary rather than upon the
death of the transferee.4 4  Thus, in spite of the formal texts
of the Louisiana and French Civil Codes which confer on the
usufructuary authority to sell "his right," one may argue that
the usufructuary may merely transfer the exercise of his right
rather than the right of enjoyment itself .4 5
Since, according to formal texts, usufruct is transferable in
Louisiana and in France, it follows that the usufructuary may
burden his right of enjoyment with another usufruct.406 This
faculty is rarely execised in practice. The burdening of usu-
fruct with another usufruct is indeed a rare occurrence brought
about by operation of law in situations where a legal usufruct
bears on a right of enjoyment. For example, the legal usufruct
of a parent over the property of a minor child may bear on a
right of enjoyment that the minor has. In these circumstances,
the parent is substituted for the minor in the position of the usu-
fructuary. The legal situation of the substitute usufructuary
differs from that of the transferee of usufruct in one respect:
whereas the transferee's right is transmissible to heirs the right
of the substitute usufructuary is non-heritable. The second
usufruct may thus be extinguished by the death of either the
original or the substitute usufructuary.
40 7
In Greece, in the absence of contrary provision, usufruct is
a nontransferable right.40 8  In Germany, the usufruct in favor
403. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 561 (1870). The same solution has been reached
in France even in the absence of a corresponding provision in the FRENCH CIVIL
CooF See 3 PLANIOL FT RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 802
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
404. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 670 (7th ed. Esmein 1961)
2 COLIN, CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIkRE, TRAITA DE DROIT CIVIL 162
(1959). The right of the transferee is heritable. See 5 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE,
TRAIT]t THkORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 349 (2d ed. Chauveau 1899).
405. See 2 PROUDHON, TRAITIf DES DROITS D'USUFRUIT, D'USAGE, DHABITATION
ET DE SUPERFICIE No. 894 (2d ed. 1836) ; 1 DEMANTE, PROGRAMME DE COURS DR
DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 291 (1830). Cf. 3 PLANIOL ET RII'ERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN4AIS 802 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
406. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITP PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
138 (7th ed. Esmein 1961).
407. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 802
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
408. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1166.
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of a natural person is always non-transferable, 4 9 whereas the
usufruct in favor of a juridical person may be transferred sub-
ject to certain conditions.410 Thus, if the title creating the usu-
fruct does not expressly exclude transfer, a juridical person may
transfer a usufruct in its favor to a natural or juridical person
along with all its assets; further, if an enterprise or part of an
enterprise is transferred by a juridical person, the transferor
may convey to the transferee rights of enjoyment destined to
serve the purposes of the enterprise transferred.4 1 The crea-
tion of a usufruct on another usufruct is expressly forbidden in
Germany.412  In Greece, the burdening of a usufruct with an-
other usufruct will presumably be permissible in the rare case of
a transferable usufruct.
Although the usufruct may not be itself transferable in Ger-
many and in Greece, the exercise of the right, i.e., the actual en-
joyment, may be freely transferred by the usufructuary to an-
other person,4 13 and even be burdened with usufruct.414  Any
provision to the contrary in the title creating the usufruct
establishes merely a personal obligation of the usufructuary
toward the naked owner and is without effect insofar as the
transferee of the enjoyment is concerned. 415  According to the
prevailing view in Germany and in Greece, the transfer of the
enjoyment does not create a real right in favor of the trans-
feree; it merely gives rise to an obligatory relationship between
409. See B.G.B. § 1059. This provision is not susceptible of modification by
agreement. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENBECHT 475 (10th ed. 1957). For critical
observations, see WESTERMANN, SACHENRECHT 601 (4th ed. 1960); HEDEIANN,
SACHENRECHT DES BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 253 (3d ed. 1960) ; 3 SOERGEL-
M1HL, BtRGERLICHES GESETZRUcH 416 (9th ed. 1960) ; PALANDT-HOCHE, KOM-
MENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 954 (22d ed. 1963).
410. See B.G.B. §§ 1059 a-e, incorporating Law of December 13, 1935
(I. R.G.B1. 1468 (1935)), as amended by Law of June 12, 1936 (I. R.G.B1. 489
(1936)). These sections apply to both private and public corporations, and, ac-
cording to the prevailing view in Germany, to ordinary commercial partnerships
which, strictly speaking, do not possess juridical personality. See HUECK, DAS
RECHT I)ER OFFENEN HANDELSGESELLSCHAFT 170 (2d ed. 1951) ; 3 SOERGEL-Mf[4GHL,
BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCff 418 (9th ed. 1960); 3 STAUDINGER-SPRENG, KOM-
MENTAR zumi B.G.B. 1151 (11th ed. 196:3) ; Heins, Betrachtungen zum Reclht dcr
oHG, 1 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 252, 254 (1948). But see WOLFF-
RAISER, SACHENRECHT 475 (10th ed. 1957).
411. See B.G.B. § 1059a; 3 SOERGEL-MtHL, BVRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 418
(9th ed. 1960).
412. See B.G.B. § 1069(2). The usufruct in favor of a juridical person, though
transferable in certain circumstances, can neither be encumbered nor seized.
B.G.B. § 1059b.
413. See B.G.B. § 1059; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1166.
414. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 482 n.3 (10th ed. 1957).
415. Cf. B.G.B. § 137; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 177; BALIS, GENERAL PRIN-
CIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW 178 (7th ed. 1955) (in Greek) ; 1 SOERGEL-HEFERMEHL,
BIGRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 470 (9th ed. 1959).
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the usufructuary and the transferee, which is bound to terminate
with the usufruct.410 The usufructuary remains bound toward
the naked owner for all violations of duty by the transferee of
the enjoyment.417
Pledge and mortgage. Since usufruct is in principle trans-
ferrable under French and Louisiana law, it follows that the
usufructuary, in the absence of contrary provision, may pledge
his right of enjoyment over movables 4I s and mortgage his right
of enjoyment over immovables. Article 3289(2) of the Lou-
isiana Civil Code of 1870, and corresponding article 2118(2) of
the French Civil Code, specifically authorize mortgages on the
usufruct of immovables in commerce.41 9  The mortgage granted
by the usufructuary is a precarious form of security because
it is bound to be extinguished with the usufruct. The mortgage
creditors of the usufructuary may merely seize and sell the usu-
fruct; the naked ownership is beyond their reach. Upon termina-
tion of the usufruct, the immovable is restored to the owner free
of the charge. 420  Whether the usufructuary has or has not
granted a mortgage on the usufruct, the naked owner is free to
grant a mortgage on his naked ownership; upon termination of
the usufruct, the owner's mortgage attaches to his full ownership.
In Germany, the right of usufruct itself can neither be
pledged nor mortgaged.42 1  But the exercise of the right of en-
joyment, to the extent that it is transferable, may be the object
of a pledge. 422 In Greece, as an exception to the principle of non-
416. See 3 SOERGEL-M tHL, BORIOERLICtES GESETZBUCH 416 (9th ed. 1960) ; 3
STAUDINOER-SPRENG, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 1146 (11th ed. 1963); WESTER-
MANN, SACHENRECHT 601 (4th ed. 1960) ; HECK, GRUNDRISS DES SACHENBECHTS
310 (1930) ; BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 376 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek). But
see WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 476 (10th ed. 1957). All authors are in agree-
ment that the right of the transferee is heritable.
417. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACRENRECHT 476 (10th ed. 1957) ; 3 SOERGoL-
MtHL, BtIPGERLICHES GESETZBUCu 419 (9th ed. 1960) ; BALis, CIVIL LAW PRO-
PERTY.378 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
418. Cf. LA. R.S. 9:4321 (1950). It ought to be noted, however, that pledge
of the right of enjoyment over movables is a rare occurrence. For example, the
usufructuary of shares of stock may pledge his right to dividends. But the usu-
fructuary of movables is not allowed to pledge the movables themselves; this would
be a prohibited act of disposition. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 800 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; 5 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE,
TRAITt THkORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 380 (2d ed. Chauveau 1899). Trib.
Civ. Saint-Omer, April 15, 1892, D.1893.2.433.
419. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3289 (1870) ; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 2118;
cf. Bank of Terrebonne v. Engeron, 140 So. 58 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1932).
420. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 801
(2d ed. Picard 1952) ; 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 670 (7th ed. Es-
mein 1961).
421. See B.G.B. §§ 1059b; 1274(2).
422. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 719 n.11 (10th ed. 1957) ; 3 SoEoEL-
MtHL, BCGRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 418 (9th ed. 1960).
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transferability of the usufruct, the Civil Code expressly provides
the mortgage of the usufruct over immovables. 423
Seizure. In Louisiana and in France, general creditors of the
usufructuary may seize his enjoyment for the satisfaction of
their claims, 424 unless, of course, the usufruct has been declared
inalienable or exempt from seizure by the law 42 5 or by the
grantor.42  Further, if the usufructuary has validly mortgaged
his enjoyment, his mortgage creditors may seize and sell the
usufruct.42 1
In Germany and in Greece, general creditors of the usu-
fructuary may always seize his enjoyment.42 The right of usu-
fruct itself may never be seized in Germany; in Greece, how-
ever, mortgage creditors of the usufructuary may seize and sell
the usufruct.429
3. Recourse to Justice
According to article 556 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870,
"the usufructuary can maintain all actions against the owner
and third persons, which may be necessary to insure him the
423. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1259; BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 376 (3d ed.
1955) (in Greek). The mortgage attaches to the right of usufruct itself and not
merely to the exercise of the right.
424. Marsoudet v. Claacy, Man. Unrep. Cas. 38 (La. 1880) ; Davis v. Carroll,
11 La. Ann. 705 (1856) (conventional usufruct). Creditors of the usufructuary
may not seize the interest of the naked owner and vice versa. Cf. Wilson v. King,
165 So. 2d 70 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) (mineral royalties derived from wells not
opened at the time of the creation of the usufruct).
425. The legal usufruct of parents over the property of their minor children
is exempt from seizure by creditors of the usufructuary. See LA. CIVIL CODE art.
1992 (1870); Marsoudet v. Clancy, Man. Unrep. Cas. 38 (La. 1880) ; Davis v.
Carroll, 11 La. Ann. 705 (1856) (dicta). See also Johnson v. Bolt, 146 So. 375
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1933) (necessitous widow's usufruct exempt from seizure). On
the other hand, the usufruct of the surviving spouse ought to be subject to seizure
for debts of the usufructuary. See CRoss, SUCCESSIONS 226 (1891). But see
dicta in Succession of Coyle, 32 La. Ann. 79 (1880) ("such a right is not liable for
the payment of debts. C.C. 1992, 1987").
426. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, IRAITf- PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS
802 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; Paris, Nov. 5, 1901, D.1902.2.89. In Louisiana, a con-
ventional prohibition against alienation or seizure of the usufruct of immovable
property, in order to be effective against third persons, must be recorded. Cf.
text at notes 272-273 supra.
427. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 617 (1870) ; 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL
FRANIAIs 670 (7th ed. Esmein 1961).
428. See 3 SOERGEL-MIOHL, BORIGERLICHES GESETZBUCii 416-18 (9th ed. 1960)
GERMAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 857(3) ; BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY
377 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek). However, the parental enjoyment in Greece, and
the right of parents to spend the revenues of a child's property in Germany, are
non-transferable and exempt from seizure. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1517(2) ;
BALIS, FAMILY LAW 317 (1956) (in Greek) ; B.G.B. 1649; 4 SOERGEL-LANGE,
B(GRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 379 (9th ed. 1963).
429. See Z.P.O. § 851(1) ; BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 376 (3d ed. 1955)
(in Greek).
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possession, enjoyment and preservation of his right. '430 In Ger-
many and in Greece, corresponding provisions in the Civil Codes
declare that usufruct is protected in the same manner as full
ownership.4 31 And in France, even in the absence of a directly
applicable provision in the Civil Code, there is no doubt that
the usufructuary may initiate all the appropriate actions for the
protection of his interests. 432
a. Real Actions
In the first place, the usufructuary may bring against the
naked owner or against third persons any available real action.
In Louisiana, the usufruct of immovable property, being an im-
movable real right, is protected by several innominate real ac-
tions as well as by three nominate real actions: the petitory ac-
tion, the possessory action, and the action of boundary.
The petitory action is "brought by a person who claims the
ownership, but who is not in possession, of immovable property
or of a real right, against another who is in possession or who
claims the ownership thereof adversely, to obtain judgment re-
cognizing the plaintiff's ownership. '433  The usufructuary of
immovable property may thus clearly bring the petitory action
against a person who possesses the property without right or
who claims adversely to the plaintiff a right of usufruct. The
possessory action is available to the "possessor of immovable
property or of a real right to be maintained in his possession
or enjoyment of the right when he has been disturbed, or to
be restored to the possession or enjoyment thereof when he has
been evicted. '434 According to the definition, the possessory ac-
tion may be brought by a "possessor," i.e., one who "possesses
430. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 556 (1870). This provision, which has no exact
equivalent in either the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 or in the French Civil Code,
was added in the 1825 revision of the Louisiana Civil Code. The redactors
stated: "The usufructuary has the possessor's action to maintain his possession
of the usufruct, and to cause himself to be reinstated, if he is evicted. Domat, part
1, tit. 11, sec. 1, No. 16." LOUISIANA LEGAL ARcHIVES, PROJET OF TIE CIVIL
CODE of 1870 p. 53 (1937). Of. Kahn v. Beenel, 108 La. 296, 32 So. 444 (1902)
Folse v. Maryland Casualty Co., 193 So. 385 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940).
431. See B.G.B. § 1065; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1173.
432. See text at notes 440-446, 453 infra.
433. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3651 (1960). See also Messick v.
Mayer, 52 La. Ann. 1161 (1900) (petitory action by usufructuary) ; YIANNOPOU-
LOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 137 (1966).
434. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3655 (1960) ; Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art.
3454(2) (1870); Preston v. Zabrinsky, 2 La. 226 (1831) ; Bagents v. Crowell
Long Leaf Lumber Co., 20 So. 2d 641 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945).
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for himself. '435 The usufructuary possesses for himself the
right of enjoyment; accordingly, he may be plaintiff in a pos-
sessory action. 436  The boundary action is available "if two con-
tiguous lands have never been separated, or have never had
their boundaries determined, or if the bounds which have been
formerly fixed are no longer to be seen, or were wrongly
placed. 4 37 This action "may be instituted by the usufructuary,
but the determination of the limits will be only provisional,
unless the owner has been made a party to the suit; and in this
case the owner may require the limits to be fixed anew at the
termination of the usufruct. ' 43s  The usufructuary of movable
property, having a movable real right, is protected in Louisiana
by the revendicatory action. 439
In France, the dispossessed usufructuary of immovable pro-
perty may bring against the owner or against a third person who
possesses the property without right a petitory action for the
recognition of his right of usufruct. Following the civilian tradi-
tion, this action is frequently termed "confessory action of the
usufruct" (action confessoire de l'usufruit).4 40 When the right
of usufruct is not itself in dispute but merely the right to the
possession of the immovable property in question, the appro-
priate remedy is one of the possessory actions.441 Object of the
possessory actions is the elimination of disturbances or the re-
covery of a lost possession. Question has arise in France as
435. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3656 (1960) : "A plaintiff in a pos-
sessory action shall be one who possesses for himself. A person entitled to the
use or usufruct of immovable property, and one who owns a real right therein,
possesses for himself."
436. At the same time, the usufructuary possesses the property, precariously,
for the naked owner. See comment (b) under Article 3656 of the Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure (1960) : ". . . A person who is entitled to the use or usufruct
possesses the property or right both for himself and for the naked owner, and hence
either may bring the possessory action." Cf. Bell v. Saunders, 139 La. 1037, 72
So. 727 (1916). In case the usufructuary is disturbed in his possession by third
persons, he is under duty "to give information of the same to the owner, and if
he fails to do it, he shall be answerable for all damages which may result to the
owner, as he would be for injuries committed by himself." LA. CIVIL CODE art.
591 (1870).
Since the usufructuary possesses precariously vis-a-vis the naked owner, he
cannot claim the property adversely to the owner by virtue of acquisitive prescrip-
tion. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3441, 3446, 3488-3490, 3510 (1870) ; Succession
of Heckert, 160 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
437. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3691 (1960). See also LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 823 (1870) ; Randazzo v. Lucas, 106 So. 2d 490 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1958) ; Deshotels v. Guillory, 161 So. 217 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935), rehearing
denied, 162 So. 652 (1935).
438. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 830 (1870).
439. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 432 (1966).
440. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS
803 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
441. See, in general, YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§ 13-132 (1966).
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to the right of the usufructuary to bring a possessory action
since under the Code of Civil Procedure possessory protection is
not available to precarious possessors and article 2236 of the
Civil Code states that usufructuaries are precarious possessors. 442
A literal interpretation of these provisions might lead to the
idea that the usufructuary is not entitled to bring the possessory
actions for the protection of his interest. French doctrine and
jurisprudence, however, have interpreted these provisions to
mean that the usufructuary possesses for himself the right of
enjoyment, an independent real right, and for the owner the pro-
perty subject to usufruct. Thus, the usufructuary is a pre-
carious possessor vis-a-vis the naked owner only insofar as the
right of ownership is concerned; insofar as the usufruct is con-
cerned, the usufructuary possesses for himself and is protected
by the possessory actions. If the usufructuary is successful in
his possessory action against the owner, he will be entitled to a
judgment recognizing his right to possession as usufructuary; at
the same time, he will be presumed to have confessed the pre-
cariousness of his right vis-a-vis the owner and will not be later
allowed to claim ownership. 443 As in Louisiana, the naked owner
possesses through the usufructuary; accordingly, he may always
bring the possessory actions against third persons who have
disturbed or evicted the usufructuary. This is confirmed by
article 614 of the French Civil Code which imposes on the usu-
fructuary the duty to notify the naked owner of any troubles to
his possession.444 The usufructuary, in addition to the petitory
and possessory actions, is entitled to bring the action of boundary,
which, as in Louisiana, will not result in a judicial determination
binding on the naked owner. 44 5 In contrast with the usufruc-
tuary of immovable property, the usufructuary of movables in
France may bring the revendicatory action for the protection of
his interests only in cases not covered by the sweeping declara-
tion of article 2279 of the Civil Code that "with respect to
movables, possession is equivalent to title. ' '446
442. See FRENCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 23; FRENCH CIVIL CODE art.
2236, corresponding to LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3510 (1870).
443. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS
803 (2d ed. Picard 1952).
444. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 614, corresponding to article 591 of the
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE of 1870.
445. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 671 (7th ed. Esmein 1961)
3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITSk PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN4AIS 803 (2d ed.
Picard 1952) (solutions reached in the absence of an article in the French Civil
Code corresponding to article 830 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870).
446. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 127 (1966).
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In Germany and in Greece, usufruct is protected by the real
actions available for the protection of ownership, by analogous
application of both substantive and procedural rules.447  Thus,
in Germany, the usufructuary may protect his enjoyment against
any person by petitory actions corresponding to the rei vin-
dicatio and actio negatoria of the Roman law as well as by
various possessory actions. 448 In Greece, the usufructuary may
bring the revendicatory action, the Publican action, the negatory
action, and the various possessory actions.4 49  The same actions
are available to the naked owner for the protection of his own
right of ownership or right to possession. 410
b. Personal Actions
In addition to the real actions, the usufructuary may bring
in all legal systems under consideration all the appropriate per-
sonal actions for the protection of his interests.451 Thus, in case
of wrongful interference with his enjoyment, he may sue for
damages under the law of delictual obligations with or without
the concurrence of the naked owner. 452
If the usufruct bears on a credit, on its maturity, the usu-
fructuary is entitled in France and in Louisiana to bring an ac-
tion for payment. 453  In Germany, however, the usufructuary
may bring an action for the payment of claims which do not
produce interest whereas he must bring an action jointly with
the naked owner for the payment of interest producing claims. 4 54
447. See id. §§ 150, 151, 152; WOLFF-RAISER, SACIIENRECIIT 465, 479 (10th ed.
1957); and, in general, WIUST, DIE INTERESSENGEMEINSCHAFT-EIN ORDNUNG-
SPRINZIP D)ES PRIVATRECHTS 145-172 (1958).
448. See B.G.B. § 1065, referring to §§ 985-1004 of the same Code. Fur-
ther, according to Section 1036(1) of the German Civil Code, the usufructuary is
entitled to possession.
449. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 1173. Cf. id. arts, 1094, 1008, 1112.
4,0. See, in general, YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY §§ 151, 152 (1966).
451. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 556 (1870) ; Kahn v. Beenel, 108 La. 296, 32 So.
444 (1902) ; Folse v. Maryland Casualty Co., 193 So. 385 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1940) ; Snow v. Copley, 3 La. Ann. 610 (1848) ; Cleveland v. Sprowl, 12 Rob.
172 (La. 1845). See also 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL
FRANVAIS 804 (2d ed. Picard 1952) ; WOLFF-RAISER, SACIIENRECIIT 479 (10th ed.
1957) ; BALIS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY 383, 390-92 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
452. See New Orleans v. Wire, 20 La. Ann. 500 (1868) (wrongful removal
of trees; usufructuary entitled to damages for "loss of convenience and gratifica-
tion") ; text at note 340 supra. For the right of the usufructuary to bring action
for damages to the naked ownership, or both to the right of enjoyment and the
naked ownership, and for the apportionment of the recovery between the naked
owner and the usufructuary, see text at notes 341-350 supra.
453. See text at notes 220-230 supra. Actually, the usufructuary is under
duty to bring an action for the payment of an obligation on its maturity. Indeed,
the usufructuary is liable to the naked owner to make good any loss ofeapital
resulting from his negligence to collect, in case of prescription of the claim or
subsequent insolvency of the debtor. Ibid.
454. See text at notes 234-235 supra.
19671
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Likewise, in Greece, the usufructuary may bring an action for
the payment of other than monetary obligations but must act
in concurrence with the naked owner for the payment of mon-
etary claims. 455
At least under French law, the usufructuary of a credit may
bring all the appropriate actions for the enforcement of securities
attached to the credit, as suretyships, privileges, and mortgages.
Further, he may bring the revocatory action to set aside a dispo-
sition made by the debtor in fraud of his creditor; and if his
right of enjoyment bears on the price of a sale, the usufructuary
may bring an action for the resolution of the sale in case of non-
payment of the price. But the usufructuary may not bring an
action for the recovery of objects which, at the time of the crea-
tion of the usufruct, no longer formed part of the grantor's
patrimony. Thus, the usufructuary cannot bring the action of
lesion, the action of nullity, or the action of redemption. If the
naked owner institutes these actions and is successful, the usu-
fructuary may claim the enjoyment of the things restored to the
patrimony of the naked owner on the condition that he reim-
burses him for the expenses of the litigation or pays the interest
thereon. 45 0
c. Effect of Judgments Obtained by or Against the Usufructuary
A petitory action brought by the usufructuary against third
persons tends to establish the existence or non-existence of his
right of usufruct, and a possessory action the existence or non-
existence of his right to possession, vis-a-vis his opponents.
Therefore, unless the grantor of the usufruct is made a party
to the proceedings, judgments obtained by the usufructuary in
real actions against third persons or by third persons against the
usufructuary do not establish the ownership or right to pos-
session of the grantor or of the third persons with respect to
the property subject to usufruct and do not have the force of
455. See text at notes 238-239 supra.
456. See 2 AuBaY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIs 671 (7th ed. Esmein 1961);
3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 804 (2d ed.
Picard 1952); 5 BAUDRY-LANCANTINERIE, TaAITA THAORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE
DEOIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 358 (2d ed. Chauveau 1899).
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res judicata in the relations between the grantor and the third
persons. 457  However, judgments obtained by the usufructuary
in such proceedings benefit the grantor of the usufruct in the
sense that the usufructuary is now under obligation to preserve
the things he has recovered and to restore them to the grantor
at the end of the usufruct.
Personal actions brought by the usufructuary of a credit for
the collection of payment, however, necessarily involve a deter-
mination as to the existence or non-existence of the credit sub-
ject to usufruct. Whether the usufructuary acts in an adminis-
trative capacity, as in France,458 as owner of the credit under
Louisiana law, 459 or as assignee of the credit under German and
Greek law,460 the decision ought to have the force of res judicata
in the relations between the grantor of the usufruct and the
persons sued for payment. Indeed, in these circumstances, the
usufructuary acts either as representative of the grantor or as
his successor by particular title.
The plaintiff usufructuary may join the naked owner ;461 per-
sons sued, be they usufructuaries, naked owners, or third per-
sons, may bring in or implead any person having an interest in
the proceedings ;462 and, conversely, any person having an in-
terest in the proceedings may intervene.4 3
457. Louisiana: see LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2286 (1870) ; Note, 15 LA. L. REV.
846 (1955) ; MeMahon, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1957-
1958 Term-Res Judicata, 19 LA. L. REV. 390-93 (1959); France: FRENCH CIVIL
CODE art. 1351; CUCHE, PRAiCIS DE PROCJtDUBE CIVILE 68-71 (13th ed. 1963);
Germany: CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 325(1); ROSENBERG, LEHRBUCH DES
DEUTSCHEN ZIVLLPROZESSRECtrrs 757-62 (8th ed. 1960) ; Greece: CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE art. 563.
458. See text at note 221 supra.
459. See text at note 227 supra.
460. See text at notes 209, 210 supra.
461. Louisiana: see LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 463 (1960) ; France:
see 1 GLASSON AND TISSIER, TRAITP, THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D'ORGANIZATION JUDI-
CIAIRE, DE COMPtTENCE, ET DE PROCItDURE CIVILE 637 (3d ed. 1925) ; Germany:
see CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 76; ROSENBERG, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVIL-
PROZESSRECHTS 212 (8th ed. 1960).
462. Louisiana: see LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 1111, 4652 (1870)
France: see CUCHE, PRtCIS DE PROCi;DURE CIVILE 619 (13th ed. 1963). In Ger-
many, parties to a lawsuit have, subject to certain conditions, the right to serve
notice of the proceedings to a third person ; the recipient of the notice is thus given
the opportunity to intervene. See GERMAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 72-77;
ROSENBERG, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS 210-14 (8th ed.
1960).
463. Louisiana: see LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1091 (1960) ; France:
1 GLASSON & TiSsma, TRAIT]k THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D'ORGANIZATION JUDICIARE,
DE COMP1tTENCE ET DE PROCPDURE CIVILE 621 (3d ed. 1925) ; CUCHE, PRCIS mR
PROCftDURE CIVILE 617 (13th ed. 1963) ; Germany: CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 64,





In Louisiana, according to article 588(1) of the Civil Code
of 1870, the cost of lawsuits between the usufructuary and third
persons "concerning the enjoyment of the property" subject to
usufruct and "for judgments which may have been given in such
suits," are borne by the usufructuary. 4 4 These provisions give
rise to an argument a contrario that costs incurred in lawsuits
concerning protection of the interests of the naked owner are to
be borne by the naked owner. On the other hand, the costs of
litigation in actions by the usufructuary "for the recovery of the
thing subject to usufruct against the owner" are divided equally
between the usufructuary and the naked owner.4 5 These rules
do not apply to parents having the enjoyment of the property of
their minor children: "fathers and mothers who enjoy the legal
usufruct of the property of their children, are bound to support
the expenses of all suits concerning that property, in the same
manner as if they were the owners of it. ' '466
Article 613 of the French Civil Code, corresponding in part
to article 588 (1) of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, provides
that "the usufructuary is bound only for such costs as result
from law suits concerning the enjoyment, and for judgments to
which such law suits may have given rise." 467  This provision
has been interpreted in France as applicable to gratuitous usu-
fructs exclusively.465  Indeed, if the usufruct is established by
onerous title, costs incurred by the usufructuary in law suits
concerning his enjoyment ought to be covered by the warranty
of the vendor in accordance with the general rules of sales. But
if the usufruct is established by gratuitous title, article 613 fur-
nishes the rule that the costs of law suits concerning the enjoy-
ment are to be borne by the usufructuary and the costs of law
464. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 588(1) (1810). The present version of this provi-
sion was adopted in 1825. In support of proposed changes the redactors cited
GOMEZ, VARIAE RESOLUTIONES, chap. 15, No. 7. See 1 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES,
POJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1870 p. 59 (1937).
465. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 588(2) (1870) ; note 464 supra.
466. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 589 (1870) ; cf. La. Civil Code art. 583 (1825)
La. Civil Code of 1808 (no corresponding article). Application of article 589 is
subject to two conditions: the minor must have property subject to the parental
enjoyment and the action must be one "concerning that property." Thus, the
costs of an aotion for personal injuries brought by a father on behalf of a minor
who has no property, are not to be borne by the father. See Fontenot v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 113 So. 2d 33 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959).
467. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 613.
468. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 829




suits concerning the naked ownership, by the naked owner.46 9
If a law suit concerns both the enjoyment and the naked owner-
ship, distinction is made by French commentators according to
whether the law suit is won or lost. If won, expenses which
cannot be recovered from the losing party should be borne by the
person who incurred them, be he the usufructuary or the naked
owner. If the law suit is lost, the usufructuary and the naked
owner should share equally the costs of the judgment given to
their adversary.470
In Germany and in Greece, costs and expense incurred by the
usufructuary in actions against the naked owner or third per-
sons will be borne, in accordance with the general rules, by the
losing party.47' Exceptionally, however, certain expenses in-
curred by the usufructuary in law suits brought for the protec-
tion of the interests of the naked owner may be recovered from
the naked owner under the rules of negotiorum gestio or unjust
enrichment. 72
469. Ibid. The costs incurred in law suits between the usufructuary and the
naked owner will be borne, in accordance with the general rules, by the losing party.
See CUCHE, PRACIS DE PROCtDURE CIVILE 639 (13th ed. 1963).
470. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANcAIS
829 (2d ed. Picard 1952), For solutions proposed by other commentators, see
2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 681-82 (7th ed. Esmein 1961) ; 5 BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE, TRAITl THItORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 462 (2d ed. Chan-
veau 1899).
471. See ROSENBERG, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS 357
(8th ed. 1960). In Greece, the paternal enjoyment over the property of minor
children, though termed "usufruct," is subject to special rules. Thus, article
1520 of the Greek Civil Code provides that the father, during the existence of the
enjoyment, is bound for the costs of law suits concerning the property subject to
his enjoyment if there are sufficient profits to cover the expenses. In Germany,
Section 1649 of the Civil Code establishes the proposition that expenses of law
suits concerning the property of the child subject to parental administration are to
be paid out of the revenues of that property. See 4 SOERGEL-LANGE, B.tRGER-
LICHES GESETZBUCH 378 (9th ed. 1963).
472. See WOLFF-RAISER, SACHENRECHT 472 (10th ed. 1957) ; BALIS, CIVIL
LAW PROPERTY 364 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek).
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